Lend-Lease Categories

Raw Materials

Copper – In an unusual twist the Soviet Union was providing copper along many other raw materials to Germany per the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940).  Most of the copper was destined for electric equipment used extensively in major weapon platforms, energy systems and telecommunications. Lend-Lease was 41.1% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II. 

Aluminum – Aircraft required lightweight and strong metals for their performance characteristics and in the 1940s none was better than aluminum.  Soviet aluminum production dropped from 59.9 thousand metric tons in 1940 to 34.5 thousand metric tons the following year.  Not until 1943 would Soviet production levels recover to their prewar numbers.  In the meantime, the Soviets needed more than even their prewar levels provided. Lend-Lease was 51.5% of the aluminum available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Tin – Tin was classified as a strategic material since tin-coated steel cans prevented food acids from corroding the steel.  Tin coated packaging was also used in medical supplies for the same reason. Supplied tin was 69.0% of the tin available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Cobalt – Military grade steel required cobalt. The British and Germans wrangled over control of Turkish cobalt exports each threatening trade embargoes.  Cobalt was another raw material that Germany negotiated with the Soviet Union in the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940). Western supplied cobalt was 58.0% of the cobalt available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Transportation

Railway Equipment – Lend-Lease took on many forms some less glamorous than others but still significant. Railcars and railway rails aren’t often thought of by the general public when thinking about supporting a war ally. However, not having to produce 1,977 locomotives, 11,075 railway wagons, or 622,000 tons of railway rails allowed USSR’s internal industries to concentrate on other needed war production. Lend-Lease was 91.1% of the railway wagon and 36.1% of the railway rails available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Vehicle tires – All major combatants in WWII were deficient in rubber and the Soviet Union was no exception. Germany in the 1930s began synthesizing rubber knowing they would not have ready access to the raw material.  Vehicle tires – Lend-Lease was 30.4% of the vehicle tires available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Military Grade Materiel

Explosives – Explosives are used at prodigious rates almost always well beyond the largest forecasts.  The Eastern Front with the millions on each side engaging on fronts hundreds of miles long consumed materiel like no where else. Lend-Lease was 34.6% of the explosives available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Aviation fuel – The Soviet Union out produced all European Axis nations in crude oil production. However, octane boosters and aviation fuels were in short supply and Lend-Lease filled that gap.  Prior to the US entry into the war the US was responsible for 63%* of the world’s oil production. Additionally, the US had extensive adjacent industries developing and producing petroleum, oil, and lubrication products. In all 2,700,000 tons of petroleum products were supplied through Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease was 35.5% of the aviation fuel available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

* Source: American Foreign Relations, https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-Oil-and-world-power.html

Food

Often overlooked is the effect of the German invasion in 1941-42 on the USSR’s breadbasket, Ukraine.  The USSR lost 40% of its state farms as well as farm animals, farm equipment, and labor. Per US Embassy and Consulates in Russia 4,500,000 tons of foodstuffs were transferred to the USSR via Lend-Lease. There are stories of Soviet troops throwing empty Lend-Lease food cans at German troops just to irritate them.

• Sugar – Lend-Lease was 39.8% of the sugar available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Canned meat – Lend-Lease was 82.8% of the copper available to the Soviet Union in World War II.
• Animal fats – Lend-Lease was 51.6% of the animal fats available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Other

• Wool – Lend-Lease was 21.4% of the wool available to the Soviet Union in World War II.

Lend-Lease Deliveries Compared to USSR Internal Production Data

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Source: Real History Online. “Lend-Lease WW2 – American Supply to the Allies.” https://www.realhistoryonline.com/articles/lendlease-ww2/, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Lend-Lease and Production Data

Recipients of US Aircraft Production

WW2 Allies: US Lend-Lease to the USSR, 1941-1945

US Lend Lease Dollar Value by Recipient Nation

Tanks Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

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Production Philosophies

Other Soviet productivity gains respective to Germany’s centered around fewer models and willingness to forestall changes in order to achieve long production runs. This allowed not only the worker to work on the higher levels of a learning curve but overall lowered factory costs. Normally each production run requires a set up of tooling and support equipment. Therefore, longer production runs save time and expense with fewer set ups for the same number of production units.

Soviet Mass Production

Much like the United States the Soviet Union believed in mass production. However, in the early war years, German industrialists complained that they were receiving piecemeal production orders. Often for a few dozen artillery pieces versus a thousand whereby they could fully ramp up and deliver. Another factor was Soviet development efforts were limited to improving existing models instead of exerting a huge effort to leapfrog current technology. Germany developed the V-2 rocket which basically became the technology of the 1950s but saw very little near term return for their effort.

Rising Productivity Despite Adversities

Even during 1941-42 when the Soviet Union was being invaded Soviet productivity rates per worker increase even though their factories were either transferred to the Urals or other points east or were destroyed so Germany could not take advantage of them. The transferred factories often were bare earth floors and powered by available timber. These factories had to make do with shortages and improvisation so their products were not of the highest caliber, but they heeded the call for higher quantities.

German Production

At the same time the Soviets were transferring factories to the east, Germany’s factories which had been ramping up war production since the mid 1930s and were also two years away from bombardment would not see much productivity gains until 1943. There was a myriad of reasons for German worker productivity levels to lag the Soviets. For example, Germany had many more numbers of weapon types per platform. Germany twenty-six different artillery types versus Soviet’s five, Germany twelve antitank guns versus Soviet’s two, Germany’s ten antiaircraft gun types versus the Soviets three, Germany’s eighteen tanks/armored vehicles versus the Soviet’s six, and Germany’s forty-two aircraft types versus the Soviet’s twelve.

The Soviets kept the number of model types down, simplified manufacturing requiring low skilled labor, and kept design change activity to a minimum and implemented those changes as a block. Germany until 1943 was an opposite in that they had many model types, a complex manufacturing environment requiring highly skilled labor, and continuously incorporated design changes so that very few products in the field were identical thus complicating logistics.

Soviet Engineering and Metalworking Labor Productivity, 41-45 Data

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Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 21, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000

Other Productivity Data

Numbers of Weapon Types Produced in Germany USSR, 1944

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

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Industrial Production

These numbers alone don’t tell the whole industrial capacity story.  Germany expected a series of short wars. Poland, Norway, and France played out per German expectations.  Nothing else did. Russia initially followed the pattern in fact Hitler believing the war won in September 1941 ordered a large-scale armament production reduction.  While Great Britain and the USSR quickly mobilized nontraditional workers backfilling and increasing the labor forces as they transitioned to industrial war production, Germany pursued a more balanced guns and butter economy.  The United States would follow a path much like Great Britain’s in mobilizing industry and labor for war production.

“This decline in civilian manpower is the more remarkable, because Germany did not exhaust her reserves of manpower in the course of the war, she began the war with about the same proportion of occupied women (outside agriculture) as Britain. But while in Britain the number of women in full- or part-time work increased 45 percent in the course of the war, the number of German women mobilized remained practically unchanged. In Britain, the number of domestic servants was cut from 1.2 to 0.5 million in the course of the war; in Germany it fell only from 1.5 million to 1.3 million. There were other sectors of the economy that had large reserves of labor which could have been utilized for war work. Among them were the public administration system employing some 3.5 million workers, which Speer attempted unsuccessfully to reduce; and civilian industry which had a considerable cushion until the last stages of the war.” 

Source: Galbraith, John, K Director, and Klein, Burton H, Assistant Director, “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey; The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy”, October 31, 1945, Page 10

Raw Material Deficit

Furthering Germany’s industrial capacity shortfall was their deficiency in certain raw materials.  Germany along with their occupied territories, Austria and Czechoslovakia, found themselves deficient in raw materials needed to support modern mobile warfare. Most significantly in oil, but also in metals such as cobalt for military grade steel, copper for electrical equipment, aluminum for lightweight airframes, tin for corrosion-resistant steel can linings, etc. Not only was Germany lacking internal access to strategic raw materials they also lacked world-wide access such as enjoyed by Great Britain and the United States. 

With Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States were able to plug some of their Allies’ industrial capacity shortages. Among the many items sent to the Soviet Union were machine tools to support their Industrial build up.  In return the Soviet Union shipped chrome ore, manganese ore, platinum, gold and wood to the United Kingdom and the United States. 

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940 Data

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Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 17, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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So why show direct man-hours per US airframe pound accepted? 

There is not one perfect way to tell the production story but the benefit of using weight is that it better shows the production capacity versus total units produced since total units included many smaller crafts such as trainers, reconnaissance, and other puddle jumpers. Direct man-hours measure the actual touch labor in a factory to produce a product. These two measurements taken together can better tell how efficiently labor is utilized across the products timeline.

Production efficiency as measured by number of man-hours per plane is good story to convey, but it becomes an even better story when it includes that the maximum takeoff weight in the case of the B-17 increased over time from 65,000 pounds to 72,000 pounds. Just measuring direct man-hours per aircraft produced would have lost the fact that the aircraft later produced were becoming heavier and more complex due to upgrades.

No one measure tells production managers the complete story but combined with other production performance measures it allows decisions to be made based upon the overall productivity health. These two measures were often combined with the square footage of factory space as another way to determine how efficiently factory space was being utilized.

Long Term Trends

An important use of these productivity measures is for long-term operating trends within a factory or an industry. These production measurements allowed some degree of comparing one aircraft factory against another. Although not exactly apples to apples it allowed informed judgements to be made that a factory needed attention, that their trends were not keeping up with the rest of the industry, or that they are a strong performer.  These comparisons can generate discussions leading to exchange of ideas and best practices.

Not only were changes made to aircraft design, but changes occurred within the companies and on the factory floors to meet the war production demands. For example, aircraft manufacturing tooling often became more flexible since they weren’t required to stamp out the vast quantities required by the automobile industry. This type of tooling allowed rolled forming of similar but not identical fuselage or wing skins.

Direct Man-Hours per US Airframe Pound Accepted Data

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Source: Abstracted AFF Hist Study 40, pp. 178-79.

Source: Holley, Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 565, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data Links

US Aircraft Pounds Produced 1940-45

US Prewar Military and Civilian Aircraft and Engine Costs by Unit

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

US Prewar Production of Aircraft Engines

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The graph below only includes complex pitch controllable blades which were difficult to manufacture. It excludes those seen on puddle jumpers or manufactured from expensive steel or fixed-pitch blades fitted to some trainers.

Where to Fabricate

These aircraft propellers demonstrated the capitalistic approach flexibility not seen in Germany, Japan, or the Soviet Union. Curtiss retained control of management, design, and production inhouse at their own facilities. Whereas Hamilton Standard licensed the design to other manufacturers. Both methodologies had pros and cons. Curtiss could maintain a higher degree of control from start to finish, however Hamilton Sundstrand licensing option allowed a greater number of units to be produced.

Normally the in-house method allowed for quicker resolution of issues when identified as the appropriate parties were normally within the same facility and could jointly work the issues face to face in a timely fashion.  However, the licensing arrangement brought fresh eyes to the design and production techniques and lessons learned could be shared across a greater swath of the industry.

Often the government stepped in and decreed that licensing would be required if the demand for a product was great. This is what occurred with the B-17 as those bombers were also manufactured at Lockheed Vega in Burbank, California, and Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach, California. Regarding the propellers both Curtiss and Hamilton Standard followed their internal corporate guidance. 

Traditional and Nontraditional Propeller Manufacturers

Due to demand non-aviation companies were brought into the production process. Nash-Kelvinator resulted from a 1937 merger of an automobile manufacturer and an appliance manufacturer. Two other nontraditional propeller manufacturers Frigidaire and Remington Rand also entered the fray.  Between these three they produced 297,114 of the 708,268 automatically controllable pitch aircraft propellers during the 1940 through 1945 timeframe. This was 41.9% of the total units produced.

Industry adapted to meet the country’s aircraft propeller war production needs. Traditional and nontraditional aviation manufacturers found ways to work together to meet their targets. Normally the traditional manufacturers provided the design and the nontraditional manufacturers stepped up to fill the capacity gap. Similar methods of utilizing traditional and nontraditional manufacturers were used extensively in the United States war production effort for other weapons and platforms as well.

US Propeller Production by Manufacturer Jul 40-Aug 45 Data

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Source: CPA, Official Munitions Production, pp. 73-80. The figures are for controllable pitch types only. Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 563, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data

US Prewar Military and Civilian Aircraft and Engine Costs by Unit

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

US Prewar Production of Aircraft Engines

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Design

Propeller design began early in the process. The propeller was part of an overall system where changes elsewhere could affect the propeller’s performance. Design considerations included:

• Type of plane. Bomber, fighter, and cargo all had different characteristics. Fighters were concerned with speed versus a cargo plane’s need for endurance and fuel conservation.
• Plane model. With each aircraft iteration weight and fuselage changes could occur requiring potential propeller adaptations.
• Engine: manufacturer, number of engines used, propeller gear ratios, engine ratings at various altitudes from sea level to planned operating altitudes, and shaft size.
• Planned airspeeds.
• Maximum allowable diameter.
• Propeller type – pusher or puller.
• Performance parameters and priority for the parameters: take off, climb, cruise, dive, or some combination.

Evolution

The 1920s and 1930s saw changes in propeller design utilizing blade pitch control. Take offs required a greater pitch angle generating more power than the lesser angle at cruise when conserving fuel was paramount. The on-ground analogy of pitch control is shifting gears in a car. Initially these designs utilized mechanical systems requiring great exertions by pilots to overcome the centrifugal forces of the blades in motion.

In 1929 a two-position hydraulic pitch control system was introduced allowing easier pitch change. An additional feature of these variable pitch blades allowed pilots to feather a blade on a disabled plane reducing drag. This saved fuel and allowed better aircraft control. Propeller design continued to evolve and in 1935 constant speed propellers were introduced. Use of these propellers allowed engines to perform at a constant speed which also was a fuel saver.

Collier Trophy

In fact, propeller performance was deemed so important that Frank W. Caldwell of Hamilton Standard was awarded the 1933 Collier Trophy for the hydraulically controllable propeller. The Robert J. Collier Trophy is an annual aviation award administered by the U.S. National Aeronautic Association, presented to those who have made “the greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America.

US Aircraft Propeller Production: 1940-45 Data

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Abstracted from Table PR-17, Crawford and Cook, Statistics: Procurement, p. 79. The figures are for controllable pitch types only. Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 549, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data Links

US Prewar Military and Civilian Aircraft and Engine Costs by Unit

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

US Prewar Production of Aircraft Engines

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Productivity Measures

So, why show production in pounds versus in number of aircraft produced? There is not one perfect way to tell the production story but the benefit of using weight is that it better shows the production capacity versus total units produced since total units included many smaller crafts such as trainers, reconnaissance, and other puddle jumpers.

Industry productivity experts as well as factory managers are always searching for ways to convey the amount of goods produced versus how efficiently those goods were produced. An often target efficiency is direct labor costs. This makes an extremely simple and easily understood measure, but it ignores indirect labor costs, material costs, overhead, depreciation, and other costs. Additionally, utilizing just a single efficiency measure whether output per labor hour or output per machine is that improvements can be made for that one factor, but it does not measure what is happening elsewhere.

In 1941, 55,000 individual work hours were needed to turn out a B-17. By 1944, this had dropped to 19,000 hours. However, this only tells part of the story since a B-17 produced in 1944 was more complex, heavier, and more capable. Production efficiency as measured by number of hours per plane is good story to convey, but it becomes an even better story when it includes that the maximum takeoff weight increased from 65,000 pounds to 72,000 pounds as well as other performance improvements. No one measure tells production managers the complete story but combined with other production performance measures it allows decisions to be made based upon the overall productivity health. 

An important use of the weight productivity measure is for long-term operating trends within a factory or an industry. Measuring production by weight allowed some degree of comparing one aircraft factory against another. Even in the case of the B-24, where two firms produced the same items, differences in expenditures on tooling and previous production experience preclude valid comparisons as to relative efficiency of production. So although not exactly apples to apples it allowed informed judgements to be made that a factory needed attention, that their trends were not keeping up with the rest of the industry, or that they are a strong performer.  These comparisons can generate discussions leading to exchange of ideas and best practices.

US Aircraft Pounds Produced 1940-45 Data

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Abstracted from R. H. Crawford and L. F. Cook, Statistics: Procurement, OCMH, Table PR-16, pp. 78-79. Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 548, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Economic and Manufacturing Data Links

Direct Man-Hours per US Airframe Pound Accepted

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

Percentage of World Motor Vehicle Production, 1936

Total Military Aircraft Production of Four Major Powers: 1939-44

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Additionally, changes were required by the military services as they learned what worked or didn’t work, what need updating to meet an enemies’ new capability, or to take advantage of an enemies’ weakness. Therefore, engineering hours such as those on the North American B-25 did not peak prior to the first unit’s production as was common in high production run industries. 

Design Change

A complicating factor for World War II weapons platforms was production often began prior to completion of design. In fact, continual design change was a norm for the industry. Unfinished aircraft were piling up in airframer factories as they could not incorporate all the engineering changes during the assembly process. Therefore, the assembly lines as well as engineering developed with ways to accommodate this dilemma.

Solutions

Two solutions arose the first was to incorporate changes group together in blocks to streamline the assembly process as much as possible. The second was to complete the aircraft assembly process elsewhere in modification centers. Aircraft manufacturers were not used to modifying aircraft after they had left the assembly lines, but their airline customers were. The airlines had repair and maintenance facilities with the appropriate mechanics, hangars, tools, and airfields to accomplish these updates. 

Modification centers offered a compromise solution maintaining the assembly lines production flows while being able to incorporate changes needed by the Air Force customers. Some modification centers were able to tow the vehicles from the factory lines to their hangars. The Ford B-24 Willow Run facility in Michigan modification center was in Birmingham, Alabama requiring the aircraft to be at least flight worthy.

Although a convenient solution, modification centers were an untimely and costly solution. Repairs and modifications were done with hand tools versus production tools or jigs and much grinding and shimming occurred, driving up labor costs. Modification center use did not diminish after the initial war production start up but continued heavily throughout.  Several planes had almost as many modification center labor hours as factory assembly line production hours.

This change dynamic required engineering support in design, manufacturing, modification centers, and in the field. An issue identified early in the requirement or design phase might take a few hours to resolve. But that same issue identified during manufacturing or out in the field could take many multiple of those few engineering hours to resolve and in addition to that would be the factory or modification center workers additional hours.

North American B-25 Engineering Hours 1940-44 Data

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Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 528, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data

US Military Civilian Aircraft Market 1926-36

Production Runs of Soviet Aircraft, 1941-1945

Warplanes Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

US War Cost of Production by Category

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For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Manufacturing Differences

US automobile manufacturing was the 1930s epitome of mass production not only at home but worldwide. Tasks were broken down to simple repetitive steps which were easily learned and accomplished. Parts were highly interchangeable, and the end products had little variation from one to the next except for a few options such as color. Changes in design happened on an annual basis and those needing to occur midyear were implemented in blocks maintaining the streamlined manufacturing as much as possible. 

Aircraft manufacturing was on the other end of the spectrum from automobile mass production. Highly skilled laborers often working as teams assembled the aircraft per detailed and often complicated work instructions covering a multitude of steps. Part interchangeability was the hope for situation but often grinding and shimming was required in order to achieve fit. Changes occurred on almost every aircraft resulting in very few identical planes. 

Adaptation to Meet War Demands

Both the automobile and aircraft industries had to adapt to meet the military demands. To the degree possible aircraft manufacturers borrowed heavily from the automobile assembly line and block changes approach. The aircraft manufacturers would never approach the streamlined methods of the auto industry, but there was room for vast improvement. One method involved using modifications centers to retrofit changes after the plane was fabricated versus stopping the production line to incorporate new designs. 

The automobile industry learned that designs couldn’t be locked down so readily since the deliverable products were often just out of the research and development phase. Therefore, changes arose as performance, manufacturability, and other issues were discovered. Their planning processes were adapted to implement more frequent block changes than they previously used while maintaining as streamlined a production flow as possible. 

The automobile industry was used to producing a high number of products off their assembly lines and utilized huge expensive presses to stamp out a large volume of identical parts. However, lower volumes and frequent changes meant using large presses would be time and cost prohibitive. Both the automobile and aircraft manufacturers developed techniques to form lighter weight materials such as aluminum by roll forming. Roll forming evolved during the war to utilize less expensive forms that required less lead time and often depended upon a skilled technician to perform the operation.

The automobile industry, the Big Three as well as their supply chains and subsidiaries, ended up producing a wide variety of new to them products. These included tanks, aircraft, torpedoes, radar, PT boats, and anti-aircraft guns.

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Facilities and Workers Data

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Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Units and Dollar Value Data

For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Economic and Manufacturing Data Links

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

Percentage of World Motor Vehicle Production, 1936

Total Military Aircraft Production of Four Major Powers: 1939-44

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The military market over the next eight years average 60% of their 1928 total units sold whereas the civil market only averaged 34% of their 1928 total units sold.  By 1936 the military market recovered to 94% of their 1928 units sold level while the civil market was just starting to rebound and was at a 44% level of their 1928 units sold. On average the US aircraft industry sold 34.2% of their units to the military and 65.8% to the civilian market. However, by market valuation 60% was in the military market and 40% in the civilian market.

The Golden Years of Aviation

The Golden Years of Aviation are the period of aviation between the two world wars 1919 through 1939.  By 1937 ninety-eight US aircraft manufacturers competed in the market space. However, the military market required higher levels of performance, engineering, manufacturing complexity, and investment. Thus, less than a fifth of the ninety-eight manufacturers produced military aircraft. The military market in the late 1930s accounted for 70% of the marketplace valuation and the larger aircraft manufacturers became more dependent upon military sales.

These golden years saw a major transformation in the aircraft industry going from fabric covered biplanes to aluminum cladded airliners, fighters, and bombers. Research and development moved from small garage shops to systematic engineering and laboratory facilities. New forms of manufacturing were required to form aircraft curved sections without incurring the high-cost presses utilized by automotive industry. The US aircraft manufacturers were learning the basics of program management.

Production Upgrades

Assembly line production and economies of scale transformed US industrial manufacturing into a juggernaut. Aircraft manufacturers were in a bind implementing these transformational practices as their production rates were low. Produce enough parts to achieve economy of scale and the parts might be obsolete before they are needed. Therefore, corporate financial analysts came into play working with engineers and program managers finding the best economic balance.

With the upsurge in civil and military aircraft manufacturers in a new industry saw ideas sprout forth at a high level. Employees traveled from one employer to the next taking lessons learned with them. Cross pollination of ideas was an American manufacturing strength implemented via conferences and symposiums both within an industry, across industries, with academia, with the government, and sometimes with all. Technology advances were copied and improved upon. 

Financial incentives to improve technology and capture profits were protected by strong patent laws. Patented technology usage agreements between companies allowed the patenting company to maintain an income stream thus protecting their initial innovation investments. 

Comparative Importance of US Military Civilian Aircraft Markets Data

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Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 21, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other US Production Data Links

US WW2 Production – Other

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles

US WW2 Production – Guns and Munitions

US War Cost of Production by Category

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