Production Philosophies

Other Soviet productivity gains respective to Germany’s centered around fewer models and willingness to forestall changes in order to achieve long production runs. This allowed not only the worker to work on the higher levels of a learning curve but overall lowered factory costs. Normally each production run requires a set up of tooling and support equipment. Therefore, longer production runs save time and expense with fewer set ups for the same number of production units.

Soviet Mass Production

Much like the United States the Soviet Union believed in mass production. However, in the early war years, German industrialists complained that they were receiving piecemeal production orders. Often for a few dozen artillery pieces versus a thousand whereby they could fully ramp up and deliver. Another factor was Soviet development efforts were limited to improving existing models instead of exerting a huge effort to leapfrog current technology. Germany developed the V-2 rocket which basically became the technology of the 1950s but saw very little near term return for their effort.

Rising Productivity Despite Adversities

Even during 1941-42 when the Soviet Union was being invaded Soviet productivity rates per worker increase even though their factories were either transferred to the Urals or other points east or were destroyed so Germany could not take advantage of them. The transferred factories often were bare earth floors and powered by available timber. These factories had to make do with shortages and improvisation so their products were not of the highest caliber, but they heeded the call for higher quantities.

German Production

At the same time the Soviets were transferring factories to the east, Germany’s factories which had been ramping up war production since the mid 1930s and were also two years away from bombardment would not see much productivity gains until 1943. There was a myriad of reasons for German worker productivity levels to lag the Soviets. For example, Germany had many more numbers of weapon types per platform. Germany twenty-six different artillery types versus Soviet’s five, Germany twelve antitank guns versus Soviet’s two, Germany’s ten antiaircraft gun types versus the Soviets three, Germany’s eighteen tanks/armored vehicles versus the Soviet’s six, and Germany’s forty-two aircraft types versus the Soviet’s twelve.

The Soviets kept the number of model types down, simplified manufacturing requiring low skilled labor, and kept design change activity to a minimum and implemented those changes as a block. Germany until 1943 was an opposite in that they had many model types, a complex manufacturing environment requiring highly skilled labor, and continuously incorporated design changes so that very few products in the field were identical thus complicating logistics.

Soviet Engineering and Metalworking Labor Productivity, 41-45 Data

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Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 21, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000

Other Productivity Data

Numbers of Weapon Types Produced in Germany USSR, 1944

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

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So why show direct man-hours per US airframe pound accepted? 

There is not one perfect way to tell the production story but the benefit of using weight is that it better shows the production capacity versus total units produced since total units included many smaller crafts such as trainers, reconnaissance, and other puddle jumpers. Direct man-hours measure the actual touch labor in a factory to produce a product. These two measurements taken together can better tell how efficiently labor is utilized across the products timeline.

Production efficiency as measured by number of man-hours per plane is good story to convey, but it becomes an even better story when it includes that the maximum takeoff weight in the case of the B-17 increased over time from 65,000 pounds to 72,000 pounds. Just measuring direct man-hours per aircraft produced would have lost the fact that the aircraft later produced were becoming heavier and more complex due to upgrades.

No one measure tells production managers the complete story but combined with other production performance measures it allows decisions to be made based upon the overall productivity health. These two measures were often combined with the square footage of factory space as another way to determine how efficiently factory space was being utilized.

Long Term Trends

An important use of these productivity measures is for long-term operating trends within a factory or an industry. These production measurements allowed some degree of comparing one aircraft factory against another. Although not exactly apples to apples it allowed informed judgements to be made that a factory needed attention, that their trends were not keeping up with the rest of the industry, or that they are a strong performer.  These comparisons can generate discussions leading to exchange of ideas and best practices.

Not only were changes made to aircraft design, but changes occurred within the companies and on the factory floors to meet the war production demands. For example, aircraft manufacturing tooling often became more flexible since they weren’t required to stamp out the vast quantities required by the automobile industry. This type of tooling allowed rolled forming of similar but not identical fuselage or wing skins.

Direct Man-Hours per US Airframe Pound Accepted Data

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Source: Abstracted AFF Hist Study 40, pp. 178-79.

Source: Holley, Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 565, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Production Data Links

US Aircraft Pounds Produced 1940-45

US Prewar Military and Civilian Aircraft and Engine Costs by Unit

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

US Prewar Production of Aircraft Engines

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For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Manufacturing Differences

US automobile manufacturing was the 1930s epitome of mass production not only at home but worldwide. Tasks were broken down to simple repetitive steps which were easily learned and accomplished. Parts were highly interchangeable, and the end products had little variation from one to the next except for a few options such as color. Changes in design happened on an annual basis and those needing to occur midyear were implemented in blocks maintaining the streamlined manufacturing as much as possible. 

Aircraft manufacturing was on the other end of the spectrum from automobile mass production. Highly skilled laborers often working as teams assembled the aircraft per detailed and often complicated work instructions covering a multitude of steps. Part interchangeability was the hope for situation but often grinding and shimming was required in order to achieve fit. Changes occurred on almost every aircraft resulting in very few identical planes. 

Adaptation to Meet War Demands

Both the automobile and aircraft industries had to adapt to meet the military demands. To the degree possible aircraft manufacturers borrowed heavily from the automobile assembly line and block changes approach. The aircraft manufacturers would never approach the streamlined methods of the auto industry, but there was room for vast improvement. One method involved using modifications centers to retrofit changes after the plane was fabricated versus stopping the production line to incorporate new designs. 

The automobile industry learned that designs couldn’t be locked down so readily since the deliverable products were often just out of the research and development phase. Therefore, changes arose as performance, manufacturability, and other issues were discovered. Their planning processes were adapted to implement more frequent block changes than they previously used while maintaining as streamlined a production flow as possible. 

The automobile industry was used to producing a high number of products off their assembly lines and utilized huge expensive presses to stamp out a large volume of identical parts. However, lower volumes and frequent changes meant using large presses would be time and cost prohibitive. Both the automobile and aircraft manufacturers developed techniques to form lighter weight materials such as aluminum by roll forming. Roll forming evolved during the war to utilize less expensive forms that required less lead time and often depended upon a skilled technician to perform the operation.

The automobile industry, the Big Three as well as their supply chains and subsidiaries, ended up producing a wide variety of new to them products. These included tanks, aircraft, torpedoes, radar, PT boats, and anti-aircraft guns.

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Facilities and Workers Data

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To download the data shown below from which the graphs were developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Comparison of US Aircraft Industry with US Automobile Industry Units and Dollar Value Data

For aircraft, value of product includes value of aircraft and parts. For automobiles, value of product denotes value of automobiles only.

Source: Holley , Irving Brinton, Jr. “United States Army In World War II Special Studies Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement For The Army Air Forces.” 1964, Page 27, Center of Military History United States Army, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 64-60000, https://history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-2/index.html, Data accessed on July 12, 2022

Other Economic and Manufacturing Data Links

Relative Productivity Ranking Of World War II Foes

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

Percentage of World Motor Vehicle Production, 1936

Total Military Aircraft Production of Four Major Powers: 1939-44

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The above graph can be downloaded as an image.

Major Labor Shortages in Key Industries

World War II placed Great Britain in a precarious position, facing significant labor shortages in four critical industries vital to the war effort:

Coal Mining

The coal mining industry was essential for energy production and industrial processes. However, labor shortages in coal mines created disruptions in energy supplies, impacting both civilian and military needs. Recruitment efforts aimed to address these shortages and ensure a steady flow of coal production.

Shipbuilding

Shipbuilding was of paramount importance, as it supported the Royal Navy and merchant marine. Labor shortages in shipyards could hinder the timely construction of warships and merchant vessels. Initiatives were launched to attract workers and maximize ship production.

Aircraft Manufacturing

The aviation industry played a pivotal role in the war, manufacturing aircraft and related equipment. Labor shortages in aircraft manufacturing could impede the production of crucial fighter planes and bombers. Recruitment drives targeted skilled workers to meet the demands of the Royal Air Force.

Military Services

The British military required a constant influx of personnel to meet its operational and strategic objectives. Mobilization efforts aimed to enlist and train large numbers of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Ensuring an adequate supply of well-trained military personnel was a top priority.

Unemployment Rates

Great Britain experienced a remarkable decline in unemployment rates as the nation transitioned to a wartime economy focused on supporting the war effort. Unemployment rates from 1938 to 1945:

1938: 12.9%, 1939: 9.3%, 1940: 6.0% , 1941: 2.2%, 1942: 0.8%, 1943: 0.6%, 1944: 0.6%, and 1945: 1.3%

These declining unemployment rates highlight the profound impact of wartime mobilization on the British labor force. As the nation shifted its focus to war production and military service, labor shortages were addressed, and the workforce was allocated to meet the needs of the war effort.

Mobilization of Nontraditional Labor Groups

To address labor shortages, Great Britain implemented a multifaceted approach, mobilizing various labor groups:

Women

The mobilization of women into the workforce was a significant strategy to fill the labor gaps created by men joining the military. Women took on a variety of roles, both in civilian industries and in auxiliary military services, freeing up men for combat duty.

Men Discharged from the Military

Men who had completed their military service were reintegrated into civilian industries, capitalizing on their training and skills gained during their service. This transition was a crucial component of labor planning.

Older Men in Unessential Industries

Older men, particularly those in non-essential industries, were encouraged to join the labor force, providing valuable experience and expertise to various sectors.

Irish Labor

Labor from Ireland, particularly Northern Ireland, played a significant role in supporting the British labor force during the war. Irish workers contributed to various industries and helped address shortages.

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war were utilized as a source of labor in accordance with international agreements. Their labor helped meet the demands of various industries and infrastructure projects.

Military Strategic Planning and Industrial Labor

Military strategic planning, particularly with the anticipation of D-Day in 1944, significantly influenced industrial labor plans in Great Britain. The early years of the war saw a concentrated effort to produce munitions and build up stockpiles to support the impending Allied invasion of mainland Europe. As D-Day approached, the labor force transitioned from munitions production and other labor roles to military roles, ensuring that the military had the necessary personnel and resources for a successful campaign. This strategic shift was a coordinated effort to maximize the efficiency of the labor force and to ensure military manpower needs. The success of D-Day and subsequent operations relied on this careful allocation of labor resources.

Great Britain Labor Force Data

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Source: W.K Hancock & M.M. Gowing, “British War Economy.” Chapter V, Page 351, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-Stats-3.html

The following notes are from the Ministry of Labour and National Service and Central Statistical Office

(1) The figures include men aged 14-64 and women aged 14-59, excluding those in private domestic service. Part-time women workers are included, two being counted as one unit. The figures refer to Great Britain only except for the Armed Forces, which include an unknown number of volunteers from Northern Ireland, Eire, etc.

(2) Group I covers metal manufacture, engineering, motors, aircraft and other vehicles, shipbuilding and ship-repairing, metal goods manufacture, chemicals, explosives, oils etc.

Group II covers agriculture, mining, national and local government services, gas, water and electricity supply, transport and shipping.

Group III covers food, drink and tobacco, textiles ,clothing and other manufactures, building and civil engineering, distribution trades, commerce, banking and other services.

Other Economic Indices Data Links

Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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