Note : Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan 1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.

Each of the countries involved in World War II produced a wide range of successful aircraft that played important roles in the war effort. Here are some of the most successful planes produced by each country in their respective roles:

Selected Aircraft by Country

Germany

Messerschmitt Bf 109: This fighter aircraft was fast, maneuverable, heavily armed and highly successful in its role, with over 30,000 produced during the war. 

Focke-Wulf Fw 190: This fighter aircraft was heavily armed and armored. It was particularly good in ground-attack missions.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka: This dive bomber was highly effective in its role especially in the early days of the war. It was responsible for inflicting significant damage on enemy ground forces and infrastructure.

United Kingdom

Supermarine Spitfire: This fighter aircraft was highly successful in its role, particularly during the Battle of Britain, playing a significant role in defending Britain from German air attacks.

Avro Lancaster: This heavy bomber was heavily armed and armored and highly successful.  It was responsible for dropping most of the bombs on Germany during the war playing a significant role in disrupting German industry and infrastructure.

United States

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress: This heavy bomber known for its ability to defend itself, but when paired with long range escort fighters it became very lethal.

North American P-51 Mustang: This fighter aircraft initially was a so-so performer, but when it was paired with the Rolls Royce Merlin engine it became a champion providing long-range escort for American bombers.

USSR

Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik: This ground-attack aircraft was the most produced plane of WWII. It was well tailored for the Soviet use of aircraft supporting land forces.

Yakovlev Yak-3: The Yak-3 was fast, maneuverable, and well suited to dogfighting. Following Soviet manufacturing and maintenance concepts it was simple to construct and maintain.

Philosophical Differences

The philosophical differences between the Allied and German air forces during World War II were significant reflecting broader differences in military strategy and doctrine. Here are some of the key differences:

Strategic bombing

The Allied air forces, particularly the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), believed in the doctrine of strategic precision bombing, which involved targeting enemy industry and infrastructure with large-scale bombing raids. The goal of strategic bombing was to disrupt the enemy’s ability to wage war. The German air force, on the other hand, did not place as much emphasis on strategic bombing, and instead focused on providing ground support to German troops and achieving air superiority over enemy forces.

The Allied air forces, especially the British Royal Air Force (RAF) believed that targeting enemy morale was a key part of their strategy. They conducted many strategic area bombing raids on civilian targets in order to lower enemy morale. The German air force, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on targeting enemy morale, and instead focused on achieving military objectives.

Technology

The Allied air forces placed a greater emphasis on technological innovation and development than the German air force. The USAAF invested heavily in the development of advanced bombers such as the B-17 and B-29, as well as fighter planes such as the P-51 Mustang. The German air force developed several advanced aircraft, such as the Me 262 jet fighter, but was hampered by resource shortages and production difficulties.

Tactics

The Allied air forces developed advanced tactics for achieving air superiority and conducting bombing raids. The RAF used the “Big Wing” formation, which allowed large numbers of fighters to engage enemy aircraft at once, first introduced during the Battle of Britain. While the USAAF used the “combat box” formation, which allowed large numbers of bombers to protect each other from enemy fighters, this technique was most successful with the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers. 

To counter Allied night bombing raids, the German air force developed various defensive techniques. One such technique was the “Himmelbett,” or “four-poster bed,” which utilized radar ground stations to direct fighter planes to the target during night raids. To successfully intercept the enemy bomber, each target required the coordinated efforts of two Freya radar units. One unit would track the bomber while the other would track the intercepting night-fighter. A ground controller would then guide the fighter using the radar data until its own Würzburg short-range radar picked up the target bomber.

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR Data

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Source: World-War-2.info, “World War 2 Death Count Per Country”, http://www.world-war-2.info/statistics/, Data accessed June 28, 2022

Additional Aircraft Production Data Links

WWII Most Produced Combat Aircraft by Model

Annual Allied Axis Military Aircraft Production 1939-1945

Total Military Aircraft Production of Allies versus Axis

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced. Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

USSR’s irrecoverable losses numbered over eleven million, greater than the population of many countries. USSR’s strategic approach allowed for the expenditure of human capital to a much greater degree than their British and American Allies. The Soviet population was motivated to oust the German invader even at the extreme costs of most having a father, son, brother, or uncle killed in action. Over 800,000 women served in Soviet armed forces and almost uniquely they were found in front lines as snipers, pilots, and auxiliary roles resulting in Soviet women having a higher killed in action than other nations.

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.
To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Irrecoverable Losses

Irrecoverable losses refer to casualties that result in the permanent absence of personnel from a military unit, rendering them incapable of returning to active service. Irrecoverable losses encompass individuals killed in action, those who died from wounds sustained in combat, and those who went missing in action or became prisoners of war (POW). These losses represent a profound and irreplaceable depletion of a nation’s military resources and human capital.

1. Losses Due to Killed in Action

The most significant category of casualties endured by the USSR forces during WWII is killed in action. A staggering 5.2 million personnel were killed in action or died of wounds during casualty evacuation. It is notable that less than 10,000 of these casualties were incurred in conflicts against Japan.

2. Died in Hospital Due to Wounds

In addition to those killed in action, 1.1 million USSR personnel succumbed to their wounds after being transported to hospitals. Nearly all these deaths, 99.9 percent, resulted from combat with German forces.

3. Died of Disease

Additionally, over half a million personnel succumbed to diseases. Once again, 99.9 percent of these deaths came in the German combat theater.

4. Missing in Action

Nearly 3.4 million personnel went missing in action, their fates shrouded in uncertainty. Many of these individuals were captured and became prisoners of war of the enemy. Approximately 939,700 POWs were subsequently reconscripted during the war, as the Red Army liberated areas formerly occupied by the enemy. An additional 1.8 million POWs were released from captivity at the war’s conclusion. However, for the remainder, death was the most likely outcome.

5. Unrecorded Casualties

In the initial months of Operation Barbarossa, the USSR’s records remained incomplete. Reports from the frontlines, containing critical loss data, were not forthcoming. Based on information gleaned from individual archives, including those of the German military command, it is estimated that 1.2 million Red Army personnel were irrecoverable losses during this period.

Summary

In summary, the USSR suffered 11.4 million irrecoverable losses during World War II. These losses encompassed personnel killed in action, those who died from wounds or disease, and individuals who went missing in action or became prisoners of war. 

Irrecoverable Losses for Red Army Navy versus Germany and Japan Data

Source: Krivosheev, Colonel General G.F. “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century.” Greenhill Books, 1997, London, Page 86, Table 57

Other World War 2 Civilian and Military Death Data

World War 2 Total Civilian and Military Deaths

USSR World War 2 Deaths by Republic

Military Manpower and Deaths by Country

The National WWII Museum Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II

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Lend-Lease Categories

Raw Materials

Copper – In an unusual twist the Soviet Union was providing copper along many other raw materials to Germany per the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940).  Most of the copper was destined for electric equipment used extensively in major weapon platforms, energy systems and telecommunications. Lend-Lease was 41.1% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II. 

Aluminum – Aircraft required lightweight and strong metals for their performance characteristics and in the 1940s none was better than aluminum.  Soviet aluminum production dropped from 59.9 thousand metric tons in 1940 to 34.5 thousand metric tons the following year.  Not until 1943 would Soviet production levels recover to their prewar numbers.  In the meantime, the Soviets needed more than even their prewar levels provided. Lend-Lease was 51.5% of the aluminum available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Tin – Tin was classified as a strategic material since tin-coated steel cans prevented food acids from corroding the steel.  Tin coated packaging was also used in medical supplies for the same reason. Supplied tin was 69.0% of the tin available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Cobalt – Military grade steel required cobalt. The British and Germans wrangled over control of Turkish cobalt exports each threatening trade embargoes.  Cobalt was another raw material that Germany negotiated with the Soviet Union in the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940). Western supplied cobalt was 58.0% of the cobalt available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Transportation

Railway Equipment – Lend-Lease took on many forms some less glamorous than others but still significant. Railcars and railway rails aren’t often thought of by the general public when thinking about supporting a war ally. However, not having to produce 1,977 locomotives, 11,075 railway wagons, or 622,000 tons of railway rails allowed USSR’s internal industries to concentrate on other needed war production. Lend-Lease was 91.1% of the railway wagon and 36.1% of the railway rails available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Vehicle tires – All major combatants in WWII were deficient in rubber and the Soviet Union was no exception. Germany in the 1930s began synthesizing rubber knowing they would not have ready access to the raw material.  Vehicle tires – Lend-Lease was 30.4% of the vehicle tires available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Military Grade Materiel

Explosives – Explosives are used at prodigious rates almost always well beyond the largest forecasts.  The Eastern Front with the millions on each side engaging on fronts hundreds of miles long consumed materiel like no where else. Lend-Lease was 34.6% of the explosives available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Aviation fuel – The Soviet Union out produced all European Axis nations in crude oil production. However, octane boosters and aviation fuels were in short supply and Lend-Lease filled that gap.  Prior to the US entry into the war the US was responsible for 63%* of the world’s oil production. Additionally, the US had extensive adjacent industries developing and producing petroleum, oil, and lubrication products. In all 2,700,000 tons of petroleum products were supplied through Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease was 35.5% of the aviation fuel available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

* Source: American Foreign Relations, https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html

Food

Often overlooked is the effect of the German invasion in 1941-42 on the USSR’s breadbasket, Ukraine.  The USSR lost 40% of its state farms as well as farm animals, farm equipment, and labor. Per US Embassy and Consulates in Russia 4,500,000 tons of foodstuffs were transferred to the USSR via Lend-Lease. There are stories of Soviet troops throwing empty Lend-Lease food cans at German troops just to irritate them.

• Sugar – Lend-Lease was 39.8% of the sugar available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Canned meat – Lend-Lease was 82.8% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Animal fats – Lend-Lease was 51.6% of the animal fats available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Other

• Wool – Lend-Lease was 21.4% of the wool available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Lend-Lease Deliveries Compared to USSR Internal Production Data

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Source: Real History Online. “Lend-Lease WW2 – American Supply to the Allies.” https://www.realhistoryonline.com/articles/lendlease-ww2/, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Lend-Lease and Production Data

Recipients of US Aircraft Production

WW2 Allies: US Lend-Lease to the USSR, 1941-1945

US Lend Lease Dollar Value by Recipient Nation

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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Axis and Allied Mobilization Responses

Axis War Visions

Germany

Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. And the early days proved out Germany’s expectations, beginning in 1935 with Germany violating the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military conscription on through to France signing an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940. 

During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. 

Although Germany’s prewar vision required industrial and military mobilizations it did not envision that of total war. Accordingly, Germany’s early war manpower mobilization geared up for quick victories. For example, Operation Barbarossa launched against the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, and was expected to last between six and eight weeks. Operation Barbarossa goal was the establishment of ‘a line of defense against Asiatic Russia’, stretching from the Volga to Archangelsk.

Operation Barbarossa was a planned quick campaign. In any case the fight on the Eastern Front was not expected to last into winter. The Germans accepted that the Soviets would ally with the British once Operation Barbarossa began. However, Hitler and his military leaders saw this as inconsequential, believing that the Wehrmacht would crush the Soviet Union before Britain could provide any aid.

Japan

Outside of the ongoing war in China the Japanese saw a rapid expansion into the southwest Pacific followed by a negotiated peace. Japan believe they could expand their empire and control the much-needed resources that they lacked. “They planned to fight a war of limited objectives and having once secured these objectives to set up a defense in such depth that the United States would find a settlement favorable to Japan an attractive alternative to a long and costly war. To the Japanese leaders this seemed an entirely reasonable view.” (1)

(1) Morton, Louis, “Command Decisions Japan’s Decision for War, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC 1990, Page 122, https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm, accessed on March 29, 2023

Allies War Visions

It is almost counterintuitive that the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan all fascist governments would act so independently of each other. Whereas the Allied nations of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) three nations with a constitutional monarchy, a representative democratic republic, and a communist government would coordinate at a high level. 

Both the UK and the Soviet Union envisioned a long haul and coordinated their mobilization of manpower and economies accordingly. The US was the last entry into the fray, but they also mobilized along the lines of their allied nation partners. 

An Awkward Alliance

Despite their vastly different political systems, these nations worked towards a common goal of defeating their enemies. High level conferences at Tehran and Yalta with Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in attendance. However, there were more than two dozen conferences with high-ranking Allied representatives coordinating intentions, materiel, and industries shaping their war effort. Teams implementing these conference decisions continued 

Training

The Axis powers, led by Germany, initially had a significant advantage in terms of training and experience. Both Germany and Japan had invested heavily in military training and had a highly trained and experienced military at the start of the war. However, as the war dragged on, both began to suffer from a shortage of manpower, and the quality of its troops began to decline. In response, they began to rely more heavily on conscription of both younger and older recruits and the use of poorly trained and inexperienced soldiers, leading to a decline in the overall quality of its forces.

In contrast, the Allied powers, led by the United States, took a different approach to training new recruits. The US military invested heavily in training and education, with a focus on developing highly skilled and well-trained soldiers. The US military also made use of modern technology and tactics to give its troops an edge in battle. As the war progressed, the Allies were able to draw on a larger pool of manpower and resources, allowing them to maintain a high level of training and experience among their troops.

Towards the end the Allies were providing better in depth and amount of training for their new troops. The Allies rotated experienced men into training roles to impart their hard gained knowledge.  Axis new recruits heard very little from the experienced veterans as they continued in their fighting roles often until they became a casualty statistic. 

Allied versus Axis Manpower 1939-1945 Data

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Note: German manpower was unknown for 1945. Post author used 7,000,000 as an estimate.

Source: Harrison, Mark. “The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison”, Cambridge University Press (1998) Page 29

Other Manpower Data Links

Comparative Military Manpower Sept 1939

Military Manpower by Nation 1940 to 1945

German Armed Forces Manpower by Year

US Military Branches Manpower and Deaths

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 Availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Availability 1941-45

The Soviet Union produced and deployed many military aircraft, although availability varied depending on factors such as production capacity, losses in combat, and maintenance and repair efforts. Here are some Soviet military aircraft of the war:

1941

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet aircraft were often outdated or in need of repair. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 led to significant losses of aircraft, with some estimates suggesting that the Soviet Union lost over 3,000 aircraft in the first month of the war. However, the Soviet Union was able to continue producing aircraft throughout the war, with production increasing significantly as the war progressed.

1942

In 1942, the Soviet Union was able to increase its production of military aircraft, with estimates suggesting that it produced around 20,000 aircraft during the year. However, losses in combat continued to be significant, particularly during the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus.

1943

By 1943, Soviet aircraft production of military aircraft increased significantly, with estimates suggesting that it produced around 35,000 aircraft during the year. This increase in production, combined with improved maintenance and repair efforts, led to a significant improvement in aircraft availability for Soviet forces.

1944-45

In the final years of the war, the Soviet Union continued to produce large numbers of military aircraft, with estimates suggesting that it produced around 40,000 aircraft in 1944 and over 43,000 in 1945. Despite significant losses in combat, particularly during the final battles for Berlin, the Soviet Union was able to maintain a high level of aircraft availability through the end of the war.

Ilyushin Il-2

The Ilyushin Il-2 was a Soviet ground attack aircraft that played a significant role in World War II. However, at the beginning of the war the Soviet Union had very few ground attack aircraft but that would change as the Ilyushin Il-2 became the most produced Soviet plane of the war. Here is some information on the Il-2 and its usage during the war:

Design

The Il-2 was designed as a heavily armored ground attack aircraft, with a crew of two and a single engine. The aircraft was heavily armed, with two 23mm cannons and two 7.62mm machine guns and could carry a variety of bombs and rockets.

Usage

The Il-2 was first deployed by the Soviet Union in 1941, and quickly proved to be highly effective in ground attack missions. The aircraft was heavily armored, which made it difficult for German anti-aircraft guns and fighter planes to shoot down. The Il-2 was used in a variety of roles, including attacking tanks, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. The aircraft was also used for reconnaissance and as a light bomber.

Production

The Soviet Union produced over 36,000 Il-2 aircraft during the war. The Il-2 was the most produced Soviet aircraft of the war. Like many other Soviet factories, the IL-2 factories moved east of the Ural Mountains to avoid being overran by the invading German armies. Startup issues at these transferred factories resulting in a famous Stalin telegram stating “You have let down our country and our Red Army. You have the nerve not to manufacture Il-2s until now. Our Red Army now needs Il-2 aircraft like the air it breathes, like the bread it eats. (This plant) now produces one Il-2 a day….It is a mockery of the Red Army….I ask you not to try the government’s patience, and demand that you manufacture more Il-2s. This is my final warning. Stalin.” (1)

(1) Stalin’s “Essential Aircraft:” Ilyushin Il-2 in WWII, September 26, 2016, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institute, https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/stalins-ilyushin-il-2-shturmovik, Accessed on March 17, 2023

Evolution

The Il-2 underwent several design changes during the war, with improvements made to the aircraft’s speed, maneuverability, and armament. Later versions of the Il-2, such as the Il-2M and Il-10, were faster and more maneuverable than earlier versions, and were also equipped with more powerful armament.

Impact

The Il-2 played a crucial role in supporting Soviet ground forces during the war, particularly during the early stages of the conflict when the Soviet Union was facing significant losses. The aircraft was highly effective in ground attack missions and was used extensively throughout the war. The Il-2 is credited with destroying thousands of German tanks and played a key role in the Soviet Union’s eventual victory over Germany.

The Ilyushin Il-2 was a highly effective ground attack aircraft that played a significant role in World War II. The aircraft’s heavy armor, powerful armament, and versatility made it a formidable weapon on the Eastern Front and contributed to the Soviet Union’s eventual victory over Germany.

Overall, while Soviet aircraft availability varied throughout the war, the Soviet Union was able to produce and deploy a significant number of aircraft, which played a crucial role in supporting Soviet ground forces and in achieving victory over Germany.

Soviet Aircraft Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section IV Aircraft (selected data), Pages 254-255, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Aircraft Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section IV Aircraft, Pages 254-255, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Aircraft Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section IV Aircraft, Pages 254-255, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data Links

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Radio Usage

Tank Radios

Communications at the fighting level contrasted significantly between the Soviets and Germans. For example, the German Panzer IV was a medium tank first introduced in 1937. The Panzer IV had a crew of five which included the commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator. In contrast the Soviet T-34 had a crew of four and radios were a rarity in Soviet tanks early in the war. Initially only the unit commander’s tank had a radio. During the war radio became more widely but even in 1944 many tanks lacked a radio set. 

Radios initially were reserved for the commander’s tank which communicated with their local headquarters receiving and transmitting. Flag communications or a follow the leader approach was often utilized. German tank communications could occur between individual tanks allowing a more coordinated effort at the platoon level. Radios were not installed in early T-34 due to short supply, expense, and lack of internal space. 

Germany often would utilize captured equipment and the Soviet tanks were no exception, however Germany would retrofit radios into the captured tanks in order to meet their operational level requirements.

Radio Traffic Analysis

“The vastness of European Russia, its dearth of good roads, the great distances which had to be traversed, the lack of high-capacity long-distance commercial teletype circuits, as well as the shortage of military telephone apparatus and cables, compelled the Soviet Army to make a far greater use or radio communication than was necessary in the armies of the highly industrialized Western countries.” (1)

(1) Praun, Albert, General der Nachrichtentrupp (Lieutenant General), MS No P-038, “German Radio Intelligence”, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief Of Military History, March 1950, Pages 86-87, https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/friedman-documents/publications/FOLDER_240/41748999078819.pdf, Accessed March 18, 2023.

The vastness of European Russia combined with severe radio operator losses early in the war resulted in replacement operators using simple, conventional call signs enabling German counter radio intelligence to identify quickly the stations of a given net. In some respects, the Soviet radio capability grew and evolved during the war. First with improved cryptography for headquarter and higher echelon communications. However, improved field level radio communications lagged significantly due to poorly trained personnel.

Radio-Controlled Mines

The Soviet Union was the first country to develop, 1941, and deploy, 1942, radio-controlled mines. By the time of the Battle of Kursk both the Soviet Union and Germany were using radio-controlled mines as part of their anti-tank defenses. The battle, which took place from July to August 1943, was the largest tank battles in history and involved hundreds of thousands of troops and tanks. The Soviet Union used radio-controlled mines as part of its anti-tank defenses, particularly in the defensive belts that were set up to slow down and disrupt the German armored offensives. 

Radio Usage Philosophical Differences

The Soviet Union and Germany used their military radios in different ways. The Soviet Union used its radios primarily for communication between units and for receiving and transmitting orders. Germany, on the other hand, used its radios for a wider range of purposes, including aerial reconnaissance, weather reports, and coordination between units in the field.

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258 (selected data), Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data Format

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Additionally other motor vehicles such as tractors, passenger vehicles, utility vehicles, and motorcycles. A total of 265,600 army trucks were produced by the Soviets during the war years. Additionally, the Soviets received approximately 200,000 Studebaker-US6 out of a total of 637,000 other military vehicles (ordnance carriers, jeeps, trucks, etc.) supplied through Lend-Lease. The Soviets averaged 422,580 available noncombat motor vehicles during the war years ranging from 272,600 in 1941 to 621,300 in 1945.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Motor Vehicles

Trucks

The Soviet Union relied heavily on motor vehicles for the transportation of personnel, weapons, and supplies. While combat vehicles such as tanks and armored cars often receive the most attention, noncombat motor vehicles played a crucial role in supporting Soviet military operations. 

The Soviet Union produced a wide variety of noncombat motor vehicles during the war, including trucks, buses, ambulances, and motorcycles. These vehicles were used for a variety of purposes, including the transportation of troops, supplies, and equipment, as well as for medical evacuation and other noncombat tasks.

The Soviet Union produced many noncombat motor vehicles during the war, with estimates that over 200,000 trucks were produced during the war years. Production of noncombat vehicles was a significant part of the Soviet Union’s war effort, and the country’s factories were often converted to produce vehicles and other equipment as needed.

Under the Lend-Lease program, the Soviet Union received over 400,000 trucks and other motor vehicles, which were used for a variety of noncombat purposes such as transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment. The vehicles provided under the Lend-Lease program included a variety of types and models, such as the Dodge WC series of trucks, the Studebaker US6, and the Ford GPA amphibious vehicle.

As the war progressed, the Soviet Union made improvements to its noncombat motor vehicles to make them more durable and effective. For example, trucks were often modified with additional armor and improved suspension systems to better withstand the rigors of combat conditions. The Soviet Union also developed specialized vehicles for medical evacuation and other noncombat tasks, which helped to improve the efficiency of its military operations.

Katyusha Rocket Launchers

Trucks were often used as the platform for Katyusha rocket launchers during World War II. The Katyusha rocket launcher was a type of multiple rocket launcher that was developed by the Soviet Union and used extensively during the war. Katyusha rocket launchers were typically mounted on the back of a truck, with a series of rockets arranged in a launch frame. The rockets were fired in a salvo, with the launch frame tilting back to reduce the recoil of the rockets.

Trucks were used as the platform for Katyusha rocket launchers for several reasons. By mounting the launchers on trucks, they could be rapidly deployed to different locations and could provide mobile artillery support to ground troops. The use of trucks also allowed the Soviet Union to quickly adapt Katyusha launchers to different types of terrain, as the launchers could be mounted on a variety of truck chassis.

Noncombat motor vehicles played a crucial role in supporting Soviet military operations during the war. Without these vehicles, it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to transport troops, supplies, and equipment to the front lines, and to evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield. Noncombat motor vehicles were a vital component of the Soviet Union’s military logistics and contributed significantly to the country’s eventual victory over Germany.

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VI Motor Vehicles, Page 257 (selected data), Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VI Motor Vehicles, Page 257, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

World War II Allies: U.S. Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945

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Note: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year. See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Soviet Fleet

The Soviet fleet in 1939 was the seventh largest by tonnage in the world after Germany’s Kriegsmarine. Counterintuitively, the Soviet Union had the largest prewar submarine fleet in the world with 212 submarines available January 1, 1941. During the war the Soviet Union procured an additional fifty-one submarines but lost 102. With such a low procurement rate the Soviets were quickly surpassed by the German Kriegsmarine which in 1941 alone produced 199 U-boats. The Kriegsmarine would go on to exceed their 1941 production number in each year from 1942-44. In all the Soviet Union received an additional 2,588 vessels and lost 1,014 vessels during the war years.

Priorities

During the war Soviet naval budget allocations fell from 11.5% in 1941 to 6.6% in 1944 highlighting their priority versus the other military branches. Lend-Lease provided additional small surface ships. “The United Kingdom and the United States traded the Royal Navy battleship HMS Royal Sovereign (renamed Arkhangelsk) and the United States Navy cruiser USS Milwaukee (renamed Murmansk) in exchange for the Soviet part of the captured Italian navy.” (1) Additionally, the Soviet Union captured eleven Romanian, Latvian and Estonian and integrated them into their fleet. Also, four British submarines were received and renamed V1 to V4.oviet

(1) Wikipedia, “Soviet Navy”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy, accessed on March 7, 2023.

Operation Barbarossa saw Soviet Navy personnel participating in land battles as the regular Soviet Army forces were overrun. Sea port towns such as Leningrad and Sevastopol were two of several cities where Soviet sailors battled as land forces. Soviet submarines were the most capable naval force projection capability and even those were limited due to German mining operations and ineffectual leadership due to the purges of the 1930s.

Due to the geography the Soviet vessels served in many of their losses came from German land forces. Soviet naval forces were highly criticized by the UK and US for their ineffectiveness especially regarding the convoy protections needed for shipments into Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, (Selected data) Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data, Transposed Format

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 Availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

The Soviet Union had a large and diverse artillery arsenal during World War II. The exact numbers of artillery pieces available are difficult to determine, but here are some estimates:

Field Artillery

The Soviet Union had many field artillery pieces, including 76mm, 85mm, and 122mm (M-30 howitzer) guns, as well as 152mm and 203mm howitzers. It’s estimated that the Soviet Union manufactured just under 300,000 field artillery pieces during the war.

Anti-Tank Guns

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of anti-tank guns, including the 45mm, 57mm, and 76mm guns. These guns were highly effective against German tanks and played a crucial role in Soviet anti-tank defense.

Rocket Launchers

The Soviet Union developed several rocket launchers during the war, including the Katyusha rocket launcher. These launchers were highly effective against enemy troops and fortifications.

Heavy Artillery

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of heavy artillery pieces, including 152mm, 203mm, and 280mm guns. These guns were used for long-range bombardment and were highly effective against enemy fortifications and artillery positions.

Significant Soviet Artillery Usage

Battle of Stalingrad

One of the most significant uses of Soviet artillery during World War II was in the defense of Stalingrad during the Battle of Stalingrad. The Soviet Union used many artillery pieces, including the 122mm howitzer M-30, to defend the city from German forces. Soviet artillery played a crucial role in the defense of Stalingrad, particularly in the early stages of the battle when German forces were attempting to capture the city. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a “kill zone” in front of the city, which made it difficult for German troops to advance.

The Soviet Union also used artillery to disrupt German supply lines and to target German artillery positions. This helped to weaken the German forces and to prevent them from launching a successful assault on the city.

Battle of Kursk

The largest massed use of Soviet artillery during World War II was at the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943. The battle was fought between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front and was the largest tank battle in history. During the battle, the Soviet Union used a massive concentration of artillery, including over 20,000 guns and mortars. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a defensive zone around the Kursk salient, which made it difficult for German tanks and infantry to penetrate.

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin saw massive usage of Soviet artillery. Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front attacked the Seelow Heights, the last natural line of defense before Berlin. The 1st Belorussian Front had 908,000 men, 3,155 AFVs, 16,934 guns, and had stockpiled over 7 million rounds of artillery ammunition. 

General Nikolai Bersarin, commanding the 5th Shock Army, later claimed that “…the Western Allies had dropped 65,000 tons of explosives on the city in the course of more than two years; whereas the Red Army had expended 40,000 tons in merely two weeks.” (1)

(1) Porter, David, “Seelow Heights and Berlin”, Miltary History, https://the-past.com/feature/seelow-heights-and-berlin/, accessed on March 17, 2023 

The Soviet Union’s use of artillery played a crucial role in the battle, allowing Soviet forces to repel German attacks and to launch their own counterattacks. The artillery was highly effective in disrupting German tank formations and infantry positions and was used to create a “kill zone” in front of Soviet defensive positions.

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 250-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan 1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Heavy Tanks

The Soviet Union developed and produced a series of heavy tanks that played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict. Here’s a brief overview of the evolution of Soviet heavy tanks during the war:

KV-1:

The KV-1 was a heavy tank that was introduced in 1939. It was heavily armored and armed with a 76.2mm gun. However, it was slow and difficult to maneuver, which limited its effectiveness on the battlefield.

KV-1S:

The KV-1S was a lighter and more maneuverable version of the KV-1 that was introduced in 1942. It had thinner armor than the original KV-1, but was faster and more agile, making it more effective in combat.

KV-85:

The KV-85 was a variant of the KV-1S that was armed with an 85mm gun. It was introduced in 1943 and saw limited use in combat.

IS-1/IS-2:

The IS-1 (also known as the IS-85) and IS-2 were heavy tanks that were introduced in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were heavily armored and armed with an 85 mm and 122mm guns respectively, making them highly effective in combat. They were also faster and more maneuverable than earlier Soviet heavy tanks, which improved their tactical flexibility. The IS-1 was produced in limited numbers, with only around 100 tanks built before it was replaced by the more advanced IS-2 tank. The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 saw the first deployment of the IS-2 heavy tank. The tanks were used to great effect, with their heavy armor and powerful guns helping to stop the German advance.

IS-3:

The IS-3 was a heavy tank that was introduced in 1945, towards the end of the war. It was heavily armored and armed with a 122mm gun, like the IS-2, but had a lower profile and more sloped armor, which made it more difficult to hit.

Usage

The IS-2 and IS-3 heavy tanks of the Soviet Union were designed to counter the German heavy tanks of the time, such as the Tiger I and II, and the Panther. Both the IS-2 and IS-3 had heavy armor that was thicker and more sloped than that of the German heavy tank making them more difficult to penetrate from enemy fire.

Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive in Belarus in the summer of 1944 saw the widespread deployment of the IS-2 and KV-1 heavy tanks along with many other tank models. They played a key role in breaking through German lines and driving the enemy back especially by dealing with heavily fortified German positions. The heavy armor and powerful guns of these tanks allowed them to withstand enemy fire and destroy enemy tanks and fortifications with greater ease than the medium and light tanks.

Overall, the evolution of Soviet heavy tanks during World War II was characterized by a focus on heavy armor and firepower, as well as improvements in mobility and maneuverability. The IS-2 and IS-3 in particular were highly effective heavy tanks that played a crucial role in the Soviet Union’s eventual victory over Nazi Germany.

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Availability Data for Chart Above

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 (selected data) Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Availability of Soviet Tanks 1941-45 Data (Includes number received and losses)

*Armoured cars, tractors, other armoured vehicles

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Availability of Soviet Tanks 1941-45 Transposed Data (Includes number received and losses)

*Armoured cars, tractors, other armoured vehicles

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Tank and Availability Data Links

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

10 Soviet Tanks of World War Two – The Good, the Bad, and the BEASTLY

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.