US Percentage of Industrial Output

The United States, even mired in the depression in the period 1936 to 1938, manufactured almost one-third of the world’s products (32.2 percent). The United States outproduced Germany about three times (10.7 percent) and Japan almost ten times (3.5 percent). Taking the United States prewar productivity in terms of production per man-hour as the standard and giving it a value of 100, the following chart indicates the relative productivity ranking of World War II foes. One must not forget, however, that the United States was “almost alone in increasing rather than diminishing consumer output during the war.” To reiterate the point, all belligerents fiercely produced munitions during the war, not just the United States. America possessed advantages that none of the other warring states had. Its output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In short:, America’s munitions production in World War II was no “miracle.” (1)

(1) Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Industrial culture

The Allied nations and the Axis nations saw the upcoming war very differently and their industrial mobilization reflected their visions. Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials.

Japan foresaw a quick expansion into the Pacific nations followed by a negotiated peace. Both Germany’s and Japan’s visions required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all foresaw a long war and mobilized their industries and military accordingly. The Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy utilized mass production techniques within their five-year plans. The United Kingdom and the United States capitalistic approach were capable of mass production in order to achieve their profitability goals.

Although both Japan and Germany both planned and implemented a war economy earlier than the Allied nations, they never achieved the industrial mobilization levels of their foes. Germany saw a short war(s) therefore total industrial mobilization not needed. “By September 1941 Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cutbacks in war production.” (2)  Additionally, the Allied nations mobilized nontraditional labor especially women to their munitions and war materiel factories. For example, German domestic servants dropped from 1.5 to 1.3 million or 20%, whereas British dropped from 1.2 to 0.7 million or 58%.  German factories for most of the war ran single shifts whereas Allied factories went to 24-hour production days.

(2) D’Olier, Franklin, Chairman, Alexander, Henry C. Vice-Chairman, “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War)”, September 30, 1945, Page 2

Industrial policy

The Allied nations cooperation through the Big Three Conferences, Combined Boards, and Lend-Lease identifying industrial and raw material gaps and priorities. Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union transition from identifying raw materials for all war materiel manufacturing needs to obtaining completed weapons platforms and focusing on expanding production capabilities where they had greater expertise.

Japan, Germany, and Italy acted mostly without prior consultation with their Axis partners. Italy did not know that Germany would invade the Soviet Union. Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to her Axis partners. The Axis nations did not coordinate much in the areas of weapon development or raw material sharing.

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes Data

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Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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Total Losses

The total number of airplanes lost during World War II is difficult to determine with complete accuracy due to varying definitions of what constitutes a “loss” and incomplete or inconsistent record-keeping in some cases. However, estimates suggest that the total number of airplanes lost during the war was nearly 400,000.

The majority of these losses occurred on the Eastern Front, where the Soviet Union and Germany engaged in some of the largest and most intense aerial battles of the war. The Soviet Union alone lost an estimated 106,400 aircraft during the war, while Germany lost around 77,000.

Other countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, also suffered significant losses of aircraft during the war. The United States lost around 95,000 aircraft, the United Kingdom lost around 42,100 aircraft, and Japan lost around 50,000 aircraft.

The loss of aircraft during the war was a significant drain on resources for all countries involved, as each lost not only the cost of the aircraft itself, but also the resources and manpower required to produce and maintain them. Additionally, the loss of experienced pilots and crew members was a significant blow to the effectiveness of air forces, particularly as the war progressed and the need for trained personnel increased.

Noncombat Losses

Estimates suggest that a significant number of aircraft lost during World War II were due to non-combat reasons. Factors such as accidents, mechanical failures, and weather conditions all contributed to the loss of aircraft during the war.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of planes lost due to non-combat reasons, as record-keeping was not always consistent or complete. However, some estimates suggest that up to 30% of aircraft losses may have been due to non-combat reasons.

United States

From December 1941 through August 1945 the United States lost over 42,000 planes due to noncombat reasons, with accidents being a significant contributor to these losses. Specifically, a total of 13,873 planes were lost due to accidents that occurred within the continental US. This was a result of over 52,000 accidents that took place within the country, with 6,039 of these incidents resulting in 14,903 fatalities. (1)

• “United States Air Force Statistical Digest World War II”, Office of Statistical Control, December 1945, Page 309, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

The aviation world was transitioning from cloth covered biplanes to aluminum cladded jet aircraft during the war years. However, aviation was still in its early stages. In 1941, the accident rate for military aviation was 92 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. By 1945, this rate had been reduced to 43 accidents per 100,000 hours, a significant improvement of nearly one half. 

Maybe the strangest noncombat aircraft losses occurred on March 23, 1944, Mount Vesuvius erupted, causing immediate devastation to a B-25 bomber outfit stationed at Pompeii Airfield at the base of the volcano. Although the men of the 340th Bombardment Group were able to evacuate and avoid casualties, their fleet of 88 bombers was entirely destroyed.

Axis Downward Spiral

Both Germany and Japan produced more aircraft in 1944 than in any other year. In fact, Germany production rose from 25,527 units in 1943 to 39,807 units in 1944 a year over year rise of 55.9%. Japan’s numbers were equally impressive their production rose from 16,693 units in 1943 to 28,180 units in 1944 a year over year rise of 68.8%. And yet they both in a death spiral in their ability to wage an air war.

There were several reasons for this death spiral but one of the biggest was that both German and Japanese pilots were receiving less and less training in operational type aircraft. See figure 9 above from the “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey The Defeat of the German Air Force” showing how Germany’s pilot training compared to both the Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force training hours by year during the war. An estimate of 25% of German planes from late 1943 to the end of the war were being lost in noncombat or nonoperational activities.

WW2 Aircraft Losses by Country Data

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Source: World War Wings. “WWII Aircraft Losses By Country.” https://worldwarwings.com/wwii-aircraft-losses-by-country/, Data accessed June 30, 2022

Other Aircraft Production, Losses or Availability Data

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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Annual Allied Axis Tank and Self-propelled Gun Production 1939-45

1939

The year 1939 saw relatively little production because the war did not officially begin until September of that year. The Soviet Union produced the most units during this year, nearly 75% of the world’s total.

1940

The year 1940 saw a massive increase in German going from 247 units to 1,643 units, including the Panzer III and IV tanks. The Soviet Union produced just over 2,794 units while the United Kingdom produced 1,399.

1941

The year 1941 was a pivotal year in the war and saw a significant increase in production as a result. Germany produced 3,790 units during this year. The Soviet Union also ramped up its production, producing 6,590 units, including the T-34. The United States began production in significant numbers, with just over 4,000 units produced during the year.

1942

The year 1942 saw rising production, with over 66,00 units produced worldwide. Germany produced just over 6,000 units, including the Panther and Tiger II tanks. The Soviet Union produced over 24,000 units, including the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, while the United States produced just 24,997 units.

1943

The year 1943 saw the highest-level production during the war, with just over 74,000 units produced worldwide. Germany produced just over 12,000 units, including the Panther and Tiger I. The Soviet Union produced just over 24,000 units, including the T-34 and IS-2. The United States produced just over 29,000 units during this year.

1944

The year 1944 saw a decline in tank production, with just over 70,000 units produced worldwide. Germany produced just over 19,000 units, including the Tiger II tank. The Soviet Union produced just under 29,000 units. The United States produced just over 17,500 units during this year.

1945

The year 1945 saw a dramatic decline in tank production as the war began to wind down. Germany produced just 3,932 units. The Soviet Union produced just over 15,000 units, including the T-34 and IS-3. The United States produced just 11,968 units during this year.

In terms of specific tank types, the most produced tank during World War II was the Soviet T-34, with over 84,000 units produced. The second most produced tank was the United States M4 Sherman with 49,422 units produced. 

World War II saw a massive surge in tank and SP production, with the years between 1942 and 1944 seeing the highest levels of production. The USSR produced 48% of the Allies units followed by the US at 40%, the UK at 13%, and Canada at 3%. Germany produced 90% of the Axis units followed by Italy and Japan at 5% each.

Annual Allied Axis Tank and Self-propelled Gun Production 1939-45 Data

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Note: Canada’s total production of 5,678 units was spread over the time period in proportion to the UK production. 

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., London, 1993, Page 277, Table 87

Other Vehicle Production and Availability Data Links

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

USSR – Germany Tank Production and Losses by Month

The American Automobile Industry in World War Two

US Army Forces

On November 30, 1941, the United States Army had a significant presence in the Philippine Islands, which was then a territory of the United States. The US Army personnel in the Philippines consisted of approximately 10,000 regular Army soldiers, 8,000 Philippine Scouts (Filipino soldiers who served in the US Army), and 26,000 Philippine Commonwealth Army troops (Filipino soldiers under the control of the Philippine government).

The US Army was under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, who had been appointed as the Commander of US Army Forces in the Far East in July 1941. MacArthur was responsible for the defense of the Philippines, which was seen as a key strategic location in the event of a war with Japan.

US Preparedness

Despite the large number of troops in the Philippines, the US Army was not fully prepared for a war with Japan. There were shortages of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies, and the troops were not well-trained or well-equipped. There were several reasons why the US Army was not fully prepared for the Japanese attack on the Philippines:

Limited Resources

The US Army, the 19^th largest in the world, was spread thin across the globe, with troops stationed in other parts of the world. This meant that resources were limited, and the US Army had to prioritize where to allocate resources. 

Underestimation of Japanese Capabilities

The US Army underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese military. They believed that the Japanese would not be able to mount a successful attack on the Philippines and were caught off guard when the Japanese launched a surprise attack.

Limited Intelligence

The US Army had limited intelligence about the Japanese military, and what they did have was often outdated or inaccurate. This made it difficult for the US Army to predict where and when the Japanese would attack.

Poor Planning

The US Army’s planning for the defense of the Philippines was flawed. They focused on defending the major cities and ports, rather than on defending the entire archipelago. This left many areas vulnerable to attack.

Shortages of Supplies

The US Army in the Philippines was short on supplies and equipment, including weapons, ammunition, and food. This made it difficult for them to mount an effective defense against the Japanese.

Japanese Attack

On December 8, 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on the Philippines, just hours after attacking Pearl Harbor. The US Army and Philippine troops fought bravely, but were eventually forced to surrender on April 9, 1942, after months of intense fighting and suffering from disease and starvation. The capture of the Philippines was a major victory for Japan and a significant setback for the Allies in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The consequences of the US Army’s surrender in the Philippines were significant and far-reaching:

Loss of Territory

The surrender of the Philippines meant that the United States lost control of a major strategic location in the Pacific. The Japanese were able to use the islands as a base for further expansion and as a launching point for attacks on other Allied territories.

Prisoners of War

The US Army soldiers and Philippine troops who surrendered became prisoners of war. Many were forced to endure harsh conditions and brutal treatment at the hands of their captors, including the infamous Bataan Death March.

Propaganda Victory for Japan

The capture of the Philippines was a major propaganda victory for Japan. It demonstrated to the world that the Japanese could defeat a major Western power and strengthened their position in the Pacific.

Loss of Morale

The surrender of the Philippines was a significant blow to the morale of the US Army and the American people. It was a reminder that the war would be long and difficult, and that victory was not assured.

Retaliation

The surrender of the Philippines also led to a desire for revenge among many Americans. This desire for retaliation would later fuel the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan.

Overall, the surrender of the Philippines was a significant setback for the Allies in the Pacific Theater of World War II and had far-reaching consequences for the war effort.

US Army Personnel in Philippine Islands: 30 November 1941 Data

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(a) Includes 31 Philippine Scout officers.

(b) According to W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (University of Chicago Press, 1948), I, 170, Air Corps strength on 7 December 1941 was 754 officers, 6,706 men.

(c) Includes officers for whom no unit is indicated.

Source: Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 449, Table 3, Center of Military History, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch13.htm#t1

Other Manpower Data Links

Comparative Military Manpower Sept 1939

Military Manpower by Nation 1940 to 1945

US Military Manpower 1939 – 1945

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Oil played a crucial role in industrial, transportation, and military aspects during World War II. At first blush, oil is viewed as a transportation necessity only. Whereas it serves many industrial and military purposes as well.

Industrial Uses

Oil was essential for powering factories and industrial machinery. It provided energy for manufacturing processes, such as refining metals, producing chemicals, and operating machinery. 

Oil was also a raw material for industrial processes. It was critical in the making of synthetic rubber. Since the Japanese had occupied the Netherlands East Indies which supplied 90 percent of the world’s natural rubber. To produce synthetic rubber required the making of butadiene, its basic raw material which was synthesized from oil.

Military Uses

Naval Operations

Oil was vital for fueling naval vessels, including battleships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and support ships. It allowed for extended range, increased speed, and greater operational capabilities of naval fleets.

Air Power

Oil-fueled aircraft, enable air forces to conduct strategic bombing campaigns, engage in aerial combat, and provide air support to ground forces. It facilitated rapid transportation of troops, supplies, and equipment. 

A distinct Allied advantage was the availability of 100-octane aviation fuel. During the Dunkirk evacuations, both British and German aircraft utilized 87-octane fuel. Before the Battle of Britain, the British aircraft were switching over to 100 octane fuel. The fuel switchover combined with improved superchargers surprised the Luftwaffe pilots with their improved performance. A French petroleum engineer, Eugene Houdry, developed the Houdry process enabling a greater amount of high-octane fuel to be converted from crude oil and lignite coal.  After moving to the US, the process was further developed, and now twice as much high-octane could be converted from crude oil. 

High octane fuel combined with supercharging gave the US and its allies improved engine performance in every aspect. During take-off and climbing it was estimated that the British Spitfires now had a 25% edge over their German counterparts, a 10% edge in speed, and a 12% edge in altitude.

Mechanized Warfare

Oil-powered tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery played a crucial role in ground operations. These vehicles provided mobility, firepower, and protection to ground forces, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield.

Germany allocated its oil supply to the military based on prioritizing the needs of different branches, with the Luftwaffe receiving a higher priority than the Kriegsmarine. Offensive operations were given a higher priority than defensive operations, as they required more fuel. The allocation of oil was a critical issue for the military, and Germany implemented conservation measures to stretch the available oil supply further. To conserve the available oil supply, Germany implemented measures such as reducing the speed of vehicles and planes and limiting training exercises.

Transportation Uses

Logistics and Supply

Oil was essential for transportation and logistics, ensuring the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment to various theaters of war. It supported military operations by maintaining supply lines and sustaining the war effort. World War II is seen as the first truly mechanized war by many, however, that was hardly the case between Germany and the Soviet Union.  Once away from a train depot, approximately 80% of German logistics was horse-drawn. About one in six German divisions were mechanized while the other five relied upon the foot soldier to march and the horse to pull. Even though the Soviet Union utilized more horses than Germany they utilized a far greater number of trucks, jeeps, and other motorized vehicles to transport men and materiel. Additionally, the food, materiel, and manpower Germany required to maintain their horses made these divisions less efficient than their enemy counterparts.

Before Germany’s invasion, the Soviet Union had about 270,000 trucks in the military.  Soviet domestic truck production for military purposes was approximately 150,000 vehicles.  Via Lend-Lease over 430,000 trucks were obtained including:

Over 200,000 Studebaker US6 U3, 2.5-ton, 6×6, Cargo Trucks,

Almost 50,000 Willys MB, truck ¼-ton, 4×4, Command Reconnaissance aka Jeep

Over 60,000 Chevrolet G-7107, 1½-ton, 4×4

Importance and Management

Allied Nations

The Allies, particularly the United States, held a significant advantage in oil supply. The U.S. was energy self-sufficient and the leading crude oil producer during the war. It supplied more than 85% of the oil used by the Allies. The Allies’ access to abundant oil resources allowed for sustained military operations and industrial production.

Axis Nations

The Axis powers, especially Germany and Japan, faced challenges in oil supply. Germany had limited domestic oil resources and relied heavily on imports. The Allied oil campaign targeted facilities supplying Nazi Germany with petroleum, oil, and lubrication products, disrupting their access to oil. Japan also faced oil shortages due to embargoes and limited domestic production. Additionally, Allied submarines targeted Japanese oil tankers with devasting results.

In conclusion, oil was fundamental for industrial and military power during World War II. It played a critical role in industrial production, transportation, and military operations. The Allies, with their access to abundant oil resources, had a significant advantage over the Axis powers. The management of oil resources and the disruption of oil supplies through strategic bombing campaigns impacted the war efforts of both sides.

Annual Allied Axis Crude Oil Production 1939-1945 Data

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Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 81

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Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

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Iron and Steel Fundamental for Industrial and Military Power

Industrial Production

Iron and steel are essential materials for industrial production. They are used in the construction of factories, machinery, and infrastructure. The ability to produce large quantities of iron and steel allowed nations to expand their industrial capacity and manufacture the necessary equipment and supplies for war efforts.

Military Equipment

Iron and steel are vital for the production of military equipment, including tanks, artillery, ships, aircraft, and weapons. These materials provide the strength, durability, and resilience required for military operations. The ability to produce sufficient iron and steel was crucial for maintaining a well-equipped military force.

Infrastructure and Transportation

Iron and steel were necessary for building and maintaining transportation networks, such as railways, bridges, and roads. These infrastructure projects were crucial for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. Additionally, iron and steel were used in the construction of ships, which played a significant role in naval warfare and the transportation of goods.

Industrialization and Economic Power

The production of iron and steel was closely tied to industrialization and economic power. Nations with robust iron and steel industries had a competitive advantage in terms of economic growth and technological advancements. The ability to produce large quantities of iron and steel allowed countries to meet their own needs and export surplus materials to support their war efforts.

Rationing and Supply Chain

During World War II, there were shortages and rationing of various resources, including iron and steel. The demand for these materials was high, and their availability was crucial for sustaining military operations. Rationing programs were implemented to ensure a fair distribution of resources and prioritize their allocation for military purposes.

Annual Iron Production:

1939

The Allies began the war with modest iron production, with the UK leading the way at 14.5 million tons. The Axis powers, particularly Germany, surpassed the Allies with a production of 18.5 million tons. However, it’s worth noting that the USA and USSR iron production did not count against the Allies, as they were not yet aligned with the alliance.

1940

The Allies witnessed a slight increase in iron production in 1940. The UK’s production rose to 17.7 million tons, closely followed by the USA, USSR, and Canada. The Axis nations, led by Germany, continued to outpace the Allies, producing 34.7 million tons collectively.

1941

This year marked a turning point in iron production, with the Allies making significant strides. The USSR emerged as a key player, contributing 24.7 million tons, while the USA and UK also demonstrated substantial growth. However, the Axis nations remained dominant, with Germany producing 53.3 million tons.

1942

Iron production reached its peak for both alliances in 1942. The Allies surged ahead, with the USA leading the charge at 107.6 million tons. The USSR, UK, and Canada also made notable contributions. Despite this, Germany’s production remained formidable, amounting to 50.6 million tons.

1943

Although the Allies maintained a steady iron production, the gap between them and the Axis nations began to narrow. The USA’s production stood at 103.1 million tons, with the USSR, UK, and Canada continuing their contributions. Germany, however, still held a significant advantage with 56.2 million tons.

1944

Iron production declined for both alliances in 1944. The Allies saw a decrease, particularly in the USA, which produced 96 million tons. Meanwhile, Germany’s production dropped significantly to 32.6 million tons, potentially indicating the strain on its industrial capacity.

1945

Unfortunately, the data for iron production in 1945 remains incomplete. However, we can observe that the Allies maintained a consistent production level, with the USA leading the way at 90.2 million tons. The Axis nations’ production is largely unknown, with only Japan’s output recorded at 0.9 million tons.

Conclusion

In summary, iron and steel were fundamental for industrial and military power during World War II. Their production enabled nations to expand their industrial capacity, manufacture military equipment, build infrastructure, and maintain transportation networks. The availability of iron and steel played a crucial role in determining a nation’s ability to sustain its war efforts and contribute to the overall outcome of the conflict.

Analyzing the annual iron production from 1939 to 1945 reveals the shifting dynamics between the Allied and Axis nations. Although the Axis powers initially held a notable advantage, the Allies steadily increased their production, with the USA taking the lead. However, Germany’s industrial might remained a formidable force throughout the war. The data underscores the immense industrial efforts made by both sides and sheds light on the critical role that iron production played in shaping the outcome of World War II.

Annual Allied Axis Iron Ore Production 1939-1945 Data

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‘—‘ indicates production not counted prior or post being a Allies or Axis nation

‘?’ indicates production value unknown

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 80

Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Annual Allied Axis Coal Production 1939-1945

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

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Allied Nations versus Axis Nations

Allied Coal Production

The coal production of the Allied nations saw significant fluctuations throughout the war. In 1939, the Allies produced a combined total of 244.6 million tons of coal. These fluctuations were due to the entries of the Soviet Union and the United States into the war. Additionally, the Soviet Union’s production dropped by nearly 50% in 1942 as the German invasion fully took hold.

Among the Allied nations, the United States was the largest contributor to coal production. Despite starting with zero production in 1939 and 1940, the US ramped up its efforts and reached 562.0 million tons in 1944, making it the leading coal producer among the Allies. The USSR also played a significant role, particularly in 1941 when it produced 151.4 million tons. The UK and Canada contributed consistently throughout the war, with the UK producing 231.3 million tons in 1939 and Canada providing around 13-15 million tons annually.

Axis Coal Production

The Axis nations, led by Germany, also relied heavily on coal production to fuel their war machine. Germany, the primary coal producer among the Axis nations, started with 332.8 million tons in 1939 and experienced continuous growth until 1942 when it reached its highest production of 407.8 million tons. However, Germany’s production gradually declined in the later years of the war, dropping to 432.8 million tons in 1944 and a mere 50.3 million tons in 1945.

Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Japan, the other Axis nations, had comparatively lower coal production. Italy’s production remained relatively stagnant, ranging from 0.0 to 4.8 million tons throughout the war. Hungary and Romania produced around 1-1.4 million tons annually, while Japan’s coal production increased from zero in 1939 to 61.3 million tons in 1944, before dropping to 11.0 million tons in 1945.

Axis Usage and Constraints

Germany, being the largest European producer of coal, faced increasing demands throughout the war. The German military’s escalating needs, coupled with the requirements of occupied economies that previously relied on coal imports from the UK, drove the need for higher coal production. German coal was even exported to the Soviet Union to power trains due to the lower quality of Soviet coal. Finally, Germany’s coal industry was severely affected by strategic bombing, causing disruptions to their transportation, utilities, industry, and domestic consumption. Transportation disruptions were so great that even though coal was being mined in increasing quantities it could not reach its destinations. In fact, there were cases where coal trains were not getting coal to run their locomotives.

Japan, on the other hand, implemented a policy of concentrating resources and production on their most efficient mines. However, with the US embargo restricting the export of essential resources including oil, Japan faced significant challenges in their coal supplies making up for other energy deficiencies. These limitations impacted Japanese industries and added further strain to their war efforts.

Conclusion

The annual coal production of the Allied nations consistently surpassed that of the Axis nations throughout World War II. The Allies, driven by the industrial might of the United States, were able to maintain a steady increase in coal production, peaking in 1944. In contrast, the Axis nations, particularly Germany, faced challenges in sustaining their coal production, leading to a decline in the later years of the war.

The disparity in coal production played a significant role in shaping the war effort, directly influencing each side’s industrial capabilities and energy resources. Ultimately, the Allies’ superior coal production contributed to their eventual victory in World War II.

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to your desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise, only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 79

Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

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Snapshot of each nation’s self-sufficiency or lack thereof in strategic raw material and foodstuffs. A glance at the chart shows that 51% of the indicators are red, deficient. The most glaring for the Axis nations were oil, rubber, most of the metals, wheat, and meat. The Allied nations also struggled with the metals and rubber as well. However, the Allies were better off regarding oil and foodstuffs.

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Policy

Axis Nations

Italy

Both Germany and Italy had adopted a policy of autarky, aiming for economic self-sufficiency to reduce their dependence on external sources of raw materials. However, Italy’s lack of preparedness and limited reserves in gold, foreign currencies, and raw materials posed significant challenges. Italy’s industrial base was only a fraction of Germany’s, and its rearmament program was hindered by these deficiencies. As a result, Italy became dependent and effectively subordinate to Germany, highlighting the limitations of its autarkic policy.

Germany

Germany, with its advanced economic, scientific, and industrial capabilities, faced constraints in accessing and controlling the resources and raw materials required for its long-term goals. The expansion of Germany’s control of natural resources, industrial capacity, and farmland beyond its borders was necessitated by political demands. Germany’s military production was tied to resources outside its area of control, creating a dependency dynamic not found among the Allies. The acquisition of new territories during the war forced these territories to sell raw materials and agricultural products to Germany, reflecting the complexities of Germany’s raw material strategy.

Japan

Japan, as an Axis power, faced unique challenges in raw material self-sufficiency. The country’s limited domestic resources, particularly in terms of oil and other critical materials, prompted its expansionist policies in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s reliance on external sources for essential raw materials, coupled with its ambitions for territorial expansion, contributed to its strategic vulnerabilities and eventual conflicts with the Allied nations.

Allied Nations

In contrast to the Axis nations’ pursuit of autarky, the Allied nations looked to make up for deficiencies from trade partners. Both the United Kingdom and the United States had vast trade networks facilitated by large merchant marines and navies. The United Kingdom, with its extensive colonial holdings and global trade connections, sought to leverage its international trade networks to address its raw material needs. The United States, with its industrial capacity and global economic influence, pursued strategic trade partnerships to secure essential raw materials for its military and industrial requirements.

The Soviet Union while facing significant challenges in the early stages of the war, also sought to address its raw material needs through domestic production and strategic alliances. The Soviet Union’s vast territorial expanse and resource-rich regions played a crucial role in sustaining its military and industrial capabilities during the conflict.

Energy

The availability of key energy resources, such as oil and coal, significantly influenced the operational capabilities and resilience of the nations involved in the conflict.

Oil

The United States and the USSR were largely self-sufficient in oil, providing them with a significant advantage in sustaining their military and industrial operations. The United Kingdom, having fought the First World War largely with oil from the United States, continued to rely on imports to meet its energy needs during World War II. This reliance on oil imports from the US underscored the strategic importance of maintaining trade partnerships for essential energy resources.

Germany, while importing oil, also produced synthetic oils.  But neither of these sources was ever in great enough quantities to meet its wartime demands. Italy faced similar challenges in achieving energy self-sufficiency, highlighting the limitations of their autarkic policies. Japan, on the other hand, captured oil resources in the Dutch East Indies, seeking to address its energy deficiencies. Throughout the war, the US and the UK interdicted Japanese oil supplies from the Dutch East Indies, further exacerbating Japan’s energy vulnerabilities.

Coal

In terms of coal, all major Allied nations were self-sufficient, providing them with a reliable source of energy for many of their military and industrial needs. Germany, similarly, self-sufficient in coal, even exported coal to Italy, reflecting its capacity to meet its energy requirements. Japan, facing resource constraints, reallocated manpower to the most efficient coal mines and prioritized resources for military usage, underscoring the strategic significance of coal in sustaining its military operations.

Strategic Metals

The strategic self-sufficiency or deficiency in strategic metals, including iron, aluminum, and copper, played a crucial role in shaping the military and economic strategies of the major belligerent nations during World War II. The availability of these strategic metals significantly influenced the operational capabilities and resilience of the nations involved in the conflict. The United States and the USSR were largely self-sufficient in iron, while the United Kingdom relied on imports from the US. Germany, Italy, and Japan faced distinct challenges and policy choices in addressing their strategic metals needs.

Iron

The United States and the USSR were largely self-sufficient in iron, providing them with a significant advantage in sustaining their military and industrial operations. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, relied on imports from the US and its colonies to meet its iron needs. Germany relied on significant imports from Sweden to address its iron requirements.

Aluminum

Germany faced significant challenges in securing aluminum, utilizing occupied Norwegian aluminum production facilities, and exploiting bauxite sources in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania after the occupation of these countries. The scavenging of aluminum from occupied Europe and Vichy France, as well as the extensive use of recycled aluminum from wrecked Allied and German aircraft, underscored the complexities of Germany’s aluminum strategy. Italy was self-sufficient in aluminum and even exported to Germany.

On the Allied side, although the USSR was self-sufficient in bauxite, it accepted finished aluminum from the US. The United States imported bauxite from South America and provided finished aluminum to the UK and USSR.

Copper

The United States, while self-sufficient in copper, took various actions to support exports to the UK and USSR, including closing gold mines and transferring workers to copper mines, discontinuing copper pennies, releasing copper miners from active duty to mine copper, and forming the Metals Reserve Company to buy up ore from neutral countries. The UK imported copper from South Africa, Canada, Chile, and the Belgian Congo to meet its copper needs. Germany relied on sources such as Yugoslavia and Sweden for copper.

Conclusion

The strategic self-sufficiency or deficiency in raw materials significantly influenced the military and economic strategies of the major belligerent nations during World War II. The Axis nations’ pursuit of autarky and the challenges they faced in achieving economic self-sufficiency underscored the complexities of their raw material policies. In contrast, the Allied nations’ reliance on trade partnerships and global networks reflected their strategic approach to addressing raw material deficiencies.

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to your desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise, only the data visible on the screen will download.

Self Sufficiency or Deficiency; Strategic Raw Materials and Foodstuffs Data

*includes Austria and Czechoslovakia

**Includes: Korea, Kwantung, Manchukuo, and Mandates

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 274, Table 77

Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

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Strong isolationist sentiment ran deep throughout the United States post World War I and grew during the 1930s.  The America First Committee, a leading isolationist organization, held rallies often featuring Charles Lindberg and were regular guests on national radio shows. Additionally, Congress enacted several Neutrality Acts during the 1930s barring or limiting arms trade with warring nations.  Even the rise of Hitler’s Nazism in Germany and Japan’s expansionism in the Pacific did little to quell the isolationists.

Against this backdrop Lend-Lease was not a foregone conclusion.  The Neutrality Act of 1935 strict bans were lessened in follow on acts. However, they were still an obstacle of providing support to potential future allies on a scale President Roosevelt thought necessary.  Isolationist sentiments started shifting with Germany’s Polish invasion, but it still took over a full year before more than 50% of Americans believed we should fight against the Axis powers. 

Enactment

The 77th US Congress on March 8, 1941, passed the Lend-Lease act (subtitled “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States”) which President Roosevelt signed into law on March 11, 1941. The first beneficiary was Great Britain and her Commonwealth of nations. Lend-Lease was later extended to China in the spring of 1941 and to the Soviet Union in November 1941. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, fully ended isolation discussion in America. Lend-Lease allowed the United States to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense of the United States.” 

Implementation

Complicating Lend-Lease was the need to further develop an undersized US Army.  The US Navy of 1940 could stand toe to toe with any nation. Conversely, the US Army ranked seventeenth, just after Romania, with 190,000 personnel worldwide.  On top of this the US Army’s equipment was either obsolete World War I leftovers or nonexistent. The strategy developed during American British Conversations and aligned with President Roosevelt’s policy was to aid nations already engaged with Axis powers first.

Lend-Lease exports in 1941 were mainly food and industrial goods destined for England. By 1943 a billion dollars per month of guns, tanks, planes, trucks, jeeps, gasoline, food, and more were being provided to allied nations. In the first six months of 1944 the dollar figure rose to 1.5 billion a month. By the end of the war about 15% of the US total war budget went to Lend-Lease.

US Lend-Lease Dollar Value by Recipient Nation Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Real History Online. “Lend-Lease WW2 – American Supply to the Allies.” https://www.realhistoryonline.com/articles/lendlease-ww2/, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Lend-Lease Data Links

Recipients of US Aircraft Production

Value of Materials Supplied by the US to its Allied Nations

WW2 Allies: US Lend-Lease to the USSR, 1941-1945

US Factory Deliveries of Military Airplanes by Recipient

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Transition From Civilian to Military Production

Herman Goring was famously quoted as saying that Americans could produce razor blades and refrigerators but not military equipment. At that time there was a kernel of truth to his statement, but it was backwards looking versus forwards looking. United States industry even in the mire of the Great Depression was outproducing the big three Axis nations combined. Its automotive and locomotive industries were world leaders.

President Franklin Roosevelt tapped William Knudsen, President of General Motors, to work with other US industry leaders to meet the needs of the American military and eventually her allies as well. The US’ industrial coordination versus the other nations of the time was more informal. Most of these industrialists worked with their existing supply chains to develop and produce needed military hardware. Handshake deals were common earlier on just to get things moving. Things became more formalized as the War Production Board and its sub-boards and committees. This included the Combined Munitions Assignments Board a joint US and UK controlling allocations of war materiel to allied nations.

Manufacturing Facilities

Due to the Great Depression numerous manufacturing facilities were either idle or underutilized. Using existing infrastructure help jump start the transition from civilian to military production. Additionally, the US Office of Production Management froze production, sales, or deliveries of commercial vehicles effective on January 1, 1942. This freed up all US automobile and truck manufacturers to be dedicated to war production. The ban of commercial vehicle sales would last until October 1945. This type of action was not limited to the automobile industry as numerous other industries also transition to military production as well.

Labor Availability

The United States was slowly coming out of the Great Depression with a 1933 unemployment rate high of 24.9% and an equally high underemployment rate. The unemployment rate for 1940 was 14.6% and 1941 was 9.9%. These rates quickly dropped in 1942 to 4.7% and then remained under 2.0% for the remainder of the war. Therefore, at the beginning of the war many men were looking and available to step up. As the volunteers and drafted men went into the services industry tapped into the then nontraditional labor forces such as women and minorities. 

Counteracting use of previously unemployed and nontraditional labor sources were a myriad of labor strikes. The AFL- CIO pledged to no strikes for the war’s duration. Some companies took advantage of the pledge and reduced benefits often resulting in wildcat strikes.

Production Output

Tank production as well as other military production rose to phenomenal heights during the war. This was based upon mass manufacturing techniques, year over year improvements due to climbing the learning curves, manufacturers sharing designs and other technology, and an able workforce.

M4 Sherman Tank Production By Manufacturer Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Sources: Hunnicutt, R.P. “Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank”, Echo Point Books & Media 2015, Stansell, P. and Laughlin, K. “Son of Sherman Vol 1: The Sherman Design and Development.” The Ampersand Group, Inc., 2013, Data accessed at The Sherman Tank Site, “The Place For All Things Sherman Tank.”, http://www.theshermantank.com/tag/tank-factories/, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Vehicle Production and Availability Data Links

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

USSR – Germany Tank Production and Losses by Month

German, US, and USSR Tank Production 1938-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.