Note : Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan 1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.

Each of the countries involved in World War II produced a wide range of successful aircraft that played important roles in the war effort. Here are some of the most successful planes produced by each country in their respective roles:

Selected Aircraft by Country

Germany

Messerschmitt Bf 109: This fighter aircraft was fast, maneuverable, heavily armed and highly successful in its role, with over 30,000 produced during the war. 

Focke-Wulf Fw 190: This fighter aircraft was heavily armed and armored. It was particularly good in ground-attack missions.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka: This dive bomber was highly effective in its role especially in the early days of the war. It was responsible for inflicting significant damage on enemy ground forces and infrastructure.

United Kingdom

Supermarine Spitfire: This fighter aircraft was highly successful in its role, particularly during the Battle of Britain, playing a significant role in defending Britain from German air attacks.

Avro Lancaster: This heavy bomber was heavily armed and armored and highly successful.  It was responsible for dropping most of the bombs on Germany during the war playing a significant role in disrupting German industry and infrastructure.

United States

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress: This heavy bomber known for its ability to defend itself, but when paired with long range escort fighters it became very lethal.

North American P-51 Mustang: This fighter aircraft initially was a so-so performer, but when it was paired with the Rolls Royce Merlin engine it became a champion providing long-range escort for American bombers.

USSR

Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik: This ground-attack aircraft was the most produced plane of WWII. It was well tailored for the Soviet use of aircraft supporting land forces.

Yakovlev Yak-3: The Yak-3 was fast, maneuverable, and well suited to dogfighting. Following Soviet manufacturing and maintenance concepts it was simple to construct and maintain.

Philosophical Differences

The philosophical differences between the Allied and German air forces during World War II were significant reflecting broader differences in military strategy and doctrine. Here are some of the key differences:

Strategic bombing

The Allied air forces, particularly the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), believed in the doctrine of strategic precision bombing, which involved targeting enemy industry and infrastructure with large-scale bombing raids. The goal of strategic bombing was to disrupt the enemy’s ability to wage war. The German air force, on the other hand, did not place as much emphasis on strategic bombing, and instead focused on providing ground support to German troops and achieving air superiority over enemy forces.

The Allied air forces, especially the British Royal Air Force (RAF) believed that targeting enemy morale was a key part of their strategy. They conducted many strategic area bombing raids on civilian targets in order to lower enemy morale. The German air force, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on targeting enemy morale, and instead focused on achieving military objectives.

Technology

The Allied air forces placed a greater emphasis on technological innovation and development than the German air force. The USAAF invested heavily in the development of advanced bombers such as the B-17 and B-29, as well as fighter planes such as the P-51 Mustang. The German air force developed several advanced aircraft, such as the Me 262 jet fighter, but was hampered by resource shortages and production difficulties.

Tactics

The Allied air forces developed advanced tactics for achieving air superiority and conducting bombing raids. The RAF used the “Big Wing” formation, which allowed large numbers of fighters to engage enemy aircraft at once, first introduced during the Battle of Britain. While the USAAF used the “combat box” formation, which allowed large numbers of bombers to protect each other from enemy fighters, this technique was most successful with the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers. 

To counter Allied night bombing raids, the German air force developed various defensive techniques. One such technique was the “Himmelbett,” or “four-poster bed,” which utilized radar ground stations to direct fighter planes to the target during night raids. To successfully intercept the enemy bomber, each target required the coordinated efforts of two Freya radar units. One unit would track the bomber while the other would track the intercepting night-fighter. A ground controller would then guide the fighter using the radar data until its own Würzburg short-range radar picked up the target bomber.

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR Data

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Source: World-War-2.info, “World War 2 Death Count Per Country”, http://www.world-war-2.info/statistics/, Data accessed June 28, 2022

Additional Aircraft Production Data Links

WWII Most Produced Combat Aircraft by Model

Annual Allied Axis Military Aircraft Production 1939-1945

Total Military Aircraft Production of Allies versus Axis

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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Axis and Allied Mobilization Responses

Axis War Visions

Germany

Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. And the early days proved out Germany’s expectations, beginning in 1935 with Germany violating the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military conscription on through to France signing an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940. 

During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. 

Although Germany’s prewar vision required industrial and military mobilizations it did not envision that of total war. Accordingly, Germany’s early war manpower mobilization geared up for quick victories. For example, Operation Barbarossa launched against the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941, and was expected to last between six and eight weeks. Operation Barbarossa goal was the establishment of ‘a line of defense against Asiatic Russia’, stretching from the Volga to Archangelsk.

Operation Barbarossa was a planned quick campaign. In any case the fight on the Eastern Front was not expected to last into winter. The Germans accepted that the Soviets would ally with the British once Operation Barbarossa began. However, Hitler and his military leaders saw this as inconsequential, believing that the Wehrmacht would crush the Soviet Union before Britain could provide any aid.

Japan

Outside of the ongoing war in China the Japanese saw a rapid expansion into the southwest Pacific followed by a negotiated peace. Japan believe they could expand their empire and control the much-needed resources that they lacked. “They planned to fight a war of limited objectives and having once secured these objectives to set up a defense in such depth that the United States would find a settlement favorable to Japan an attractive alternative to a long and costly war. To the Japanese leaders this seemed an entirely reasonable view.” (1)

(1) Morton, Louis, “Command Decisions Japan’s Decision for War, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC 1990, Page 122, https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm, accessed on March 29, 2023

Allies War Visions

It is almost counterintuitive that the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan all fascist governments would act so independently of each other. Whereas the Allied nations of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) three nations with a constitutional monarchy, a representative democratic republic, and a communist government would coordinate at a high level. 

Both the UK and the Soviet Union envisioned a long haul and coordinated their mobilization of manpower and economies accordingly. The US was the last entry into the fray, but they also mobilized along the lines of their allied nation partners. 

An Awkward Alliance

Despite their vastly different political systems, these nations worked towards a common goal of defeating their enemies. High level conferences at Tehran and Yalta with Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin in attendance. However, there were more than two dozen conferences with high-ranking Allied representatives coordinating intentions, materiel, and industries shaping their war effort. Teams implementing these conference decisions continued 

Training

The Axis powers, led by Germany, initially had a significant advantage in terms of training and experience. Both Germany and Japan had invested heavily in military training and had a highly trained and experienced military at the start of the war. However, as the war dragged on, both began to suffer from a shortage of manpower, and the quality of its troops began to decline. In response, they began to rely more heavily on conscription of both younger and older recruits and the use of poorly trained and inexperienced soldiers, leading to a decline in the overall quality of its forces.

In contrast, the Allied powers, led by the United States, took a different approach to training new recruits. The US military invested heavily in training and education, with a focus on developing highly skilled and well-trained soldiers. The US military also made use of modern technology and tactics to give its troops an edge in battle. As the war progressed, the Allies were able to draw on a larger pool of manpower and resources, allowing them to maintain a high level of training and experience among their troops.

Towards the end the Allies were providing better in depth and amount of training for their new troops. The Allies rotated experienced men into training roles to impart their hard gained knowledge.  Axis new recruits heard very little from the experienced veterans as they continued in their fighting roles often until they became a casualty statistic. 

Allied versus Axis Manpower 1939-1945 Data

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Note: German manpower was unknown for 1945. Post author used 7,000,000 as an estimate.

Source: Harrison, Mark. “The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison”, Cambridge University Press (1998) Page 29

Other Manpower Data Links

Comparative Military Manpower Sept 1939

Military Manpower by Nation 1940 to 1945

German Armed Forces Manpower by Year

US Military Branches Manpower and Deaths

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US Percentage of Industrial Output

The United States, even mired in the depression in the period 1936 to 1938, manufactured almost one-third of the world’s products (32.2 percent). The United States outproduced Germany about three times (10.7 percent) and Japan almost ten times (3.5 percent). Taking the United States prewar productivity in terms of production per man-hour as the standard and giving it a value of 100, the following chart indicates the relative productivity ranking of World War II foes. One must not forget, however, that the United States was “almost alone in increasing rather than diminishing consumer output during the war.” To reiterate the point, all belligerents fiercely produced munitions during the war, not just the United States. America possessed advantages that none of the other warring states had. Its output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In short:, America’s munitions production in World War II was no “miracle.” (1)

(1) Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Industrial culture

The Allied nations and the Axis nations saw the upcoming war very differently and their industrial mobilization reflected their visions. Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials.

Japan foresaw a quick expansion into the Pacific nations followed by a negotiated peace. Both Germany’s and Japan’s visions required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all foresaw a long war and mobilized their industries and military accordingly. The Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy utilized mass production techniques within their five-year plans. The United Kingdom and the United States capitalistic approach were capable of mass production in order to achieve their profitability goals.

Although both Japan and Germany both planned and implemented a war economy earlier than the Allied nations, they never achieved the industrial mobilization levels of their foes. Germany saw a short war(s) therefore total industrial mobilization not needed. “By September 1941 Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cutbacks in war production.” (2)  Additionally, the Allied nations mobilized nontraditional labor especially women to their munitions and war materiel factories. For example, German domestic servants dropped from 1.5 to 1.3 million or 20%, whereas British dropped from 1.2 to 0.7 million or 58%.  German factories for most of the war ran single shifts whereas Allied factories went to 24-hour production days.

(2) D’Olier, Franklin, Chairman, Alexander, Henry C. Vice-Chairman, “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War)”, September 30, 1945, Page 2

Industrial policy

The Allied nations cooperation through the Big Three Conferences, Combined Boards, and Lend-Lease identifying industrial and raw material gaps and priorities. Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union transition from identifying raw materials for all war materiel manufacturing needs to obtaining completed weapons platforms and focusing on expanding production capabilities where they had greater expertise.

Japan, Germany, and Italy acted mostly without prior consultation with their Axis partners. Italy did not know that Germany would invade the Soviet Union. Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to her Axis partners. The Axis nations did not coordinate much in the areas of weapon development or raw material sharing.

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes Data

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Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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Conscription

Great Britain

Great Britain introduced conscription in the 1930s, but it was limited in scope and duration compared to the conscription that took place during World War II. The conscription during the 1930s was used to supplement the existing volunteer army and was often introduced in response to specific crises. It was generally limited to men aged 20 to 22, and the period of service was typically six months. The conscription during World War II was expanded to include men aged 18 to 41 and women aged 20 to 30. It affected millions of people and was in effect for the entire duration of the war and beyond.

During the 1930s, there were provisions for conscientious objectors who were opposed to military service on religious or moral grounds. These objectors could perform alternative forms of service, such as working in hospitals or on farms. However, during World War II, the government was less accommodating, and many objectors were sent to prison or forced to perform dangerous work. The conscription that took place during the 1930s was relatively short-lived, and there were important gaps in time between the different periods of conscription. In contrast, conscription during World War II was a massive effort that affected millions and continued for the entire duration of the war and beyond.

National Service was made mandatory for men up to the age of 60, including military service for those below 51. This was due to a lack of volunteers for police and civilian defense work, as well as a shortage of women for the auxiliary units of the armed forces.

United States

In 1920 The National Defense Act establishes a system of voluntary recruitment. Therefore, the United States did not have a conscription program in the 1930s and instead relied on a relatively small standing army and a National Guard composed of citizen-soldiers. However, the US introduced conscription on a massive scale with the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, which required all men aged 21 to 45 to register for the draft. 

During World War II, there were provisions for conscientious objectors, but the government was less accommodating than during the 1930s. Conscription during World War II continued until the end of the war and beyond, with some forms of conscription continuing until 1973.

 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 allowed the US to rapidly expand its military manpower in response to the growing threat of war in Europe and Asia. By the end of the war 50 million men between eighteen and forty-five had registered for the draft and 10 million had been inducted in the military.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union implemented a large-scale conscription program throughout the 1930s and during World War II. During the 1930s, all men aged 21 to 23 were required to serve in the military for two years, 

Germany launched a surprise attack on its ally, the USSR’s western border on June 22, 1941. In response, the government passed a new military service law in October 1941, which required all male citizens aged 16 to 28 to be liable for military service. Later the age range was expanded to include men aged 18 to 45. 

Women were also conscripted during World War II, with an estimated 800,000 serving in combat and support roles. The length of service for conscripts during World War II varied, but many served for the duration of the war. 

The Soviet Union used conscription during the 1930s as a means of indoctrinating soldiers with communist ideology, while during World War II, the focus was more on military training and the needs of the military.

Germany

Germany introduced conscription in the 1935, but it was limited in scope and duration compared to the conscription that took place during World War II. The conscription during the 1930s was used to rapidly expand Germany’s military forces, but it was often limited in scope and duration and was used to supplement the existing volunteer army. Additionally, the conscription law of 1935 required draftees to show evidence that they were “Aryan.”

The conscription during World War II was introduced on a massive scale and affected millions of people, both men and women. The age range was expanded to include men aged 16 to 60, and the period of service was longer than during the 1930s. The government was less accommodating to conscientious objectors during World War II than during the 1930s.

Even within the war years Germany’s military conscription program underwent significant changes. In 1940, the conscription program was limited to men aged 18 to 45, with a standard period of service of one year. However, by 1944, the age range had been expanded to include boys as young as 16 and men as old as 60, and the period of service had been extended to two years. Health requirements were also relaxed, and conscientious objectors were treated more harshly. These changes reflect the increasingly dire circumstances that Germany faced during the later years of World War II, as the country’s manpower needs became more desperate.

Japan

During the 1930s, Japan had a relatively small standing army and relied on conscription to supplement its military manpower. The conscription program required men aged 20 to 24 to serve for two years. However, during World War II, Japan greatly expanded its military forces, and conscription was used to mobilize millions of men and women for the war effort. The age range was expanded to include men aged 15 to 60, and the length of service was extended to several years.

During the 1930s, Japan had provisions for conscientious objectors, but these were not well-established or well-respected. During World War II, the government was less accommodating to conscientious objectors, and many were subject to harsh penalties, including imprisonment or execution. Additionally, during World War II, Japan began conscripting women into the military, with an estimated 100,000 serving in support roles. These changes reflect Japan’s growing militarism and the country’s increasing involvement in World War II.

Starting from 1938, Korean and Formosan subjects of the empire were allowed to volunteer for service, but they were usually assigned to labor battalions. In 1944, Japan began to conscript Koreans and Formosans for service, but these were desperate measures that were too late to alter Japan’s final fate in 1945.

Military Manpower by Nation 1940 to 1945 Data

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*Germany’s manpower for 1945 is unknown

Source: Trueman, C. N. “Weapons And Manpower.” https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/weapons-and-manpower/, Data accessed on July 22, 2022

Other Manpower Data Links

Comparative Military Manpower Sept 1939

Allied versus Axis Manpower 1939-1945

Combat Forces on the Eastern Front Manpower Ratios

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Production Share

In 1940 and 1941 the UK was the leading warship producer by tonnage. In 1942 the US took over that role. 1941 was the year that the Axis nation had their largest share of the production pie at 36.2%. By 1943 the axis percentage stood at 11.9% and would fall to 7.5% by 1945.

Production Capacity

Historically not only were the UK and the US leading worldwide naval forces they were leading shipbuilders as well. The UK and the US could and would convert commercial shipbuilding facilities into military shipbuilding facilities. For example, prior to the war years Harland & Wolff in Belfast, Northern Ireland was famous for building ocean liners. However, during the war years Harland & Wolff transitioned to building built Abercrombie-class monitors and cruisers. Similar stories could be told of other British and American shipbuilders.

Liberty Ships

The production story of the Liberty ships is well known as the Kaiser shipbuilding facilities were able to reduce production time from more than a year to less than 90 days. Lesser known is Kaiser’s production of the Casablanca-class escort carrier. Kaiser’s bid to produce fifty escort carriers in two years was rejected as the Navy believed this was impossible. It took President Roosevelt’s advisers to intercede and award the contract. Kaiser delivered the fifty escort carriers on time.

The US was simplifying the design and using mass production techniques to produce quantity. The Axis nations were trying to streamline their production processes but overall, they were using traditional one at a time techniques. The US had forty-four shipbuilding facilities along their eastern, western and gulf coasts. The Great Lakes added eleven more bringing the grand total to fifty-five production facilities during the war years. 

For the most part the UK and US shipbuilding facilities were not attacked by their enemies whereas the Axis facilities found themselves under Allied bombardment. Freedom from enemy harassment allowed their facilities to be set up with emphasis on production first and foremost.

Warships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940 to 1945 Data

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*submarines only. Germany produced very few surface vessels between 1940 and 1945.

Trueman, C. N. “Weapons And Manpower.” https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/weapons-and-manpower/, Data accessed on July 22, 2022

Other Naval Vessel Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Naval Forces

US Army Dead Weight Tonnage Pacific and Atlantic, Nov 41 – Dec 42

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage (>= 1,600 gross tons)

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Tank production was a key factor in determining the outcome of the conflict. Here’s a breakdown of tank production numbers for each major belligerent, as well as the factors that limited their production:

Germany

Germany produced a total of approximately 47,000 tanks during the war. However, production was limited by several factors, including shortages of raw materials, labor, and production capacity. In addition, the complexity of German tank designs made them more difficult and time-consuming to produce than their Allied counterparts. Germany’s production of tanks was also competing with the production of other weapons platforms, such as aircraft, artillery, jet fighters and rockets. As a result, tank production was often limited by shortages of key materials and skilled labor.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union produced a total of approximately 102,000 tanks during the war, making it the largest tank producer of the conflict. However, production was also limited by shortages of raw materials and production capacity, as well as the need to relocate factories eastward to avoid being overrun by the advancing German army. Additionally, Soviet tank production was often competing with the production of other key weapons platforms, such as aircraft and artillery.

United States

The United States produced a total of approximately 88,500 tanks during the war, with production ramping up significantly after the entry of the United States into the conflict in 1941. However, production was initially limited by a lack of experience in tank design and manufacturing, as well as shortages of raw materials and production capacity. US tank production initially lagged other weapons platforms due to the prioritization of aircraft as well as naval and merchant ship production, which was seen as more crucial to the war effort.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom produced a total of approximately 20,150 tanks during the war. Production was limited by several factors, including shortages of raw materials and production capacity, as well as the need to balance tank production with other wartime needs especially air and sea production.

Although the Allied nations tank production suffered due to competing weapons platforms thereby limiting their tank production. Despite this limitation the Allied nations that were able to produce a larger number of tanks which enabled them for success on the battlefield.

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945 Data

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Trueman, C. N. “Weapons And Manpower.” https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/weapons-and-manpower/, Data accessed on July 22, 2022

Other Production Data Links

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

Allies Axis Vital Commerce and Raw Materials

German Soviet War Production, 1940-45

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Total Losses

The total number of airplanes lost during World War II is difficult to determine with complete accuracy due to varying definitions of what constitutes a “loss” and incomplete or inconsistent record-keeping in some cases. However, estimates suggest that the total number of airplanes lost during the war was nearly 400,000.

The majority of these losses occurred on the Eastern Front, where the Soviet Union and Germany engaged in some of the largest and most intense aerial battles of the war. The Soviet Union alone lost an estimated 106,400 aircraft during the war, while Germany lost around 77,000.

Other countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, also suffered significant losses of aircraft during the war. The United States lost around 95,000 aircraft, the United Kingdom lost around 42,100 aircraft, and Japan lost around 50,000 aircraft.

The loss of aircraft during the war was a significant drain on resources for all countries involved, as each lost not only the cost of the aircraft itself, but also the resources and manpower required to produce and maintain them. Additionally, the loss of experienced pilots and crew members was a significant blow to the effectiveness of air forces, particularly as the war progressed and the need for trained personnel increased.

Noncombat Losses

Estimates suggest that a significant number of aircraft lost during World War II were due to non-combat reasons. Factors such as accidents, mechanical failures, and weather conditions all contributed to the loss of aircraft during the war.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of planes lost due to non-combat reasons, as record-keeping was not always consistent or complete. However, some estimates suggest that up to 30% of aircraft losses may have been due to non-combat reasons.

United States

From December 1941 through August 1945 the United States lost over 42,000 planes due to noncombat reasons, with accidents being a significant contributor to these losses. Specifically, a total of 13,873 planes were lost due to accidents that occurred within the continental US. This was a result of over 52,000 accidents that took place within the country, with 6,039 of these incidents resulting in 14,903 fatalities. (1)

• “United States Air Force Statistical Digest World War II”, Office of Statistical Control, December 1945, Page 309, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

The aviation world was transitioning from cloth covered biplanes to aluminum cladded jet aircraft during the war years. However, aviation was still in its early stages. In 1941, the accident rate for military aviation was 92 accidents per 100,000 flying hours. By 1945, this rate had been reduced to 43 accidents per 100,000 hours, a significant improvement of nearly one half. 

Maybe the strangest noncombat aircraft losses occurred on March 23, 1944, Mount Vesuvius erupted, causing immediate devastation to a B-25 bomber outfit stationed at Pompeii Airfield at the base of the volcano. Although the men of the 340th Bombardment Group were able to evacuate and avoid casualties, their fleet of 88 bombers was entirely destroyed.

Axis Downward Spiral

Both Germany and Japan produced more aircraft in 1944 than in any other year. In fact, Germany production rose from 25,527 units in 1943 to 39,807 units in 1944 a year over year rise of 55.9%. Japan’s numbers were equally impressive their production rose from 16,693 units in 1943 to 28,180 units in 1944 a year over year rise of 68.8%. And yet they both in a death spiral in their ability to wage an air war.

There were several reasons for this death spiral but one of the biggest was that both German and Japanese pilots were receiving less and less training in operational type aircraft. See figure 9 above from the “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey The Defeat of the German Air Force” showing how Germany’s pilot training compared to both the Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force training hours by year during the war. An estimate of 25% of German planes from late 1943 to the end of the war were being lost in noncombat or nonoperational activities.

WW2 Aircraft Losses by Country Data

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Source: World War Wings. “WWII Aircraft Losses By Country.” https://worldwarwings.com/wwii-aircraft-losses-by-country/, Data accessed June 30, 2022

Other Aircraft Production, Losses or Availability Data

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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Vengeance Weapon 2

The average V-1 cost 5,090 Reichsmarks (RM) (approximately $2,000 in 1944) whereas a V-2 cost 100,000 RM at the beginning of 1944 and dropped to 50,000 RM by the end of the war. The V-1 required approximately 800 manhours of labor whereas the V-2 required 20,000 hours in early 1944 and decreased to 10,000 hours per unit by war’s end. Over 30,000 V-Is were produced whereas just over 3,000 V-2s were produced even though the first operational launches were only two months apart.

During its development phase numerous design issues were discovered through testing. This was a slow process as each issue had to be identify down to its root cause and appropriate corrective action taken. This included moving away from the pressure tanks utilized by the V-1 to deliver fuel to turbopumps, reengineering the combustion chamber to preclude burn through, and a host of other technical issues.

Production

Hitler authorized mass production of the V-2 in December 1942. However, a year and a half later mass production issues plagued the program. The Royal Air Force launched Operation Hydra at the Peenemunde production site neared readiness resulting in a four-to-six-week delay. Even though mass production had been authorized the design was still in flux and a finalized parts list still did not exist by the mid 1944.

Due to the Allied bombing efforts V-2 production was moved underground to the Mittelwerke production facility. As Peenemunde production wound down Mittelwerke production ramped up. Mittelwerke production facilities were underground well away from Allied bombers. A total of 515 V-2s were produced at Peenemunde and 6400 V-2s at Mittelwerke.

Specifications

The V-2 weighed 27,600 pounds, stood 45 ft 11 inches, and had a war with an explosive weight of 2000 pounds. The V-1 carried a slightly smaller warhead at 1,870 pounds versus the V-2’s warhead at 2,000 pounds.

Operations

V-2 rockets were most often transported by train at night and launched quickly from mobile launch sites. A dedicated tow vehicle, Meillerwagen, was used to move the V-2s from the train depot and erect the rocket at the mobile launch sites. The mobile launch sites were Germany’s response to the Allied targeting fixed launch sites or underground bunkers. 

First Launch and Targets

First launch occurred on September 7, 1944, when two units were launch at Paris, but both failed shortly after launch. The next day would see the first successful operational V-2 as one was launched and struck Paris. The most frequently targeted countries were Belgium 1,664 and England 1,402 times. The most targeted cities were Antwerp 1,610 and London 1,358 times.

V-2 Production Estimates Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

“Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter IX, Table IX-2, Page 121, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Buil-1

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

*Source: “Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Page 54, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html

The USAAF 8th and 15th

The United States Army 8^th and 15^th Air Forces played a major role in the Allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany during World War II. Both the 8^th and 15th Air Forces were tasked with carrying out bombing missions against German aircraft manufacturing sites. These strategic bombing missions were designed to reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability to produce aircraft and engines, as well as to disrupt the production of aviation fuel and other supplies. 

The 8th Air Force’s bombing campaign was relentless and targeted the major German airframe and air engine manufacturers, such as Focke-Wulf FW 190, Messerschmitt Me 109 and Me 262, Heinkel He 177 and He 111, Junkers Ju 88 and 188, and BMW engine plants. Over the course of the war, thousands of aircraft took part in these missions. In total, the 8th Air Force flew over 200,000 sorties, dropping over 800,000 tons of bombs on Germany.

The 15^th Air Force originally stationed in Tunisia and later in Italy also targeted German airframe and air engine manufacturers. This included Messerschmitt Me 109, Me 410, and Me 262 aircraft plants. Among the missions the 15^th flew against engine manufacturers included five missions against the BMW Munich/Allach and five missions against the Daimler-Benz Wiener Neudorf factory.

The Big Week

Both the 8^th and 15^th Air Forces along with the RAF participated in Operation Argument or as it would become to be known as the Big Week. From February 20-25, 1944, the Allies bombing campaign focused on Germany’s aircraft industry in order to gain air superiority over the European skies. Air superiority was a requirement for a successful D-Day operation. Not only were aircraft manufacturers, especially fighter manufacturers, targeted but also airfields and aviation fuel supplies. 

But the biggest goal of the Big Week was elimination of as many of the existing Luftwaffe’s fighters as possible as well as introduction of new fighters. Prior to the Big Week Allied fighter escorts stayed close to their bombers and the Luftwaffe fighters stayed back at a distance. However, during the Big Week Allied escort fighters for the first time were ordered to leave the bombers and go directly after the German fighters. 

In some ways the results of the Big Week were mixed, but loss of fighters on the Allied side saw quick replacements with trained crew versus German replacement with ill trained crew. Although Germany was still producing large quantity of fighters the Luftwaffe was now in an operational downward spiral. German airmen, aircraft, and fuel qualities were degrading day by day. 

The results of these missions were devastating for the German aircraft industry. By D-Day the Allies had air superiority which would become air domination by the end of the war. This had a significant impact on the Luftwaffe, as it was no longer able to produce new aircraft and engines. This lack of new aircraft and engines severely weakened the German air force and was a major factor in the Allied victory in World War II.

USAAF 8th and 15th Missions Flown Against Aircraft Industry Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

“Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Table V-4, Page 60, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

Bomb Tonnage Dropped on Aircraft Industry by UK and US Air Forces

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Tonnage Dropped

Prior to January 1944, the USAAF 8^th and 15^th Air Forces dropped a total of 28,030 tons on German aircraft manufacturers whereas in the first five months of 1944 they dropped a total 28,121 tons on that same strategic industry. The graphic shows two spikes in the USAAF bombing of the German aircraft industry, the months just prior to and the months just after D-Day. The months prior led to air superiority and the months after led to air domination.

The shape of the European battlefield was changing as the RAF and USAAF ramped up their bombing campaigns. Allied air forces strategically targeted Germany’s aircraft industry versus the Eastern Front where both Germany and the USSR primarily used their air forces to support army land actions. However, the German Luftwaffe gradually shifted their emphasis to the west.

Fighters and anti-aircraft guns, such as the famed 8.8 cm flax gun, more and more faced the UK and US Air Forces rather than the Soviet Air Force or Army. The 8.8 cm flax gun, better known in the west as the 88 mm, no longer was prioritized for the Eastern Front as an anti-tank weapon. Although a land front had not yet opened in France the Soviet Army saw some relief as weapon platforms and personnel were shifted west.

The 8^th Air Force dropped a total of 47,671 tons of their total 691,470 tons (6.87%) on Germany’s aircraft industry. The 15^th Air Force dropped a total of 14,352 tons (2.55%) of their total 545,000 tons on Germany’s aircraft industry. The RAF dropped a total of 29,000 tons (2.75%) of their total 1,060,000 tons on Germany’s aircraft industry. Overall, the Allies bomb tonnage dropped on Germany’s aircraft manufacturers total 91,047 tons or 3.95% of the 2,296,470 tons dropped.

Strategic Bombing Priority

Prior to May 1944 the German aircraft industry along with U-boat bases were the highest priority Allied strategic bombing targets. Post D-Day German aircraft industry sites were given a lower priority. Almost as many missions were flown against the German aircraft industry sites, but now they were secondary targets or even targets of last resort. Part of the reason for lowering the priority was that Germany had effectively dispersed their manufacturing sites making then less appealing a target.

In September 1944 Germany’s new wonder weapon, jet airplanes, were in the highest priority category after that of oil. Jets remained a high priority throughout the rest of the war. However, since jet production facilities were largely underground it was difficult to damage them.

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Table V-2, Page 58, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022, Source: 8th Air Force Statistical Summary; and for 15th Air Force, Tabulating Section, USSBS.

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.