The above graph can be downloaded as an image.

Oil Availability

Germany’s oil sources were limited, and the country faced significant challenges in maintaining its oil supply. Germany produced some oil domestically, primarily from fields in the north of the country, but domestic production was limited and could not meet the country’s needs. To supplement its supply, Germany developed a process for synthesizing oil from coal, seized oil reserves in occupied territories such as Norway and Romania, and traded with neutral countries such as Spain and Sweden. However, these sources were not enough to sustain Germany’s war effort, and oil shortages had a significant impact on the country’s military operations. Ultimately, the lack of oil was one of the key factors that contributed to Germany’s defeat in World War II.

The Allies’ strategic bombing campaign had a significant impact on Germany’s oil supply. The bombing raids targeted oil refineries, production facilities, and transport infrastructure, causing significant damage and disruption to Germany’s oil supply. As a result, Germany was forced to rely more heavily on synthetic oil produced through the Fischer-Tropsch process, which was expensive and less efficient to produce.

Allied Targeting Transportation and its Effects on Oil Supply

The Allied bombing campaign targeted transportation infrastructure critical for Germany’s oil production and supply. The railway system was a key target, as it was critical for transporting oil from production facilities to refineries and distribution centers. The bombing raids targeted railway yards, bridges, and lines of communication, causing significant damage and disruption to the railway system.

Oil refineries were another critical target, as they were responsible for processing crude oil into usable fuel. The bombing raids targeted refineries, storage tanks, and other key infrastructure, causing significant damage and disruption to the refinery network.

German Oil Allocations

Germany allocated its oil supply primarily to military operations, with the military receiving most of the available supply. Some oil was allocated to essential services, such as hospitals and emergency services, while the remaining oil was allocated to civilian use. However, civilian use was heavily restricted and subjected to rationing to conserve the available oil supply. Despite these efforts, Germany’s oil supply was insufficient to sustain its war effort, and shortages of oil and other resources contributed to the country’s eventual defeat in the war. 

Germany allocated its oil supply within the military based on prioritizing the needs of different branches, with the Luftwaffe receiving a higher priority than the Kriegsmarine. Offensive operations were given a higher priority than defensive operations, as they required more fuel. The allocation of oil was a critical issue for the military, and Germany implemented conservation measures to stretch the available oil supply further. To conserve the available oil supply, Germany implemented measures such as reducing the speed of vehicles and planes and limiting training exercises.

Despite these efforts, shortages of oil and other resources contributed to Germany’s eventual defeat in the war. Competition between branches for access to oil was common, and the allocation of oil played a significant role in shaping Germany’s military operations during the war.

German Aviation, Motor, and Diesel Fuels Availability Data

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to your desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise, only the data visible on the screen will download.

* Availability includes; internally produced, imported, and in 1940 captured fuels: aviation 275 motor 309 and diesel 200 (000 metric tons).

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., 1993, Page 276, Table 83 selected data

Other Oil Data

German versus US Oil Production

US Vehicles Per Unit and Fuel Consumption Rates

Self Sufficiency or Deficiency; Strategic Raw Materials and Foodstuffs

US Crude Oil First Purchase Price

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referenced. Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites is accurate or will remain accurate.

Note : Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan 1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.

Each of the countries involved in World War II produced a wide range of successful aircraft that played important roles in the war effort. Here are some of the most successful planes produced by each country in their respective roles:

Selected Aircraft by Country

Germany

Messerschmitt Bf 109: This fighter aircraft was fast, maneuverable, heavily armed and highly successful in its role, with over 30,000 produced during the war. 

Focke-Wulf Fw 190: This fighter aircraft was heavily armed and armored. It was particularly good in ground-attack missions.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka: This dive bomber was highly effective in its role especially in the early days of the war. It was responsible for inflicting significant damage on enemy ground forces and infrastructure.

United Kingdom

Supermarine Spitfire: This fighter aircraft was highly successful in its role, particularly during the Battle of Britain, playing a significant role in defending Britain from German air attacks.

Avro Lancaster: This heavy bomber was heavily armed and armored and highly successful.  It was responsible for dropping most of the bombs on Germany during the war playing a significant role in disrupting German industry and infrastructure.

United States

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress: This heavy bomber known for its ability to defend itself, but when paired with long range escort fighters it became very lethal.

North American P-51 Mustang: This fighter aircraft initially was a so-so performer, but when it was paired with the Rolls Royce Merlin engine it became a champion providing long-range escort for American bombers.

USSR

Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik: This ground-attack aircraft was the most produced plane of WWII. It was well tailored for the Soviet use of aircraft supporting land forces.

Yakovlev Yak-3: The Yak-3 was fast, maneuverable, and well suited to dogfighting. Following Soviet manufacturing and maintenance concepts it was simple to construct and maintain.

Philosophical Differences

The philosophical differences between the Allied and German air forces during World War II were significant reflecting broader differences in military strategy and doctrine. Here are some of the key differences:

Strategic bombing

The Allied air forces, particularly the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), believed in the doctrine of strategic precision bombing, which involved targeting enemy industry and infrastructure with large-scale bombing raids. The goal of strategic bombing was to disrupt the enemy’s ability to wage war. The German air force, on the other hand, did not place as much emphasis on strategic bombing, and instead focused on providing ground support to German troops and achieving air superiority over enemy forces.

The Allied air forces, especially the British Royal Air Force (RAF) believed that targeting enemy morale was a key part of their strategy. They conducted many strategic area bombing raids on civilian targets in order to lower enemy morale. The German air force, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on targeting enemy morale, and instead focused on achieving military objectives.

Technology

The Allied air forces placed a greater emphasis on technological innovation and development than the German air force. The USAAF invested heavily in the development of advanced bombers such as the B-17 and B-29, as well as fighter planes such as the P-51 Mustang. The German air force developed several advanced aircraft, such as the Me 262 jet fighter, but was hampered by resource shortages and production difficulties.

Tactics

The Allied air forces developed advanced tactics for achieving air superiority and conducting bombing raids. The RAF used the “Big Wing” formation, which allowed large numbers of fighters to engage enemy aircraft at once, first introduced during the Battle of Britain. While the USAAF used the “combat box” formation, which allowed large numbers of bombers to protect each other from enemy fighters, this technique was most successful with the B-17 Flying Fortress bombers. 

To counter Allied night bombing raids, the German air force developed various defensive techniques. One such technique was the “Himmelbett,” or “four-poster bed,” which utilized radar ground stations to direct fighter planes to the target during night raids. To successfully intercept the enemy bomber, each target required the coordinated efforts of two Freya radar units. One unit would track the bomber while the other would track the intercepting night-fighter. A ground controller would then guide the fighter using the radar data until its own Würzburg short-range radar picked up the target bomber.

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR Data

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Source: World-War-2.info, “World War 2 Death Count Per Country”, http://www.world-war-2.info/statistics/, Data accessed June 28, 2022

Additional Aircraft Production Data Links

WWII Most Produced Combat Aircraft by Model

Annual Allied Axis Military Aircraft Production 1939-1945

Total Military Aircraft Production of Allies versus Axis

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced. Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Radio Usage

Tank Radios

Communications at the fighting level contrasted significantly between the Soviets and Germans. For example, the German Panzer IV was a medium tank first introduced in 1937. The Panzer IV had a crew of five which included the commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator. In contrast the Soviet T-34 had a crew of four and radios were a rarity in Soviet tanks early in the war. Initially only the unit commander’s tank had a radio. During the war radio became more widely but even in 1944 many tanks lacked a radio set. 

Radios initially were reserved for the commander’s tank which communicated with their local headquarters receiving and transmitting. Flag communications or a follow the leader approach was often utilized. German tank communications could occur between individual tanks allowing a more coordinated effort at the platoon level. Radios were not installed in early T-34 due to short supply, expense, and lack of internal space. 

Germany often would utilize captured equipment and the Soviet tanks were no exception, however Germany would retrofit radios into the captured tanks in order to meet their operational level requirements.

Radio Traffic Analysis

“The vastness of European Russia, its dearth of good roads, the great distances which had to be traversed, the lack of high-capacity long-distance commercial teletype circuits, as well as the shortage of military telephone apparatus and cables, compelled the Soviet Army to make a far greater use or radio communication than was necessary in the armies of the highly industrialized Western countries.” (1)

(1) Praun, Albert, General der Nachrichtentrupp (Lieutenant General), MS No P-038, “German Radio Intelligence”, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief Of Military History, March 1950, Pages 86-87, https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/friedman-documents/publications/FOLDER_240/41748999078819.pdf, Accessed March 18, 2023.

The vastness of European Russia combined with severe radio operator losses early in the war resulted in replacement operators using simple, conventional call signs enabling German counter radio intelligence to identify quickly the stations of a given net. In some respects, the Soviet radio capability grew and evolved during the war. First with improved cryptography for headquarter and higher echelon communications. However, improved field level radio communications lagged significantly due to poorly trained personnel.

Radio-Controlled Mines

The Soviet Union was the first country to develop, 1941, and deploy, 1942, radio-controlled mines. By the time of the Battle of Kursk both the Soviet Union and Germany were using radio-controlled mines as part of their anti-tank defenses. The battle, which took place from July to August 1943, was the largest tank battles in history and involved hundreds of thousands of troops and tanks. The Soviet Union used radio-controlled mines as part of its anti-tank defenses, particularly in the defensive belts that were set up to slow down and disrupt the German armored offensives. 

Radio Usage Philosophical Differences

The Soviet Union and Germany used their military radios in different ways. The Soviet Union used its radios primarily for communication between units and for receiving and transmitting orders. Germany, on the other hand, used its radios for a wider range of purposes, including aerial reconnaissance, weather reports, and coordination between units in the field.

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258 (selected data), Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data Format

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Additionally other motor vehicles such as tractors, passenger vehicles, utility vehicles, and motorcycles. A total of 265,600 army trucks were produced by the Soviets during the war years. Additionally, the Soviets received approximately 200,000 Studebaker-US6 out of a total of 637,000 other military vehicles (ordnance carriers, jeeps, trucks, etc.) supplied through Lend-Lease. The Soviets averaged 422,580 available noncombat motor vehicles during the war years ranging from 272,600 in 1941 to 621,300 in 1945.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Motor Vehicles

Trucks

The Soviet Union relied heavily on motor vehicles for the transportation of personnel, weapons, and supplies. While combat vehicles such as tanks and armored cars often receive the most attention, noncombat motor vehicles played a crucial role in supporting Soviet military operations. 

The Soviet Union produced a wide variety of noncombat motor vehicles during the war, including trucks, buses, ambulances, and motorcycles. These vehicles were used for a variety of purposes, including the transportation of troops, supplies, and equipment, as well as for medical evacuation and other noncombat tasks.

The Soviet Union produced many noncombat motor vehicles during the war, with estimates that over 200,000 trucks were produced during the war years. Production of noncombat vehicles was a significant part of the Soviet Union’s war effort, and the country’s factories were often converted to produce vehicles and other equipment as needed.

Under the Lend-Lease program, the Soviet Union received over 400,000 trucks and other motor vehicles, which were used for a variety of noncombat purposes such as transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment. The vehicles provided under the Lend-Lease program included a variety of types and models, such as the Dodge WC series of trucks, the Studebaker US6, and the Ford GPA amphibious vehicle.

As the war progressed, the Soviet Union made improvements to its noncombat motor vehicles to make them more durable and effective. For example, trucks were often modified with additional armor and improved suspension systems to better withstand the rigors of combat conditions. The Soviet Union also developed specialized vehicles for medical evacuation and other noncombat tasks, which helped to improve the efficiency of its military operations.

Katyusha Rocket Launchers

Trucks were often used as the platform for Katyusha rocket launchers during World War II. The Katyusha rocket launcher was a type of multiple rocket launcher that was developed by the Soviet Union and used extensively during the war. Katyusha rocket launchers were typically mounted on the back of a truck, with a series of rockets arranged in a launch frame. The rockets were fired in a salvo, with the launch frame tilting back to reduce the recoil of the rockets.

Trucks were used as the platform for Katyusha rocket launchers for several reasons. By mounting the launchers on trucks, they could be rapidly deployed to different locations and could provide mobile artillery support to ground troops. The use of trucks also allowed the Soviet Union to quickly adapt Katyusha launchers to different types of terrain, as the launchers could be mounted on a variety of truck chassis.

Noncombat motor vehicles played a crucial role in supporting Soviet military operations during the war. Without these vehicles, it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to transport troops, supplies, and equipment to the front lines, and to evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield. Noncombat motor vehicles were a vital component of the Soviet Union’s military logistics and contributed significantly to the country’s eventual victory over Germany.

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VI Motor Vehicles, Page 257 (selected data), Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VI Motor Vehicles, Page 257, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

World War II Allies: U.S. Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year. See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Soviet Fleet

The Soviet fleet in 1939 was the seventh largest by tonnage in the world after Germany’s Kriegsmarine. Counterintuitively, the Soviet Union had the largest prewar submarine fleet in the world with 212 submarines available January 1, 1941. During the war the Soviet Union procured an additional fifty-one submarines but lost 102. With such a low procurement rate the Soviets were quickly surpassed by the German Kriegsmarine which in 1941 alone produced 199 U-boats. The Kriegsmarine would go on to exceed their 1941 production number in each year from 1942-44. In all the Soviet Union received an additional 2,588 vessels and lost 1,014 vessels during the war years.

Priorities

During the war Soviet naval budget allocations fell from 11.5% in 1941 to 6.6% in 1944 highlighting their priority versus the other military branches. Lend-Lease provided additional small surface ships. “The United Kingdom and the United States traded the Royal Navy battleship HMS Royal Sovereign (renamed Arkhangelsk) and the United States Navy cruiser USS Milwaukee (renamed Murmansk) in exchange for the Soviet part of the captured Italian navy.” (1) Additionally, the Soviet Union captured eleven Romanian, Latvian and Estonian and integrated them into their fleet. Also, four British submarines were received and renamed V1 to V4.oviet

(1) Wikipedia, “Soviet Navy”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy, accessed on March 7, 2023.

Operation Barbarossa saw Soviet Navy personnel participating in land battles as the regular Soviet Army forces were overrun. Sea port towns such as Leningrad and Sevastopol were two of several cities where Soviet sailors battled as land forces. Soviet submarines were the most capable naval force projection capability and even those were limited due to German mining operations and ineffectual leadership due to the purges of the 1930s.

Due to the geography the Soviet vessels served in many of their losses came from German land forces. Soviet naval forces were highly criticized by the UK and US for their ineffectiveness especially regarding the convoy protections needed for shipments into Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, (Selected data) Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data, Transposed Format

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 Availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

The Soviet Union had a large and diverse artillery arsenal during World War II. The exact numbers of artillery pieces available are difficult to determine, but here are some estimates:

Field Artillery

The Soviet Union had many field artillery pieces, including 76mm, 85mm, and 122mm (M-30 howitzer) guns, as well as 152mm and 203mm howitzers. It’s estimated that the Soviet Union manufactured just under 300,000 field artillery pieces during the war.

Anti-Tank Guns

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of anti-tank guns, including the 45mm, 57mm, and 76mm guns. These guns were highly effective against German tanks and played a crucial role in Soviet anti-tank defense.

Rocket Launchers

The Soviet Union developed several rocket launchers during the war, including the Katyusha rocket launcher. These launchers were highly effective against enemy troops and fortifications.

Heavy Artillery

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of heavy artillery pieces, including 152mm, 203mm, and 280mm guns. These guns were used for long-range bombardment and were highly effective against enemy fortifications and artillery positions.

Significant Soviet Artillery Usage

Battle of Stalingrad

One of the most significant uses of Soviet artillery during World War II was in the defense of Stalingrad during the Battle of Stalingrad. The Soviet Union used many artillery pieces, including the 122mm howitzer M-30, to defend the city from German forces. Soviet artillery played a crucial role in the defense of Stalingrad, particularly in the early stages of the battle when German forces were attempting to capture the city. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a “kill zone” in front of the city, which made it difficult for German troops to advance.

The Soviet Union also used artillery to disrupt German supply lines and to target German artillery positions. This helped to weaken the German forces and to prevent them from launching a successful assault on the city.

Battle of Kursk

The largest massed use of Soviet artillery during World War II was at the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943. The battle was fought between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front and was the largest tank battle in history. During the battle, the Soviet Union used a massive concentration of artillery, including over 20,000 guns and mortars. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a defensive zone around the Kursk salient, which made it difficult for German tanks and infantry to penetrate.

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin saw massive usage of Soviet artillery. Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front attacked the Seelow Heights, the last natural line of defense before Berlin. The 1st Belorussian Front had 908,000 men, 3,155 AFVs, 16,934 guns, and had stockpiled over 7 million rounds of artillery ammunition. 

General Nikolai Bersarin, commanding the 5th Shock Army, later claimed that “…the Western Allies had dropped 65,000 tons of explosives on the city in the course of more than two years; whereas the Red Army had expended 40,000 tons in merely two weeks.” (1)

(1) Porter, David, “Seelow Heights and Berlin”, Miltary History, https://the-past.com/feature/seelow-heights-and-berlin/, accessed on March 17, 2023 

The Soviet Union’s use of artillery played a crucial role in the battle, allowing Soviet forces to repel German attacks and to launch their own counterattacks. The artillery was highly effective in disrupting German tank formations and infantry positions and was used to create a “kill zone” in front of Soviet defensive positions.

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 250-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan 1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Heavy Tanks

The Soviet Union developed and produced a series of heavy tanks that played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict. Here’s a brief overview of the evolution of Soviet heavy tanks during the war:

KV-1:

The KV-1 was a heavy tank that was introduced in 1939. It was heavily armored and armed with a 76.2mm gun. However, it was slow and difficult to maneuver, which limited its effectiveness on the battlefield.

KV-1S:

The KV-1S was a lighter and more maneuverable version of the KV-1 that was introduced in 1942. It had thinner armor than the original KV-1, but was faster and more agile, making it more effective in combat.

KV-85:

The KV-85 was a variant of the KV-1S that was armed with an 85mm gun. It was introduced in 1943 and saw limited use in combat.

IS-1/IS-2:

The IS-1 (also known as the IS-85) and IS-2 were heavy tanks that were introduced in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were heavily armored and armed with an 85 mm and 122mm guns respectively, making them highly effective in combat. They were also faster and more maneuverable than earlier Soviet heavy tanks, which improved their tactical flexibility. The IS-1 was produced in limited numbers, with only around 100 tanks built before it was replaced by the more advanced IS-2 tank. The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 saw the first deployment of the IS-2 heavy tank. The tanks were used to great effect, with their heavy armor and powerful guns helping to stop the German advance.

IS-3:

The IS-3 was a heavy tank that was introduced in 1945, towards the end of the war. It was heavily armored and armed with a 122mm gun, like the IS-2, but had a lower profile and more sloped armor, which made it more difficult to hit.

Usage

The IS-2 and IS-3 heavy tanks of the Soviet Union were designed to counter the German heavy tanks of the time, such as the Tiger I and II, and the Panther. Both the IS-2 and IS-3 had heavy armor that was thicker and more sloped than that of the German heavy tank making them more difficult to penetrate from enemy fire.

Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive in Belarus in the summer of 1944 saw the widespread deployment of the IS-2 and KV-1 heavy tanks along with many other tank models. They played a key role in breaking through German lines and driving the enemy back especially by dealing with heavily fortified German positions. The heavy armor and powerful guns of these tanks allowed them to withstand enemy fire and destroy enemy tanks and fortifications with greater ease than the medium and light tanks.

Overall, the evolution of Soviet heavy tanks during World War II was characterized by a focus on heavy armor and firepower, as well as improvements in mobility and maneuverability. The IS-2 and IS-3 in particular were highly effective heavy tanks that played a crucial role in the Soviet Union’s eventual victory over Nazi Germany.

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

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To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Availability Data for Chart Above

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 (selected data) Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Availability of Soviet Tanks 1941-45 Data (Includes number received and losses)

*Armoured cars, tractors, other armoured vehicles

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Availability of Soviet Tanks 1941-45 Transposed Data (Includes number received and losses)

*Armoured cars, tractors, other armoured vehicles

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section III Armored Vehicles, Pages 252-253, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Tank and Availability Data Links

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

10 Soviet Tanks of World War Two – The Good, the Bad, and the BEASTLY

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Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See ‘Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Data” download below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Selected Light Arms

The primary Soviet rifle was the Mosin-Nagant 91/30. It was a bolt-action rifle that held 5 rounds and was effective to 500m. Over 17 million were produced from 1930-45.

The PPSh-41 submachine gun was a key weapon for Soviet infantry and vehicle crews. It was mass-produced and effective at close ranges, firing 900rpm. Over 6 million were made during the war.

The Degtyaryov DP light machine gun could fire full-auto at up 750rpm. It was used as a squad support weapon, mounted on vehicles, and in aircraft. Millions were produced from 1927-45.

The Tokarev TT-33 pistol was the standard Soviet sidearm. Over 1.5 million were made from 1933-51. It fired 8-round magazines of the 7.62x25mm pistol cartridge, effective to 100m.

Soviet infantry made heavy use of grenades, including fragmentation and anti-tank grenades. Millions of grenades were produced and they were integral to Soviet small-unit tactics.

Light Arms Production

Soviet small arms were relatively simple, hard-hitting, and cheaply mass-produced. While less advanced than German weapons, their sheer numbers contributed greatly to Soviet victories against the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. There were several factors that contributed to this:

Simplicity of Design

Soviet light arms were designed to be simple and easy to manufacture. This allowed for mass production and reduced the cost of production.

Use of Standardized Parts

Soviet light arms often used standardized parts, which reduced the need for specialized tools and equipment. This made it easier and less expensive to manufacture and repair weapons.

Use of Low-Grade Materials

The Soviet Union often used lower-grade materials, such as stamped steel, to produce light arms. This reduced the cost of production, but also resulted in weapons that were less durable and less accurate than their Western counterparts. Whereas the German light arms manufacturing industry used higher-grade materials in the production of weapons, which resulted in weapons that were more durable and accurate than their Soviet counterparts but were more expensive and time consuming to produce.

Centralized Production

The Soviet Union had a highly centralized system of production, which allowed for greater efficiency and coordination in the manufacturing process. This helped to reduce costs and increase production rates.

Overall, the Soviet Union’s light arms manufacturing industry was effective in producing large quantities of weapons quickly and efficiently. While the weapons produced were often less durable and accurate than their Western counterparts, they played an important role in the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II.

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London,  Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section I – Small Arms (Selected data only) Pages 246-247, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Data

This includes all the data needed to calculate the availability quantities.

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section I – Small Arms Pages 246-247, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data Links

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

Weapons of the Red Army: Soviet Small Arms of World War II

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Common Truck Types

These trucks were used in a variety of roles, from transporting troops and supplies to towing artillery and other heavy equipment. Some of the most common types of military trucks produced by the United States during the war included:

CCKW – Deuce and a Half

The CCKW was a 2.5-ton 6×6 truck, nicknamed the Deuce and a Half, that was widely used for transporting troops and supplies. More than 800,000 CCKWs were produced during the war, making it one of the most common military vehicles of the conflict. One of the most famous uses of the CCKW was during the Red Ball Express operations. It had a payload capacity of up to 5,000 pounds and was equipped with a gasoline-powered engine that produced between 91 and 104 horsepower, depending on the model. 

M3 Half-track

The M3 Half-track was a versatile vehicle that combined the mobility of a truck with the off-road capability of a tank. It was used for a variety of roles, including troop transport and artillery towing. More than 40,000 M3 Half-tracks were produced during the war.

GMC 6×6

The GMC 6×6 was a heavy-duty truck that was used for transporting heavy equipment and supplies. It was also used as a prime mover for artillery and other weapons systems. More than 193,000 GMC 6×6 trucks were produced during the war. It had a payload capacity of up to 10,000 pounds and was equipped with a larger gasoline-powered engine that produced between 147 and 187 horsepower, depending on the model.

Manufacturing Limitations

The production of military trucks faced several challenges. Here are some of the key challenges faced by manufacturers during the war:

Raw material shortages

The production of military trucks required large amounts of steel, rubber, and other raw materials that were in short supply during the war. As a result, manufacturers had to find ways to conserve materials and use substitutes when possible.

Labor shortages

The war effort required many workers to enlist in the military, leaving factories with a shortage of skilled labor. This forced manufacturers to find ways to train new workers quickly and efficiently.

Production capacity

The demand for military trucks was high, and manufacturers had to ramp up production quickly to meet the needs of the war effort. This required the construction of new factories and the expansion of existing ones.

Transportation challenges

The logistics of transporting raw materials and finished vehicles was a challenge during the war, as many transportation networks, especially the sea routes, were disrupted by the conflict.

Design challenges

The design of military trucks had to balance a variety of factors, including mobility, durability, and ease of maintenance. Manufacturers had to find ways to create vehicles that could operate effectively in a variety of terrain and weather conditions.

Despite these challenges, the production of military trucks was a key factor in the Allied victory in World War II. Manufacturers worked tirelessly to overcome these obstacles and produce large numbers of vehicles that played a crucial role in the outcome of the conflict.

US WW2 Production – Combat and Motor Vehicles Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

(1) 1941 = July 1, 1940 through Dec 41

(2) 1945 = Jan 1 1945 through July 31 1945

(3) Total = July 1, 1940 through July 31, 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 144, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other US Production Data Links

US WW2 Production – Other

US WW2 Production – Guns and Munitions

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

US War Cost of Production by Category

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“Everywhere one looks there are very impressive American production statistics throughout World War II. The war on the ground in Europe was often tank warfare. Between 1918 and 1933, the United States produced only 35 tanks, and no two of them the same model. In 1940, after witnessing Germany’s Blitzkrieg in Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, the United States produced 309 tanks, versus 1,400 in Britain and 1,450 in Germany. In 1943, however, the United States manufactured 29,500 tanks, more in 1 year than Germany produced in the entire war from 1939 to 1945. In all, the United States manufactured 88,430 tanks during World War II versus 24,800 in Britain and 24,050 in Germany.” (1)

(1) Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 93. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Industrial Production

An argument made by many is that with the combined Allied nations industrial might is that victory in World War 2 was all but a foregone conclusion. Except during the 1930s Germany led all nations in military production so the edge in Europe at least initially was with the Axis. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. 

So, it was not a given that the Allies industrial might would trump Germany’s. US industries pivoting sharply from commercial products to military materiel was fraught with risk. US industries used to work at an arm’s length from the government now had to work hand in hand often conceding leadership to the government. Companies that previously competed vigorously now agreed to share patent and technical information. Shortages of manpower and materials were worked through coordinating committees based not just US need but upon greatest Allied need. The US and its Allied partners through its government, military, and industry leadership learned quickly how to work together. There were plenty of bumps in the road, but they worked as a team with a common goal. The Axis nations did not.

Germany squandered many of its early advantages. Germany’s vision required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war because they foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. Accordingly, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. Up to the Battle of Britain and Operation Barbarossa the German short war or political takeover scenario played out time and time again. The Allies on the other hand foresaw a long war and mobilized its industries accordingly with factories running around the clock seven days a week.

US Production Data

The above graphs can be downloaded as images.  

To download the data shown below from which the graphs were developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

US Production WWII: Ships 1941 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Production WWII: Aircraft 1940 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Production WWII: Tanks 1940 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other Production and Availability Data Links

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

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