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Oil Availability

Germany’s oil sources were limited, and the country faced significant challenges in maintaining its oil supply. Germany produced some oil domestically, primarily from fields in the north of the country, but domestic production was limited and could not meet the country’s needs. To supplement its supply, Germany developed a process for synthesizing oil from coal, seized oil reserves in occupied territories such as Norway and Romania, and traded with neutral countries such as Spain and Sweden. However, these sources were not enough to sustain Germany’s war effort, and oil shortages had a significant impact on the country’s military operations. Ultimately, the lack of oil was one of the key factors that contributed to Germany’s defeat in World War II.

The Allies’ strategic bombing campaign had a significant impact on Germany’s oil supply. The bombing raids targeted oil refineries, production facilities, and transport infrastructure, causing significant damage and disruption to Germany’s oil supply. As a result, Germany was forced to rely more heavily on synthetic oil produced through the Fischer-Tropsch process, which was expensive and less efficient to produce.

Allied Targeting Transportation and its Effects on Oil Supply

The Allied bombing campaign targeted transportation infrastructure critical for Germany’s oil production and supply. The railway system was a key target, as it was critical for transporting oil from production facilities to refineries and distribution centers. The bombing raids targeted railway yards, bridges, and lines of communication, causing significant damage and disruption to the railway system.

Oil refineries were another critical target, as they were responsible for processing crude oil into usable fuel. The bombing raids targeted refineries, storage tanks, and other key infrastructure, causing significant damage and disruption to the refinery network.

German Oil Allocations

Germany allocated its oil supply primarily to military operations, with the military receiving most of the available supply. Some oil was allocated to essential services, such as hospitals and emergency services, while the remaining oil was allocated to civilian use. However, civilian use was heavily restricted and subjected to rationing to conserve the available oil supply. Despite these efforts, Germany’s oil supply was insufficient to sustain its war effort, and shortages of oil and other resources contributed to the country’s eventual defeat in the war. 

Germany allocated its oil supply within the military based on prioritizing the needs of different branches, with the Luftwaffe receiving a higher priority than the Kriegsmarine. Offensive operations were given a higher priority than defensive operations, as they required more fuel. The allocation of oil was a critical issue for the military, and Germany implemented conservation measures to stretch the available oil supply further. To conserve the available oil supply, Germany implemented measures such as reducing the speed of vehicles and planes and limiting training exercises.

Despite these efforts, shortages of oil and other resources contributed to Germany’s eventual defeat in the war. Competition between branches for access to oil was common, and the allocation of oil played a significant role in shaping Germany’s military operations during the war.

German Aviation, Motor, and Diesel Fuels Availability Data

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* Availability includes; internally produced, imported, and in 1940 captured fuels: aviation 275 motor 309 and diesel 200 (000 metric tons).

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 276, Table 83 selected data

Other Oil Data

German versus US Oil Production

US Vehicles Per Unit and Fuel Consumption Rates

Self Sufficiency or Deficiency; Strategic Raw Materials and Foodstuffs

US Crude Oil First Purchase Price

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Lend-Lease Categories

Raw Materials

Copper – In an unusual twist the Soviet Union was providing copper along many other raw materials to Germany per the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940).  Most of the copper was destined for electric equipment used extensively in major weapon platforms, energy systems and telecommunications. Lend-Lease was 41.1% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II. 

Aluminum – Aircraft required lightweight and strong metals for their performance characteristics and in the 1940s none was better than aluminum.  Soviet aluminum production dropped from 59.9 thousand metric tons in 1940 to 34.5 thousand metric tons the following year.  Not until 1943 would Soviet production levels recover to their prewar numbers.  In the meantime, the Soviets needed more than even their prewar levels provided. Lend-Lease was 51.5% of the aluminum available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Tin – Tin was classified as a strategic material since tin-coated steel cans prevented food acids from corroding the steel.  Tin coated packaging was also used in medical supplies for the same reason. Supplied tin was 69.0% of the tin available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Cobalt – Military grade steel required cobalt. The British and Germans wrangled over control of Turkish cobalt exports each threatening trade embargoes.  Cobalt was another raw material that Germany negotiated with the Soviet Union in the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940). Western supplied cobalt was 58.0% of the cobalt available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Transportation

Railway Equipment – Lend-Lease took on many forms some less glamorous than others but still significant. Railcars and railway rails aren’t often thought of by the general public when thinking about supporting a war ally. However, not having to produce 1,977 locomotives, 11,075 railway wagons, or 622,000 tons of railway rails allowed USSR’s internal industries to concentrate on other needed war production. Lend-Lease was 91.1% of the railway wagon and 36.1% of the railway rails available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Vehicle tires – All major combatants in WWII were deficient in rubber and the Soviet Union was no exception. Germany in the 1930s began synthesizing rubber knowing they would not have ready access to the raw material.  Vehicle tires – Lend-Lease was 30.4% of the vehicle tires available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Military Grade Materiel

Explosives – Explosives are used at prodigious rates almost always well beyond the largest forecasts.  The Eastern Front with the millions on each side engaging on fronts hundreds of miles long consumed materiel like no where else. Lend-Lease was 34.6% of the explosives available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Aviation fuel – The Soviet Union out produced all European Axis nations in crude oil production. However, octane boosters and aviation fuels were in short supply and Lend-Lease filled that gap.  Prior to the US entry into the war the US was responsible for 63%* of the world’s oil production. Additionally, the US had extensive adjacent industries developing and producing petroleum, oil, and lubrication products. In all 2,700,000 tons of petroleum products were supplied through Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease was 35.5% of the aviation fuel available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

* Source: American Foreign Relations, https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html

Food

Often overlooked is the effect of the German invasion in 1941-42 on the USSR’s breadbasket, Ukraine.  The USSR lost 40% of its state farms as well as farm animals, farm equipment, and labor. Per US Embassy and Consulates in Russia 4,500,000 tons of foodstuffs were transferred to the USSR via Lend-Lease. There are stories of Soviet troops throwing empty Lend-Lease food cans at German troops just to irritate them.

• Sugar – Lend-Lease was 39.8% of the sugar available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Canned meat – Lend-Lease was 82.8% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Animal fats – Lend-Lease was 51.6% of the animal fats available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Other

• Wool – Lend-Lease was 21.4% of the wool available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Lend-Lease Deliveries Compared to USSR Internal Production Data

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Source: Real History Online. “Lend-Lease WW2 – American Supply to the Allies.” https://www.realhistoryonline.com/articles/lendlease-ww2/, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Lend-Lease and Production Data

Recipients of US Aircraft Production

WW2 Allies: US Lend-Lease to the USSR, 1941-1945

US Lend Lease Dollar Value by Recipient Nation

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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US Percentage of Industrial Output

The United States, even mired in the depression in the period 1936 to 1938, manufactured almost one-third of the world’s products (32.2 percent). The United States outproduced Germany about three times (10.7 percent) and Japan almost ten times (3.5 percent). Taking the United States prewar productivity in terms of production per man-hour as the standard and giving it a value of 100, the following chart indicates the relative productivity ranking of World War II foes. One must not forget, however, that the United States was “almost alone in increasing rather than diminishing consumer output during the war.” To reiterate the point, all belligerents fiercely produced munitions during the war, not just the United States. America possessed advantages that none of the other warring states had. Its output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In short:, America’s munitions production in World War II was no “miracle.” (1)

(1) Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Industrial culture

The Allied nations and the Axis nations saw the upcoming war very differently and their industrial mobilization reflected their visions. Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials.

Japan foresaw a quick expansion into the Pacific nations followed by a negotiated peace. Both Germany’s and Japan’s visions required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States all foresaw a long war and mobilized their industries and military accordingly. The Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy utilized mass production techniques within their five-year plans. The United Kingdom and the United States capitalistic approach were capable of mass production in order to achieve their profitability goals.

Although both Japan and Germany both planned and implemented a war economy earlier than the Allied nations, they never achieved the industrial mobilization levels of their foes. Germany saw a short war(s) therefore total industrial mobilization not needed. “By September 1941 Hitler was so confident that he had succeeded in Russia that he ordered large scale cutbacks in war production.” (2)  Additionally, the Allied nations mobilized nontraditional labor especially women to their munitions and war materiel factories. For example, German domestic servants dropped from 1.5 to 1.3 million or 20%, whereas British dropped from 1.2 to 0.7 million or 58%.  German factories for most of the war ran single shifts whereas Allied factories went to 24-hour production days.

(2) D’Olier, Franklin, Chairman, Alexander, Henry C. Vice-Chairman, “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War)”, September 30, 1945, Page 2

Industrial policy

The Allied nations cooperation through the Big Three Conferences, Combined Boards, and Lend-Lease identifying industrial and raw material gaps and priorities. Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union transition from identifying raw materials for all war materiel manufacturing needs to obtaining completed weapons platforms and focusing on expanding production capabilities where they had greater expertise.

Japan, Germany, and Italy acted mostly without prior consultation with their Axis partners. Italy did not know that Germany would invade the Soviet Union. Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to her Axis partners. The Axis nations did not coordinate much in the areas of weapon development or raw material sharing.

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes Data

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Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 135, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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UK National Income and Expenditure 1938-1945 Data

Source: Hancock, W.K. and Gowing, M.M. “British War Economy.” United Kingdom Civil Series, London, 1949, Page 347, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-Stats-3.html

Other Government Spending Costs Data Links

New Construction Activity In The United States 1939-1945 Data

The Costs of The Manhattan Project

US Congressional War Department Allocations – 1939

Combat Munitions Production, Allies versus Axis, 1935-44

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Background

Both the US and the UK were separated from the land masses where armies faced off. In the Pacific it is was more apparent that the battles and movement would be decided by sea and air at least until the actual invasion of Japan. In Europe both the US and UK were physically separated from the continent, therefore the air and sea wars initially would take priority.

How the US and UK practiced total war in WWII was different from the other major belligerents. Both the US and UK armies, navies, and air forces would be involved worldwide and needed to allocate their resources accordingly including which weapons platforms got priority. The Soviet strategy focused on land battles with their air force mainly providing combat support. Germany’s naval forces focused on interdicting the flow of the Allies war materiel, but their strategic goals were seizing land in the east. Japan strategic intention was to quickly seize territories they desired and then holding on until a negotiated peace. 

Soviet versus German and Japanese Mobilization

The Soviet Union along with its two Allied nations mobilized their industries quickly utilizing women and other nontraditional labor sources. Both Germany and Japan were slower to use nontraditional labor sources in their factories. Although the Allied nations had internal competition from the military branches for resources, they were much more effective through their coordinating committees to allocate resources and who got which weapons platforms or resources.

Naval Strength

Both the US and UK began WWII as naval powerhouses. The UK was considered the strongest in the world followed closely by the US. The UK and US were alone in thinking that strategic bombing would be an effective use of their air forces. In part it was their traditional naval strength and belief in air warfare that led to their resource allocations. They believed that their navies could not only move men and materiel but also could constrict and pin down their enemies. 

However, it is in the air that the UK and US practices would differ from the other combatants. For a successful D-Day the Allies required air superiority. And their air forces went after it in every way possible. They bombed and strafed the: natural resources needed by Germany’s aircraft factories, transportation facilities suppling those factories, aircraft factories, personnel building the aircraft, pilot training facilities, aircraft prior to deployment, airfields, maintenance facilities, ground personnel, and the German pilots themselves in one-on-one combat.

The desired outcome was costly to Allied airmen and aircraft and it was also slow in coming, but it was devastatingly effective against the Germans in the end. The Allies gained air superiority in western Europe which became air domination. This air strength limited German movement on the ground. Eventually, as demonstrated in Operation Cobra, it would lead to the most effective land air combined arms capability in the war.

US War Cost Data

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Source: O’Brien, Phillips Payson. “How The War Was Won Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.”, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018. Page 55. ISBN 978–1–107–71689-5

Other US War Cost and Production Data Links

US WW2 Production – Other

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

US WW2 Production – Guns and Munitions

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

US Army 1930s

US Army Ranking 1939

The US Army total personnel on June 30, 1939, equaled 188,565 which included 672 Army Nurses. Depending on how the comparisons are made the US Army ranked from 17^th to 19^th largest in the world. Many of their future Allied nations and Axis opponents had spent the 1930s gearing up for action while the US Army mainly held status quo.

US Prewar Military Spending

During the interwar years a wave of isolationism and pacifism engulfed the United States. Many Americans were leery of international involvements especially those in Europe that could include the military. This led to a prevailing notion that American armed forces should focus solely on defense and not offense. This idea was influenced by the Washington Treaties for arms limitation (1922) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929), which further reinforced this policy. 

US military spending in the 1930s reflected that attitude. During the 1930s the major nations spent the following percentages of their GDPs on their militaries; Soviet Union – 13.0%, Japan – 9.2%, Italy – 7.7%, Germany – 7.3%, the United Kingdom – 5.9%, and the United States – 1.1% (1).

(1) Source: Military Expenditure as a Share Of GDP (OWID Calculated Based on NMC, Cow & Sipri (2017)), https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-as-a-share-of-gdp-long?time=1922..1945

New Weapons Funding

Congress provided limited funding for new weapons in 1939, $84 million or 18.5% of the Army budget. Further analysis of appropriations during the preceding decade, computed on the same basis, showed the following percentages of Army budget devoted to new equipment: 1930-8.5%, 1931-9.2%, 1932-9.6%, 1933-6.2%, 1934-3-2%, 1935-7.6%, 1936-15.3%, 1937-16.3%, 1938-14.1%, 1939-18.5% (2). 

(2) Source: Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 31, Note 16, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch02.htm#b3

Lack of new weapons funding was felt most in areas of new development such as aircraft. There were several factors that contributed to the United States’ limited development and procurement of new weapons during the 1930s.

Firstly, the aftermath of World War I had left the US with a surplus of weaponry and equipment that was still functional but largely outdated. This surplus was seen as a resource that could be utilized before any new purchases were made. Furthermore, there was a general aversion to military spending and war in the country, which was still grappling with the effects of the Great Depression.

Secondly, the US military was focused on maintaining and modernizing its existing equipment rather than developing new weapons. This was due in part to a lack of funding and resources, as well as a belief that existing equipment could be upgraded to meet new challenges.

Thirdly, there was a lack of urgency in the US military’s approach to modernization. The country was not directly involved in any major conflicts during the 1930s, and there was a belief that the US was protected by its vast oceans and its naval strength.

Lastly, there were political constraints on military spending during this time. Many politicians were wary of increasing military spending and believed that it was important to prioritize domestic programs and social welfare.

US Congressional War Department Allocations – 1939 Data

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(a) The 1939 appropriations totaled $646,000,000 but, of these, $192,000,000, or nearly 30 percent, were for nonmilitary purposes, such as Panama Canal costs and rivers and harbors work. The military items were thus divided, roughly in millions of dollars and relative percentages

(b) These figures, amounting to less than $1 or 0.1 percent, are absorbed in reaching the rounded totals.

(c) Further analysis of appropriations during the preceding decade, computed on the same basis, showed the following percentages of money devoted to new equipment: 1930-8.5%, 1931-9.2%, 1932-9.6%, 1933-6.2%, 1934-3-2%, 1935-7.6%, 1936-15.3%, 1937-16.3%, 1938-14.1%, 1939-18.5%. A War Department computation, employing different minor items, appearing as an unsigned memorandum in CofS files, Emergency, bndr t, shows new equipment and ammunition as follows: 1937-17%, 1938-16%, 1939-19%, 1940-33%.

Still another computation accompanies a statement by Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, 28 May 40, copy of which is in a compilation by H. W. Cater, “Annotations of War Department Spokesmen Relative to the Inadequacy of the National Defense during the Period 1919 to 1941,” in Cater files, 1941 folder, Kist Div files. It concludes that of $6,169,300,000 military appropriations for the Army over 16 years (1925-40) 86.1 % was for “recurring changes and improvement of plant,” 8.3% for Air Corps equipment, and only 5.6% for arms and equipment of the ground forces.

Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 31, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington D.C., Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch02.htm#t1

Other Government Spending Costs Data

New Construction Activity In The United States 1939-1945 Data

UK National Income and Expenditure 1938-1945

The Costs of The Manhattan Project

Combat Munitions Production, Allies versus Axis, 1935-44

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German Prewar Oil Production and Supply  

Germany’s main oil supply in the 1930s were Western Hemisphere nations including the United States, Venezuela, Mexico, and various Caribbean nations. These nations annually supplied between 63% to 72% during the 1930s of Germany’s total oil needs. However, after the start of hostilities in 1939 these supplies were halted by a successful Allied Naval blockade. By 1940 synthetic oil became Germany’s most significant oil source. And by 1942 more than 50% of Germany’s oil was synthetically derived. Finally, by 1944 for every metric ton of home or imported crude oil, Germany produced 1.5 metric tons of synthetic oil. Oil and other natural resources were great German weaknesses. 

Germany’s Oil Synthesis

The synthesis of oil from coal during World War II required several resources and processes. Here are the essential resources involved:

• Coal was the primary raw material used for the synthesis of oil. It served as the carbon source for the production of synthetic fuels.
• Hydrogen gas was required for the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis process, which converted carbon monoxide derived from coal into synthetic oil. Hydrogen could be obtained from various sources, including water and natural gas.
• Catalysts were used in the Fischer-Tropsch process to facilitate the chemical reactions involved in converting carbon monoxide and hydrogen into synthetic oil. Common catalysts included iron, cobalt, and nickel.
• Energy Sources – The synthesis of oil from coal requires energy sources to power the various stages of the process, such as coal gasification and hydrogen production. These energy sources could include coal itself, natural gas, or other fuels.
• Infrastructure – The construction and operation of specialized plants and facilities were necessary for the large-scale production of synthetic oil from coal. These facilities included coal gasification plants, hydrogen production units, and Fischer-Tropsch reactors.

“However successful synthetic oil may have been at granting Germany some degree of petroleum independence, the technology did not come cheap. Capital and construction costs for the average F-T plant were on average RM 30 million ($75 million). Production costs for synthetic oil and refined fuel products were also exponentially higher than that for natural crude. The average manufacturing cost for a barrel of synthetic oil was between RM 32-45 ($13-18) and processed fuel values averaged 23-26 pfennig per kg (approximately 31-44 cents per gallon). In comparison, a barrel of crude oil traded for 93 cents on the U.S. commodities exchange in December 1939, and in the same month a gallon of regular gasoline sold for 13.4 cents at the average New York City service station.” (1)

(1) Keller, Shawn P., Major, USAF, “Turning Point: A History of German Petroleum in World War II And Its Lessons for The Role of Oil in Modern Air Warfare”, Air Command And Staff College Air University, Pages 8-9. See https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1020261.pdf

Peak Production

In the year 1944, Germany’s annual synthetic fuel production reached its peak production at more than 124,000 barrels per day from their 25 plants. In contrast, the US in 1944, when 115/145 octane aviation gas was introduced, would produce 595,238 barrels a day of just aviation gas. The US averaged over five million barrels of oil a day in 1944. The Soviet Union was producing over 800,000 barrels a day in 1944.

In conclusion, Germany’s pursuit of self-sufficiency in oil during World War II led them to develop synthetic oil production from coal. While this technology provided some degree of petroleum independence, it came at a high cost and was not as efficient as natural crude oil. Germany’s annual synthetic fuel production reached its peak in 1944, but it was still significantly lower than the production levels of the United States and the Soviet Union during the same period

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Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 82

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Other Production and Availability Data

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

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Oil played a crucial role in industrial, transportation, and military aspects during World War II. At first blush, oil is viewed as a transportation necessity only. Whereas it serves many industrial and military purposes as well.

Industrial Uses

Oil was essential for powering factories and industrial machinery. It provided energy for manufacturing processes, such as refining metals, producing chemicals, and operating machinery. 

Oil was also a raw material for industrial processes. It was critical in the making of synthetic rubber. Since the Japanese had occupied the Netherlands East Indies which supplied 90 percent of the world’s natural rubber. To produce synthetic rubber required the making of butadiene, its basic raw material which was synthesized from oil.

Military Uses

Naval Operations

Oil was vital for fueling naval vessels, including battleships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and support ships. It allowed for extended range, increased speed, and greater operational capabilities of naval fleets.

Air Power

Oil-fueled aircraft, enable air forces to conduct strategic bombing campaigns, engage in aerial combat, and provide air support to ground forces. It facilitated rapid transportation of troops, supplies, and equipment. 

A distinct Allied advantage was the availability of 100-octane aviation fuel. During the Dunkirk evacuations, both British and German aircraft utilized 87-octane fuel. Before the Battle of Britain, the British aircraft were switching over to 100 octane fuel. The fuel switchover combined with improved superchargers surprised the Luftwaffe pilots with their improved performance. A French petroleum engineer, Eugene Houdry, developed the Houdry process enabling a greater amount of high-octane fuel to be converted from crude oil and lignite coal.  After moving to the US, the process was further developed, and now twice as much high-octane could be converted from crude oil. 

High octane fuel combined with supercharging gave the US and its allies improved engine performance in every aspect. During take-off and climbing it was estimated that the British Spitfires now had a 25% edge over their German counterparts, a 10% edge in speed, and a 12% edge in altitude.

Mechanized Warfare

Oil-powered tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery played a crucial role in ground operations. These vehicles provided mobility, firepower, and protection to ground forces, enhancing their effectiveness on the battlefield.

Germany allocated its oil supply to the military based on prioritizing the needs of different branches, with the Luftwaffe receiving a higher priority than the Kriegsmarine. Offensive operations were given a higher priority than defensive operations, as they required more fuel. The allocation of oil was a critical issue for the military, and Germany implemented conservation measures to stretch the available oil supply further. To conserve the available oil supply, Germany implemented measures such as reducing the speed of vehicles and planes and limiting training exercises.

Transportation Uses

Logistics and Supply

Oil was essential for transportation and logistics, ensuring the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment to various theaters of war. It supported military operations by maintaining supply lines and sustaining the war effort. World War II is seen as the first truly mechanized war by many, however, that was hardly the case between Germany and the Soviet Union.  Once away from a train depot, approximately 80% of German logistics was horse-drawn. About one in six German divisions were mechanized while the other five relied upon the foot soldier to march and the horse to pull. Even though the Soviet Union utilized more horses than Germany they utilized a far greater number of trucks, jeeps, and other motorized vehicles to transport men and materiel. Additionally, the food, materiel, and manpower Germany required to maintain their horses made these divisions less efficient than their enemy counterparts.

Before Germany’s invasion, the Soviet Union had about 270,000 trucks in the military.  Soviet domestic truck production for military purposes was approximately 150,000 vehicles.  Via Lend-Lease over 430,000 trucks were obtained including:

Over 200,000 Studebaker US6 U3, 2.5-ton, 6×6, Cargo Trucks,

Almost 50,000 Willys MB, truck ¼-ton, 4×4, Command Reconnaissance aka Jeep

Over 60,000 Chevrolet G-7107, 1½-ton, 4×4

Importance and Management

Allied Nations

The Allies, particularly the United States, held a significant advantage in oil supply. The U.S. was energy self-sufficient and the leading crude oil producer during the war. It supplied more than 85% of the oil used by the Allies. The Allies’ access to abundant oil resources allowed for sustained military operations and industrial production.

Axis Nations

The Axis powers, especially Germany and Japan, faced challenges in oil supply. Germany had limited domestic oil resources and relied heavily on imports. The Allied oil campaign targeted facilities supplying Nazi Germany with petroleum, oil, and lubrication products, disrupting their access to oil. Japan also faced oil shortages due to embargoes and limited domestic production. Additionally, Allied submarines targeted Japanese oil tankers with devasting results.

In conclusion, oil was fundamental for industrial and military power during World War II. It played a critical role in industrial production, transportation, and military operations. The Allies, with their access to abundant oil resources, had a significant advantage over the Axis powers. The management of oil resources and the disruption of oil supplies through strategic bombing campaigns impacted the war efforts of both sides.

Annual Allied Axis Crude Oil Production 1939-1945 Data

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Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 81

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Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

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The above graph can be downloaded as an image.

Iron and Steel Fundamental for Industrial and Military Power

Industrial Production

Iron and steel are essential materials for industrial production. They are used in the construction of factories, machinery, and infrastructure. The ability to produce large quantities of iron and steel allowed nations to expand their industrial capacity and manufacture the necessary equipment and supplies for war efforts.

Military Equipment

Iron and steel are vital for the production of military equipment, including tanks, artillery, ships, aircraft, and weapons. These materials provide the strength, durability, and resilience required for military operations. The ability to produce sufficient iron and steel was crucial for maintaining a well-equipped military force.

Infrastructure and Transportation

Iron and steel were necessary for building and maintaining transportation networks, such as railways, bridges, and roads. These infrastructure projects were crucial for the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. Additionally, iron and steel were used in the construction of ships, which played a significant role in naval warfare and the transportation of goods.

Industrialization and Economic Power

The production of iron and steel was closely tied to industrialization and economic power. Nations with robust iron and steel industries had a competitive advantage in terms of economic growth and technological advancements. The ability to produce large quantities of iron and steel allowed countries to meet their own needs and export surplus materials to support their war efforts.

Rationing and Supply Chain

During World War II, there were shortages and rationing of various resources, including iron and steel. The demand for these materials was high, and their availability was crucial for sustaining military operations. Rationing programs were implemented to ensure a fair distribution of resources and prioritize their allocation for military purposes.

Annual Iron Production:

1939

The Allies began the war with modest iron production, with the UK leading the way at 14.5 million tons. The Axis powers, particularly Germany, surpassed the Allies with a production of 18.5 million tons. However, it’s worth noting that the USA and USSR iron production did not count against the Allies, as they were not yet aligned with the alliance.

1940

The Allies witnessed a slight increase in iron production in 1940. The UK’s production rose to 17.7 million tons, closely followed by the USA, USSR, and Canada. The Axis nations, led by Germany, continued to outpace the Allies, producing 34.7 million tons collectively.

1941

This year marked a turning point in iron production, with the Allies making significant strides. The USSR emerged as a key player, contributing 24.7 million tons, while the USA and UK also demonstrated substantial growth. However, the Axis nations remained dominant, with Germany producing 53.3 million tons.

1942

Iron production reached its peak for both alliances in 1942. The Allies surged ahead, with the USA leading the charge at 107.6 million tons. The USSR, UK, and Canada also made notable contributions. Despite this, Germany’s production remained formidable, amounting to 50.6 million tons.

1943

Although the Allies maintained a steady iron production, the gap between them and the Axis nations began to narrow. The USA’s production stood at 103.1 million tons, with the USSR, UK, and Canada continuing their contributions. Germany, however, still held a significant advantage with 56.2 million tons.

1944

Iron production declined for both alliances in 1944. The Allies saw a decrease, particularly in the USA, which produced 96 million tons. Meanwhile, Germany’s production dropped significantly to 32.6 million tons, potentially indicating the strain on its industrial capacity.

1945

Unfortunately, the data for iron production in 1945 remains incomplete. However, we can observe that the Allies maintained a consistent production level, with the USA leading the way at 90.2 million tons. The Axis nations’ production is largely unknown, with only Japan’s output recorded at 0.9 million tons.

Conclusion

In summary, iron and steel were fundamental for industrial and military power during World War II. Their production enabled nations to expand their industrial capacity, manufacture military equipment, build infrastructure, and maintain transportation networks. The availability of iron and steel played a crucial role in determining a nation’s ability to sustain its war efforts and contribute to the overall outcome of the conflict.

Analyzing the annual iron production from 1939 to 1945 reveals the shifting dynamics between the Allied and Axis nations. Although the Axis powers initially held a notable advantage, the Allies steadily increased their production, with the USA taking the lead. However, Germany’s industrial might remained a formidable force throughout the war. The data underscores the immense industrial efforts made by both sides and sheds light on the critical role that iron production played in shaping the outcome of World War II.

Annual Allied Axis Iron Ore Production 1939-1945 Data

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to your desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise, only the data visible on the screen will download.

‘—‘ indicates production not counted prior or post being a Allies or Axis nation

‘?’ indicates production value unknown

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 80

Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Annual Allied Axis Coal Production 1939-1945

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referenced. Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites is accurate or will remain accurate.

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

Allied Nations versus Axis Nations

Allied Coal Production

The coal production of the Allied nations saw significant fluctuations throughout the war. In 1939, the Allies produced a combined total of 244.6 million tons of coal. These fluctuations were due to the entries of the Soviet Union and the United States into the war. Additionally, the Soviet Union’s production dropped by nearly 50% in 1942 as the German invasion fully took hold.

Among the Allied nations, the United States was the largest contributor to coal production. Despite starting with zero production in 1939 and 1940, the US ramped up its efforts and reached 562.0 million tons in 1944, making it the leading coal producer among the Allies. The USSR also played a significant role, particularly in 1941 when it produced 151.4 million tons. The UK and Canada contributed consistently throughout the war, with the UK producing 231.3 million tons in 1939 and Canada providing around 13-15 million tons annually.

Axis Coal Production

The Axis nations, led by Germany, also relied heavily on coal production to fuel their war machine. Germany, the primary coal producer among the Axis nations, started with 332.8 million tons in 1939 and experienced continuous growth until 1942 when it reached its highest production of 407.8 million tons. However, Germany’s production gradually declined in the later years of the war, dropping to 432.8 million tons in 1944 and a mere 50.3 million tons in 1945.

Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Japan, the other Axis nations, had comparatively lower coal production. Italy’s production remained relatively stagnant, ranging from 0.0 to 4.8 million tons throughout the war. Hungary and Romania produced around 1-1.4 million tons annually, while Japan’s coal production increased from zero in 1939 to 61.3 million tons in 1944, before dropping to 11.0 million tons in 1945.

Axis Usage and Constraints

Germany, being the largest European producer of coal, faced increasing demands throughout the war. The German military’s escalating needs, coupled with the requirements of occupied economies that previously relied on coal imports from the UK, drove the need for higher coal production. German coal was even exported to the Soviet Union to power trains due to the lower quality of Soviet coal. Finally, Germany’s coal industry was severely affected by strategic bombing, causing disruptions to their transportation, utilities, industry, and domestic consumption. Transportation disruptions were so great that even though coal was being mined in increasing quantities it could not reach its destinations. In fact, there were cases where coal trains were not getting coal to run their locomotives.

Japan, on the other hand, implemented a policy of concentrating resources and production on their most efficient mines. However, with the US embargo restricting the export of essential resources including oil, Japan faced significant challenges in their coal supplies making up for other energy deficiencies. These limitations impacted Japanese industries and added further strain to their war efforts.

Conclusion

The annual coal production of the Allied nations consistently surpassed that of the Axis nations throughout World War II. The Allies, driven by the industrial might of the United States, were able to maintain a steady increase in coal production, peaking in 1944. In contrast, the Axis nations, particularly Germany, faced challenges in sustaining their coal production, leading to a decline in the later years of the war.

The disparity in coal production played a significant role in shaping the war effort, directly influencing each side’s industrial capabilities and energy resources. Ultimately, the Allies’ superior coal production contributed to their eventual victory in World War II.

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to your desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise, only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 275, Table 79

Other Raw Material and Commerce Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Strategic Raw Materials Self Sufficiency or Deficiency

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage

Mobilizing; U.S. Industry World War II

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referenced. Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites is accurate or will remain accurate.