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UK National Income and Expenditure 1938-1945 Data

Source: Hancock, W.K. and Gowing, M.M. “British War Economy.” United Kingdom Civil Series, London, 1949, Page 347, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-Stats-3.html

Other Government Spending Costs Data Links

New Construction Activity In The United States 1939-1945 Data

The Costs of The Manhattan Project

US Congressional War Department Allocations – 1939

Combat Munitions Production, Allies versus Axis, 1935-44

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Background

Both the US and the UK were separated from the land masses where armies faced off. In the Pacific it is was more apparent that the battles and movement would be decided by sea and air at least until the actual invasion of Japan. In Europe both the US and UK were physically separated from the continent, therefore the air and sea wars initially would take priority.

How the US and UK practiced total war in WWII was different from the other major belligerents. Both the US and UK armies, navies, and air forces would be involved worldwide and needed to allocate their resources accordingly including which weapons platforms got priority. The Soviet strategy focused on land battles with their air force mainly providing combat support. Germany’s naval forces focused on interdicting the flow of the Allies war materiel, but their strategic goals were seizing land in the east. Japan strategic intention was to quickly seize territories they desired and then holding on until a negotiated peace. 

Soviet versus German and Japanese Mobilization

The Soviet Union along with its two Allied nations mobilized their industries quickly utilizing women and other nontraditional labor sources. Both Germany and Japan were slower to use nontraditional labor sources in their factories. Although the Allied nations had internal competition from the military branches for resources, they were much more effective through their coordinating committees to allocate resources and who got which weapons platforms or resources.

Naval Strength

Both the US and UK began WWII as naval powerhouses. The UK was considered the strongest in the world followed closely by the US. The UK and US were alone in thinking that strategic bombing would be an effective use of their air forces. In part it was their traditional naval strength and belief in air warfare that led to their resource allocations. They believed that their navies could not only move men and materiel but also could constrict and pin down their enemies. 

However, it is in the air that the UK and US practices would differ from the other combatants. For a successful D-Day the Allies required air superiority. And their air forces went after it in every way possible. They bombed and strafed the: natural resources needed by Germany’s aircraft factories, transportation facilities suppling those factories, aircraft factories, personnel building the aircraft, pilot training facilities, aircraft prior to deployment, airfields, maintenance facilities, ground personnel, and the German pilots themselves in one-on-one combat.

The desired outcome was costly to Allied airmen and aircraft and it was also slow in coming, but it was devastatingly effective against the Germans in the end. The Allies gained air superiority in western Europe which became air domination. This air strength limited German movement on the ground. Eventually, as demonstrated in Operation Cobra, it would lead to the most effective land air combined arms capability in the war.

US War Cost Data

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Source: O’Brien, Phillips Payson. “How The War Was Won Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.”, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018. Page 55. ISBN 978–1–107–71689-5

Other US War Cost and Production Data Links

US WW2 Production – Other

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

US WW2 Production – Guns and Munitions

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

US Army 1930s

US Army Ranking 1939

The US Army total personnel on June 30, 1939, equaled 188,565 which included 672 Army Nurses. Depending on how the comparisons are made the US Army ranked from 17^th to 19^th largest in the world. Many of their future Allied nations and Axis opponents had spent the 1930s gearing up for action while the US Army mainly held status quo.

US Prewar Military Spending

During the interwar years a wave of isolationism and pacifism engulfed the United States. Many Americans were leery of international involvements especially those in Europe that could include the military. This led to a prevailing notion that American armed forces should focus solely on defense and not offense. This idea was influenced by the Washington Treaties for arms limitation (1922) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929), which further reinforced this policy. 

US military spending in the 1930s reflected that attitude. During the 1930s the major nations spent the following percentages of their GDPs on their militaries; Soviet Union – 13.0%, Japan – 9.2%, Italy – 7.7%, Germany – 7.3%, the United Kingdom – 5.9%, and the United States – 1.1% (1).

(1) Source: Military Expenditure as a Share Of GDP (OWID Calculated Based on NMC, Cow & Sipri (2017)), https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-as-a-share-of-gdp-long?time=1922..1945

New Weapons Funding

Congress provided limited funding for new weapons in 1939, $84 million or 18.5% of the Army budget. Further analysis of appropriations during the preceding decade, computed on the same basis, showed the following percentages of Army budget devoted to new equipment: 1930-8.5%, 1931-9.2%, 1932-9.6%, 1933-6.2%, 1934-3-2%, 1935-7.6%, 1936-15.3%, 1937-16.3%, 1938-14.1%, 1939-18.5% (2). 

(2) Source: Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 31, Note 16, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch02.htm#b3

Lack of new weapons funding was felt most in areas of new development such as aircraft. There were several factors that contributed to the United States’ limited development and procurement of new weapons during the 1930s.

Firstly, the aftermath of World War I had left the US with a surplus of weaponry and equipment that was still functional but largely outdated. This surplus was seen as a resource that could be utilized before any new purchases were made. Furthermore, there was a general aversion to military spending and war in the country, which was still grappling with the effects of the Great Depression.

Secondly, the US military was focused on maintaining and modernizing its existing equipment rather than developing new weapons. This was due in part to a lack of funding and resources, as well as a belief that existing equipment could be upgraded to meet new challenges.

Thirdly, there was a lack of urgency in the US military’s approach to modernization. The country was not directly involved in any major conflicts during the 1930s, and there was a belief that the US was protected by its vast oceans and its naval strength.

Lastly, there were political constraints on military spending during this time. Many politicians were wary of increasing military spending and believed that it was important to prioritize domestic programs and social welfare.

US Congressional War Department Allocations – 1939 Data

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(a) The 1939 appropriations totaled $646,000,000 but, of these, $192,000,000, or nearly 30 percent, were for nonmilitary purposes, such as Panama Canal costs and rivers and harbors work. The military items were thus divided, roughly in millions of dollars and relative percentages

(b) These figures, amounting to less than $1 or 0.1 percent, are absorbed in reaching the rounded totals.

(c) Further analysis of appropriations during the preceding decade, computed on the same basis, showed the following percentages of money devoted to new equipment: 1930-8.5%, 1931-9.2%, 1932-9.6%, 1933-6.2%, 1934-3-2%, 1935-7.6%, 1936-15.3%, 1937-16.3%, 1938-14.1%, 1939-18.5%. A War Department computation, employing different minor items, appearing as an unsigned memorandum in CofS files, Emergency, bndr t, shows new equipment and ammunition as follows: 1937-17%, 1938-16%, 1939-19%, 1940-33%.

Still another computation accompanies a statement by Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, 28 May 40, copy of which is in a compilation by H. W. Cater, “Annotations of War Department Spokesmen Relative to the Inadequacy of the National Defense during the Period 1919 to 1941,” in Cater files, 1941 folder, Kist Div files. It concludes that of $6,169,300,000 military appropriations for the Army over 16 years (1925-40) 86.1 % was for “recurring changes and improvement of plant,” 8.3% for Air Corps equipment, and only 5.6% for arms and equipment of the ground forces.

Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 31, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch02.htm#t1

Other Government Spending Costs Data

New Construction Activity In The United States 1939-1945 Data

UK National Income and Expenditure 1938-1945

The Costs of The Manhattan Project

Combat Munitions Production, Allies versus Axis, 1935-44

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WW2 Munitions Expenditure per Military Personnel: Allied Nations vs. Germany

Allied Nations: Intensive Munitions Production 

The Allied nations adopted a long-term existential strategy, with a primary focus on defeating Germany first. They recognized the importance of resource sharing and collaboration to maximize their military capabilities. The United Kingdom and the United States emphasized mechanization and munitions expenditure to minimize casualties and strategic bombing to cripple enemy infrastructure. Technology sharing and improvement were encouraged, with close engagement with industrialists to ensure efficient production.

The Soviet Union, while also emphasizing mechanization and munitions expenditure, aimed to supplement its large frontline forces. They relocated factories to the Urals and implemented a scorched earth policy for those that couldn’t be transferred. The Soviet industries, although under a command-and-control economy, had more flexibility in managing resources and supplies compared to Nazi-controlled industries.

Germany Strategy and Economic Management

Germany’s strategy lacked clarity, particularly in terms of economic management. They consistently violated the Versailles Treaty without facing significant consequences, as they believed they would engage in a series of appeasements or short wars. The concept of blitzkrieg, a war of movement, was expected to rapidly crush opposing armies. The initial success of these diplomatic and military operations led Germany to believe that they did not need to fully mobilize their economy for long-term warfare.

German Economy

The German economy was controlled by the state, with prices set by the Nazi bureaucracy favoring the Nazi state but leading conquered nations to the verge of collapse. Resources were directed towards political ends rather than economic efficiency. Additionally, Germany did not fully utilize the industrial strengths of the territories they occupied. Instead of having these factories continue producing defense products, Germany plundered and looted them, resulting in suboptimal use of acquired machine tools.

Challenges in German Industrial Adaptability and Labor Motivation

Germany’s industrial management faced challenges due to the Nazi hierarchy’s unfamiliarity with industrial requirements. The Nazi-managed industries were not as adaptable or nimble in responding to changing demands. Forced or slave labor, often working under fear and lacking motivation to produce quality products, became common. Sabotage efforts, such as notching dipsticks or deliberately withholding key components like ball bearings, further hindered production.

Conclusion

The contrasting approaches to munitions expenditure per military personnel between the Allied nations and Germany during World War II were influenced by strategic considerations, economic management, and industrial adaptability. The Allied nations prioritized intensive munitions production from the beginning, focusing on mechanization, technology sharing, and efficient resource allocation. In contrast, Germany’s strategy relied on short wars and the belief in highly trained troops, leading to a slower build-up process and challenges in managing captured territories’ industrial strengths. These divergent approaches played a significant role in shaping the outcomes of the war and the effectiveness of each nation’s military capabilities.

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Munition Expenditure per Military Personnel Data

Source Harrison, Mark. “Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938‐1945.” Published in the Economic History Review, 41:2 (1988), pp. 175

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Historical Tables Budget of the U.S. Government

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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Munitions Spending Ratios and Military Pay 

Allied Nations: Emphasis on Munitions Production

From the outset, the Allied nations were committed to mass arms production, recognizing the importance of a well-equipped military. They prioritized logistics, ensuring that materials reached the front lines promptly and that vehicles were repaired and maintained efficiently. Mechanized forces, characterized by trucks rather than horses, were prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom, while the Soviet Union relied on both mechanization and horses for logistics. However, the Soviet reliance on horses was to a much lesser extent than Germany’s.

Industrial productivity was a key strength of the Allied nations. They embraced a culture of part standardization, assembly lines, and employing a significant percentage of low-skilled labor. Long production runs without design changes allowed for streamlined manufacturing. The end products of the United Kingdom and the United States emphasized reliability, while the Soviet Union prioritized quantity and low-cost production.

The reliance on technology and mechanization by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union was rooted in their respective experiences and strategic considerations. The United Kingdom drew lessons from the casualties suffered in World War I, leading to a focus on minimizing losses through technology. The United States initially embraced isolationism, perceiving the war in Europe as a distant affair, but eventually recognized the need for technological superiority to preclude high casualties. The Soviet Union, while emphasizing manpower and willing to accept high casualty rates, also embraced mechanization to a greater extent than Germany.

Germany: Craftsmanship and Manpower Emphasis

Unlike the Allies, Germany did not adopt a total war mentality regarding munitions production until later in the war. Expecting a series of short wars, they believed they could rely on their craftsmanship culture and the ability to make specific changes to each end item to achieve superior quality. This approach required higher-skilled workers and allowed for individual end-item customization. Without standardization, this drove intensive military manpower costs during depot and frontline repairs.

Germany’s military culture placed a high value on highly trained troops, emphasizing their willpower over firepower alone. While their Panzer armies were mechanized, the rest of the German forces relied heavily on trains and horses for logistics. Therefore, a lower munitions cost by reliance on military manpower.

Spending Ratios and Strategic Differences:

The spending ratios for munitions versus military pay reveal the divergent strategies employed by the Allies and Germany. The Allied nations allocated a significant portion of their resources to munitions production, recognizing the importance of a well-equipped military. Germany, on the other hand, placed a higher emphasis on manpower, expecting shorter wars and relying on highly trained troops.

Conclusion:

The spending ratios for munitions versus military pay during World War II highlight the differing strategies and priorities of the Allied nations and Germany. The Allies focused on mass arms production, logistics, and industrial productivity, while Germany emphasized craftsmanship, manpower, and highly trained troops. The contrasting approaches played a significant role in determining the outcome of the war, as the Allies’ commitment to munitions production and technological superiority ultimately tipped the scales in their favor.

Allies-German Spending Ratios, Munitions vs Military Pay Data

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Source Harrison, Mark. “Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938‐1945.” Published in the Economic History Review, 41:2 (1988), pp. 175

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Historical Tables Budget of the U.S. Government

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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Sea Power

Of the five major WW2 belligerents, Germany, Japan, UK, US, and USSR only the Soviets did not prioritize munitions spending on naval vessels and aircraft.

Japan

Japan, the UK and the US were all major sea powers prior to WW2 with the UK and the US projecting power worldwide and Japan more regionally in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Five-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy in 1922 mandated a set ratio of warship tonnage which allowed the United States and the United Kingdom 500,000 tons, Japan 300,000 tons, and France and Italy each 175,000 tons.

Several follow-on conferences were held between 1927 and 1935, and the results modified the original the Five-Power Treaty to address tonnage ratios, cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary ships.  Cruisers became a sticking point as the original treaty limited the size but not how many could be built, and all raced to build as many as possible. The provisions in both the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 treaties were set to expire in 1936. Japan ended further participation upon the 1936 expiration date.

Germany

Germany post World War I was extremely bound by treaty to a small navy and was allowed to expand it to 45% of the UK’s naval tonnage by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. Germany withdrew from the agreement in 1939 with intentions to expand their fleet. No matter how much Germany wanted to expand their naval capacity it wasn’t possible given all the competing demands from the other military branches. Germany made the strategic decision to concentrate on submarines as their naval vessel of choice.

United Kingdom

The Royal Navy, still the largest in the world in September 1939, had 332 commissioned ships and would add 553 more prior to the end of the war. As the war progressed the Royal Navy expanded rapidly with large construction programs, particularly escort carriers, destroyers, corvettes, frigates, submarines, landing ships and craft.

The UK developed tactics and technologies to counter the rising German U-boat threat. Convoys were organized and provided escort defenses. As the war wore on and the merchant ships became faster as the older slower ships were culled out it became rarer that a convoyed ship was sank. With the advent of ASDIC, later called SONAR, and centimetric radar the escorts were able to electronically track submarines. To this the Royal Navy developed tactics, such as Raspberry to counter in a coordinated manner.

United States

Like the United Kingdom the United States had large commercial and military shipbuilding facilities with long established capabilities. The US had forty-four shipbuilding facilities along their eastern, western and gulf coasts. The Great Lakes added eleven more bringing the grand total to fifty-five production facilities during the war years. Even beyond military vessels the US was building a fleet of merchant marines with Liberty and Victory ships. The US simplified merchant marine ship design and used mass production techniques to produce quantity.

Combat Munitions Production, Major Belligerents, 1935-44 Data

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Note: * Figures for 1935-9 are given as cumulative expenditure in the source, annual average expenditure in this table. Source: Goldsmith, ‘Power of victory’, p. 75.

Source Harrison, Mark. “Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938‐1945.” Published in the Economic History Review, 41:2 (1988), pp. 172

Other Cost and Production Data

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Warplanes Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

Warships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940 to 1945

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Naval Forces

US Army Dead Weight Tonnage Pacific and Atlantic, Nov 41 – Dec 42

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage (>= 1,600 gross tons)

British and Commonwealth Navies at the Beginning and End of World War 2

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Combat Munitions

Definition

Combat munitions are weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices designed and used specifically for military operations. These can include firearms, grenades, rockets, bombs, and other types of explosives. Combat munitions are designed to cause damage to enemy personnel, equipment, and infrastructure in order to achieve military objectives.

Situation

Germany attempted to manufacture a wide range of military equipment, including tanks, guns, airplanes, submarines, missile systems, fortresses, small arms, and V-1 and V-2 vengeance weapons. However, they did not initially standardize or focus on a select few platforms or models, resulting in a confusing array of trucks, motorcycles, aircraft, and other equipment that complicated production and logistics.

Whereas the Allies worked together not just on the operational aspects but how to best ensure that their industries were producing as much as possible. For example, Lend-Lease provided the Soviet Union extensive railway equipment. The USSR not having to produce 1,977 locomotives, 11,075 railway wagons, or 622,000 tons of railway rails allowed their internal industries to concentrate on other needed war production. 

Additionally, the Allies from the start built a few models of trucks, tanks, and other platforms to better rationalize their production and logistic systems.

War Vision

Germany

Germany anticipated conducting a series of brief wars or seizing control of neighboring states through political actions. And early events proved Germany’s expectations, beginning in 1935 when Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by reinstating conscription, through France agreeing to an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940.

During the 1930s, Germany mobilized its military and industry for war to a greater extent than other European nation. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations, which included constructing synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials.

Although Germany’s prewar vision necessitated industrial and military mobilizations, it did not foresee total war or a prolonged conflict. As a result, Germany’s early war industrial mobilization geared up for swift victories. For instance, in 1942 only 10% of the workforce in tank, artillery, armor vehicles, and small arms industries was working double shifts.

Allies

It is almost counterintuitive that the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan which were all fascist governments would act so independently of each other. Whereas the Allied nations of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) three nations with a constitutional monarchy, a representative democratic republic, and a communist government would coordinate at a high level. 

Both the UK and the Soviet Union envisioned a long haul and coordinated their mobilization of manpower and economies accordingly. The US was the last entry into the fray, but they also mobilized their industries along the lines of their allied nation partners.

Mass production was key for the Allies, keeping designs simple and robust whenever possible. Minimizing numbers of model types and ensuring production runs which would benefit from economies of scale.

Combat Munitions Production

Germany attempted to manufacture a wide range of military equipment, including tanks, guns, airplanes, submarines, missile systems, fortresses (such as the Atlantic Wall), small arms, and V-1 and V-2 vengeance weapons. However, they did not initially standardize or focus on a select few platforms or models, resulting in a confusing array of trucks, motorcycles, aircraft, and other equipment that complicated production and logistics.

In contrast, the Allies collaborated not only on operational aspects but also on optimizing their industrial output. For instance, Lend-Lease provided the Soviet Union with significant railway equipment, enabling them to avoid producing 1,977 locomotives, 11,075 railway wagons, and 622,000 tons of railway rails and concentrate on other crucial war production.

Furthermore, the Allies streamlined their production and logistic systems by building a limited number of truck, tank, and other platform models from the outset, improving efficiency and coordination.

Outcome

The Allies relied on mass production geared towards a long-protracted war. The Axis nations foresaw a series of short wars either overrunning their foe or quickly ending in a negotiated peace. By the time the Axis nations fully accepted that they were in a total war ending years away they had already fallen well behind the production curve with no capability of catching up.

Combat Munitions Production, Allies versus Axis, 1935-44

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Source Harrison, Mark. “Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938‐1945.” Published in the Economic History Review, 41:2 (1988), pp. 172

Note: * Figures for 1935-9 are given as cumulative expenditure in the source, annual average expenditure in this table. Source: Goldsmith, ‘Power of victory’, p. 75.

Other Government Spending Costs Data

New Construction Activity In The United States 1939-1945 Data

UK National Income and Expenditure 1938-1945

The Costs of The Manhattan Project

US Congressional War Department Allocations – 1939

The Economics of the Second World War: Seventy-Five Years On

For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Manufacturing Differences

US automobile manufacturing was the 1930s epitome of mass production not only at home but worldwide. Tasks were broken down to simple repetitive steps which were easily learned and accomplished. Parts were highly interchangeable, and the end products had little variation from one to the next except for a few options such as color. Changes in design happened on an annual basis and those needing to occur midyear were implemented in blocks maintaining the streamlined manufacturing as much as possible. 

Aircraft manufacturing was on the other end of the spectrum from automobile mass production. Highly skilled laborers often working as teams assembled the aircraft per detailed and often complicated work instructions covering a multitude of steps. Part interchangeability was the hope for situation but often grinding and shimming was required in order to achieve fit. Changes occurred on almost every aircraft resulting in very few identical planes. 

Adaptation to Meet War Demands

Both the automobile and aircraft industries had to adapt to meet the military demands. To the degree possible aircraft manufacturers borrowed heavily from the automobile assembly line and block changes approach. The aircraft manufacturers would never approach the streamlined methods of the auto industry, but there was room for vast improvement. One method involved using modifications centers to retrofit changes after the plane was fabricated versus stopping the production line to incorporate new designs. 

The automobile industry learned that designs couldn’t be locked down so readily since the deliverable products were often just out of the research and development phase. Therefore, changes arose as performance, manufacturability, and other issues were discovered. Their planning processes were adapted to implement more frequent block changes than they previously used while maintaining as streamlined a production flow as possible. 

The automobile industry was used to producing a high number of products off their assembly lines and utilized huge expensive presses to stamp out a large volume of identical parts. However, lower volumes and frequent changes meant using large presses would be time and cost prohibitive. Both the automobile and aircraft manufacturers developed techniques to form lighter weight materials such as aluminum by roll forming. Roll forming evolved during the war to utilize less expensive forms that required less lead time and often depended upon a skilled technician to perform the operation.

The automobile industry, the Big Three as well as their supply chains and subsidiaries, ended up producing a wide variety of new to them products. These included tanks, aircraft, torpedoes, radar, PT boats, and anti-aircraft guns.

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Facilities and Workers Data

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Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Units and Dollar Value Data

For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Economic and Manufacturing Data Links

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

Percentage of World Motor Vehicle Production, 1936

Total Military Aircraft Production of Four Major Powers: 1939-44

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Post World War I

The end of World War I saw United States aircraft government sales declined dramatically as orders were cancelled with no other government procurements in the offing. Unlike their European counterparts the United States in the 1920s did not subsidize the nascent commercial airline industry. Additionally, European governments continued military aircraft development and procurement post World War I.

Air Mail and the Rise Of Commercial Airlines

Although not initially seen as significant as commercial airline subsidies the US did subsidize air mail where manufacturers such as Boeing were able to survive the interwar years. In 1927 Boeing won the Chicago to San Francisco air mail route. Their bid was a third lower than their competitor, Western Air Express. But Boeing based their bid on not only carrying the mail but using these routes for paying passengers as well. Thus, Boeing figured out how to springboard air mail delivery service into a commercial airline business. Other airframers and airlines soon followed suit and a thriving industry emerged.

Even without commercial airline subsidies United States aircraft manufacturing grew annually by 74.5% from 1923 (263 units) through 1929 (6193 units). However, the Great Depression reversed that trend with an annual growth rate of -29.6% from 1929 (6193 units) through 1933 (1324 units). By the late 1920s the US military market by dollar volume was larger than the commercial market.

In 1928, the last full calendar without any great depression impacts, 3,582 civil aircraft were sold valued at $17,194,000. During the same year 1,219 military aircraft were sold valued at $19,066,000. With the onset of the great depression both the military and civil markets plummeted. The military market over the next eight years average 60% of their 1928 total units sold whereas the civil market only averaged 34% of their 1928 total units sold.  By 1936 the military market recovered to 94% of their 1928 units sold level while the civil market was just starting to rebound and was at a 44% level of their 1928 units sold.

Late 1920s profits on air mail and military sales soared resulting in public outcry. Pratt & Whitney made 36% on Navy aircraft and Boeing’s profits ranged up to 25% on Army and Navy procurements. Congress acted with the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 limiting profits on Navy orders to 10 percent. It took another five years before Congress limited profits on Army aircraft at 12 percent.

Late 1930s Market Valuations

By 1937 ninety-eight US aircraft manufacturers competed in the market space. However, the military market required higher levels of performance, engineering, manufacturing complexity, and investment. Thus, less than a fifth of the ninety-eight manufacturers produced military aircraft. The military market in the late 1930s accounted for 70% of the marketplace valuation and the larger aircraft manufacturers became more dependent upon military sales. 

Aircraft Manufacturers Percentage Sales to US Government 1931-37 Data

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Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 22, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data

US Military Civilian Aircraft Market 1926-36

Production Runs of Soviet Aircraft, 1941-1945

Warplanes Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

US War Cost of Production by Category

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The military market over the next eight years average 60% of their 1928 total units sold whereas the civil market only averaged 34% of their 1928 total units sold.  By 1936 the military market recovered to 94% of their 1928 units sold level while the civil market was just starting to rebound and was at a 44% level of their 1928 units sold. On average the US aircraft industry sold 34.2% of their units to the military and 65.8% to the civilian market. However, by market valuation 60% was in the military market and 40% in the civilian market.

The Golden Years of Aviation

The Golden Years of Aviation are the period of aviation between the two world wars 1919 through 1939.  By 1937 ninety-eight US aircraft manufacturers competed in the market space. However, the military market required higher levels of performance, engineering, manufacturing complexity, and investment. Thus, less than a fifth of the ninety-eight manufacturers produced military aircraft. The military market in the late 1930s accounted for 70% of the marketplace valuation and the larger aircraft manufacturers became more dependent upon military sales.

These golden years saw a major transformation in the aircraft industry going from fabric covered biplanes to aluminum cladded airliners, fighters, and bombers. Research and development moved from small garage shops to systematic engineering and laboratory facilities. New forms of manufacturing were required to form aircraft curved sections without incurring the high-cost presses utilized by automotive industry. The US aircraft manufacturers were learning the basics of program management.

Production Upgrades

Assembly line production and economies of scale transformed US industrial manufacturing into a juggernaut. Aircraft manufacturers were in a bind implementing these transformational practices as their production rates were low. Produce enough parts to achieve economy of scale and the parts might be obsolete before they are needed. Therefore, corporate financial analysts came into play working with engineers and program managers finding the best economic balance.

With the upsurge in civil and military aircraft manufacturers in a new industry saw ideas sprout forth at a high level. Employees traveled from one employer to the next taking lessons learned with them. Cross pollination of ideas was an American manufacturing strength implemented via conferences and symposiums both within an industry, across industries, with academia, with the government, and sometimes with all. Technology advances were copied and improved upon. 

Financial incentives to improve technology and capture profits were protected by strong patent laws. Patented technology usage agreements between companies allowed the patenting company to maintain an income stream thus protecting their initial innovation investments. 

Comparative Importance of US Military Civilian Aircraft Markets Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 21, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other US Production Data Links

US WW2 Production – Other

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

US WW2 Production – Guns and Munitions

US War Cost of Production by Category

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.