Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 Availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

The Soviet Union had a large and diverse artillery arsenal during World War II. The exact numbers of artillery pieces available are difficult to determine, but here are some estimates:

Field Artillery

The Soviet Union had many field artillery pieces, including 76mm, 85mm, and 122mm (M-30 howitzer) guns, as well as 152mm and 203mm howitzers. It’s estimated that the Soviet Union manufactured just under 300,000 field artillery pieces during the war.

Anti-Tank Guns

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of anti-tank guns, including the 45mm, 57mm, and 76mm guns. These guns were highly effective against German tanks and played a crucial role in Soviet anti-tank defense.

Rocket Launchers

The Soviet Union developed several rocket launchers during the war, including the Katyusha rocket launcher. These launchers were highly effective against enemy troops and fortifications.

Heavy Artillery

The Soviet Union also had a significant number of heavy artillery pieces, including 152mm, 203mm, and 280mm guns. These guns were used for long-range bombardment and were highly effective against enemy fortifications and artillery positions.

Significant Soviet Artillery Usage

Battle of Stalingrad

One of the most significant uses of Soviet artillery during World War II was in the defense of Stalingrad during the Battle of Stalingrad. The Soviet Union used many artillery pieces, including the 122mm howitzer M-30, to defend the city from German forces. Soviet artillery played a crucial role in the defense of Stalingrad, particularly in the early stages of the battle when German forces were attempting to capture the city. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a “kill zone” in front of the city, which made it difficult for German troops to advance.

The Soviet Union also used artillery to disrupt German supply lines and to target German artillery positions. This helped to weaken the German forces and to prevent them from launching a successful assault on the city.

Battle of Kursk

The largest massed use of Soviet artillery during World War II was at the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943. The battle was fought between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front and was the largest tank battle in history. During the battle, the Soviet Union used a massive concentration of artillery, including over 20,000 guns and mortars. The Soviet Union used a combination of artillery and other weapons to create a defensive zone around the Kursk salient, which made it difficult for German tanks and infantry to penetrate.

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin

The Battles of Seelow Heights and Berlin saw massive usage of Soviet artillery. Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front attacked the Seelow Heights, the last natural line of defense before Berlin. The 1st Belorussian Front had 908,000 men, 3,155 AFVs, 16,934 guns, and had stockpiled over 7 million rounds of artillery ammunition. 

General Nikolai Bersarin, commanding the 5th Shock Army, later claimed that “…the Western Allies had dropped 65,000 tons of explosives on the city in the course of more than two years; whereas the Red Army had expended 40,000 tons in merely two weeks.” (1)

(1) Porter, David, “Seelow Heights and Berlin”, Miltary History, https://the-past.com/feature/seelow-heights-and-berlin/, accessed on March 17, 2023 

The Soviet Union’s use of artillery played a crucial role in the battle, allowing Soviet forces to repel German attacks and to launch their own counterattacks. The artillery was highly effective in disrupting German tank formations and infantry positions and was used to create a “kill zone” in front of Soviet defensive positions.

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

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Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 250-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section II Artillery (selected data), Pages 248-251, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year.  See ‘Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Data” download below for actual data.

Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.

Selected Light Arms

The primary Soviet rifle was the Mosin-Nagant 91/30. It was a bolt-action rifle that held 5 rounds and was effective to 500m. Over 17 million were produced from 1930-45.

The PPSh-41 submachine gun was a key weapon for Soviet infantry and vehicle crews. It was mass-produced and effective at close ranges, firing 900rpm. Over 6 million were made during the war.

The Degtyaryov DP light machine gun could fire full-auto at up 750rpm. It was used as a squad support weapon, mounted on vehicles, and in aircraft. Millions were produced from 1927-45.

The Tokarev TT-33 pistol was the standard Soviet sidearm. Over 1.5 million were made from 1933-51. It fired 8-round magazines of the 7.62x25mm pistol cartridge, effective to 100m.

Soviet infantry made heavy use of grenades, including fragmentation and anti-tank grenades. Millions of grenades were produced and they were integral to Soviet small-unit tactics.

Light Arms Production

Soviet small arms were relatively simple, hard-hitting, and cheaply mass-produced. While less advanced than German weapons, their sheer numbers contributed greatly to Soviet victories against the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. There were several factors that contributed to this:

Simplicity of Design

Soviet light arms were designed to be simple and easy to manufacture. This allowed for mass production and reduced the cost of production.

Use of Standardized Parts

Soviet light arms often used standardized parts, which reduced the need for specialized tools and equipment. This made it easier and less expensive to manufacture and repair weapons.

Use of Low-Grade Materials

The Soviet Union often used lower-grade materials, such as stamped steel, to produce light arms. This reduced the cost of production, but also resulted in weapons that were less durable and less accurate than their Western counterparts. Whereas the German light arms manufacturing industry used higher-grade materials in the production of weapons, which resulted in weapons that were more durable and accurate than their Soviet counterparts but were more expensive and time consuming to produce.

Centralized Production

The Soviet Union had a highly centralized system of production, which allowed for greater efficiency and coordination in the manufacturing process. This helped to reduce costs and increase production rates.

Overall, the Soviet Union’s light arms manufacturing industry was effective in producing large quantities of weapons quickly and efficiently. While the weapons produced were often less durable and accurate than their Western counterparts, they played an important role in the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II.

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

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Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London,  Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section I – Small Arms (Selected data only) Pages 246-247, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45 Data

This includes all the data needed to calculate the availability quantities.

Source: Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section I – Small Arms Pages 246-247, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data Links

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

Weapons of the Red Army: Soviet Small Arms of World War II

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Vengeance Weapon 2

The average V-1 cost 5,090 Reichsmarks (RM) (approximately $2,000 in 1944) whereas a V-2 cost 100,000 RM at the beginning of 1944 and dropped to 50,000 RM by the end of the war. The V-1 required approximately 800 manhours of labor whereas the V-2 required 20,000 hours in early 1944 and decreased to 10,000 hours per unit by war’s end. Over 30,000 V-Is were produced whereas just over 3,000 V-2s were produced even though the first operational launches were only two months apart.

During its development phase numerous design issues were discovered through testing. This was a slow process as each issue had to be identify down to its root cause and appropriate corrective action taken. This included moving away from the pressure tanks utilized by the V-1 to deliver fuel to turbopumps, reengineering the combustion chamber to preclude burn through, and a host of other technical issues.

Production

Hitler authorized mass production of the V-2 in December 1942. However, a year and a half later mass production issues plagued the program. The Royal Air Force launched Operation Hydra at the Peenemunde production site neared readiness resulting in a four-to-six-week delay. Even though mass production had been authorized the design was still in flux and a finalized parts list still did not exist by the mid 1944.

Due to the Allied bombing efforts V-2 production was moved underground to the Mittelwerke production facility. As Peenemunde production wound down Mittelwerke production ramped up. Mittelwerke production facilities were underground well away from Allied bombers. A total of 515 V-2s were produced at Peenemunde and 6400 V-2s at Mittelwerke.

Specifications

The V-2 weighed 27,600 pounds, stood 45 ft 11 inches, and had a war with an explosive weight of 2000 pounds. The V-1 carried a slightly smaller warhead at 1,870 pounds versus the V-2’s warhead at 2,000 pounds.

Operations

V-2 rockets were most often transported by train at night and launched quickly from mobile launch sites. A dedicated tow vehicle, Meillerwagen, was used to move the V-2s from the train depot and erect the rocket at the mobile launch sites. The mobile launch sites were Germany’s response to the Allied targeting fixed launch sites or underground bunkers. 

First Launch and Targets

First launch occurred on September 7, 1944, when two units were launch at Paris, but both failed shortly after launch. The next day would see the first successful operational V-2 as one was launched and struck Paris. The most frequently targeted countries were Belgium 1,664 and England 1,402 times. The most targeted cities were Antwerp 1,610 and London 1,358 times.

V-2 Production Estimates Data

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“Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter IX, Table IX-2, Page 121, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Buil-1

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The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

World War II Munition Expenditures: A Comparative Analysis

Allied Nations’ Munition Expenditures

The Allied nations demonstrated a significant commitment to munition expenditures, reflecting their strategic imperative to equip and sustain their armed forces. The United States, despite its initial neutrality, began to provide substantial military supplies and assistance to the Allies from September 1940, well before its formal entry into the war in December 1941. This support, facilitated through innovative programs such as Lend-Lease, played a crucial role in bolstering the military capabilities of the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, and other nations already engaged in conflict with Germany and Japan.

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union collectively invested substantial resources in munitions production, with a clear escalation in expenditures from 1940 onwards. This concerted effort resulted in a significant buildup of munitions, reflecting the Allies’ determination to counter the Axis powers and secure victory in the war. The United States expended $0.3 billion on average during the 1935-39 prewar years but was able to ramp up to $42 billion by 1944. This US 1944 total of $ 42 billion was equal to 79% of Germany’s 1939-44 total munitions expenditures. And it was two and a half times Japan’s 1939-44 total munitions expenditures.

Axis Nations’ Munition Expenditures

In contrast, the Axis powers, particularly Germany and Japan, faced challenges in matching the munition expenditures of the Allied nations. Germany’s munition expenditures, while substantial, were outpaced by the combined efforts of the Allied nations. Both the US and the Soviets individually outspent Germany while the United Kingdom’s expenditures were 78% of Germany’s. Japan, despite its significant military expansion in the early years of the war, also encountered limitations in munitions production compared to the Allied powers. Japan’s total wartime munitions expenditures were the least of the major combatants by far.

The disparity in munition expenditures between the Allied nations and the Axis powers reflected broader resource and industrial constraints faced by the latter, ultimately impacting their ability to sustain a prolonged and resource-intensive conflict.

Strategic Implications and Historical Context

The munition expenditures of the Allied nations and the Axis powers during World War II had profound strategic implications. The Allies’ substantial investments in munitions production enabled them to maintain a formidable military arsenal, supporting their strategic offensives and sustained operations across multiple theaters of war. This buildup of munitions, coupled with innovative programs such as Lend-Lease, significantly bolstered the military capabilities of the Allied forces.

Conversely, the Axis powers’ limitations in munition expenditures, particularly in comparison to the Allied nations, posed significant challenges in sustaining their military operations and countering the escalating military might of the Allies. Additionally, Germany mismanaged the economic aspects of industrial production. For example, German conquered territories industries were plundered of their industrial machine tooling. Germany utilized these machine tools in German factories in suboptimal settings since machine tooling is normally designed for a unique application and setup. Production from the conquered territories collapsed and provided little to the Axis cause. These constraints ultimately impacted the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the Axis powers’ war efforts.

Conclusion

The munition expenditures of the Allied nations and the Axis powers during World War II offer a compelling narrative of the industrial and strategic dynamics that shaped the conflict. The substantial investments made by the Allied nations in munitions production, supported by innovative programs and resource mobilization, played a pivotal role in securing their military superiority and eventual victory in the war. In contrast, the Axis powers’ limitations in munition expenditures reflected broader resource constraints and strategic challenges, ultimately impacting their ability to sustain a prolonged and resource-intensive conflict.

The legacy of World War II munition expenditures continues to serve as a testament to the pivotal role of industrial capacity, resource mobilization, and strategic foresight in shaping the outcomes of global conflicts.

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

Allies Axis Munitions Production in World War II Data

Source: Wikipedia, “Military production during World War II.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

*Note: The amount shown in the Total 1939–44 column for row titled ‘Allies Total’ is 204.4. All other totals in this column represent a summation of the numbers preceding it on their respective rows. That being the case the Allies Total should have been 208.9. However, this table reflects the original since it cannot be validated where to make the change.

Other Economic Data Links

Historical Tables Budget of the U.S. Government

German vs. USSR Volume of Industrial Production, 1940

Allies to Axis GDP Ratios 1938-1945

Real National Product of UK, US, USSR, and Germany, 1937-45

US Federal Spending and Military Spending During WW2

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Prewar Expectations

Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. And the early days proved out Germany’s expectations, beginning in 1935 with Germany violating the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military conscription on through to France signing an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940. Germany saw no need to mobilize for an industrial total war. For example, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. 

Outside of the ongoing war in China the Japanese saw a rapid expansion into the southwest Pacific followed by a negotiated peace. Japan believe they could expand their empire and control the much-needed resources that they lacked. “They planned to fight a war of limited objectives and having once secured these objectives to set up a defense in such depth that the United States would find a settlement favorable to Japan an attractive alternative to a long and costly war. To the Japanese leaders this seemed an entirely reasonable view.” (1)

(1) Morton, Louis, “Command Decisions Japan’s Decision for War”, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC 1990, Page 122

Whereas the Allied Nations consisting of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) all believe that it would be a long war, and each quickly mobilized their industries for total war in ways suited for their situations. 

Industrial Philosophy

All three Allied nations relied on mass production. The UK and US utilized a capitalistic mass production approach, and the USSR utilized a central planning approach to mass production. The US adapted lessons from the automobile industry to the building of tanks, locomotives, and aircraft. The Soviet Union dialed up production rates. USSR military analysis determined the projected life of a weapons group or platform, such as a tank, and their requirements for subcomponents reflected that life expectancy.

Germany and Japan relied on a more artisanal production approach often with very short production runs. Axis militaries were intimately involved with production demanding design changes often in the middle of production runs thus slowing current production and making logistics later on much more difficult.

Additionally, the Allied nations tried to limit the number of weapon types. For example, Germany produced 42 types of aircraft versus the Soviet Union producing twelve types.

Coordination Between Partners

Italy’s and Japan’s leaders were stunned when Germany invaded the USSR. No pre-coordination occurred the three nations. Japan’s partners were also surprised when the bombed Pearl Harbor. The Allies had some level of cooperation between the three major partners and a high-level degree of cooperation between the UK and the US. Allied cooperation made all three of their industries more efficient via programs such as Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease.

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries Data

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* Tanks, self-propelled artillery, vehicles

** For the Allies Missiles were only for test

Source: Wikipedia, “Military production during World War II.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Production and Availability Data Links

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

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Automotive Industry Transition to Military Production

Germany’s automotive industry, led by companies like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, and Volkswagen (which was then known as “Volkswagenwerk”), was heavily supported by the Nazi government. The government invested in infrastructure and provided subsidies to help the industry grow. German automakers also benefited from innovations in engineering and production techniques, such as the development of the assembly line. In 1936 Germany with a 4.8% market share was the world’s third largest auto manufacturer behind the United States at 77.2% and Great Britain at 7.8%.

Meanwhile, Japan’s automotive industry was still in its early stages. The government saw the industry as a key component of its efforts to modernize the country and catch up with the West. The industry was led by companies like Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, which were focused on producing small, affordable cars for the domestic market. The Japanese government also provided support for the industry, including the creation of a national research institute for automotive technology. Japanese market share did not even make it to 1%.

The United States and Great Britain transitioned their automotive industry to produce tanks, self-propelled Guns, other armored vehicles, trucks, aircraft, and dozens of other weapons and platforms. The Soviet Union as well transition their automotive sector into producing vast quantities of war materiel. In comparison to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan’s automotive industries were not as effective in terms of producing military vehicles and equipment.

Machine Gun Production

The most commonly used machine guns during World War II were the German MG34 and MG42, the American M1919 and M2 Browning, and the Soviet DP-27 and Maxim PM1910.

Exact production numbers for machine guns during World War II can be difficult to pin down, as records and data collection were not always complete. However, here are some production estimates for machine guns by some of the major powers:

It is estimated that Germany produced around 1.2 million MG34s and MG42s combined during the war, both fired a 7.92×57mm Mauser rifle cartridge. Production numbers varied by year, with approximately 100,000 MG34s produced in 1940 and over 400,000 MG42s produced in 1944.

The United States produced large numbers of machine guns during the war. The M1919, a .30 caliber medium machine gun, was the most common model. It is estimated that the US produced around 3 million M1919s and M2 Brownings, a .50 caliber machine gun, combined. Production numbers varied by year, with approximately 400,000 M1919s produced in 1943 and 700,000 M2 Brownings produced in 1944.

The Soviet Union also produced large numbers of machine guns during the war, with the DP-27 and Maxim PM1910 being the most commonly produced models and both fired the 7.62×54mmR cartridge. It is estimated that the Soviet Union produced around 1 million DP-27s and 520,000 Maxim PM1910s. Production numbers varied by year, with approximately 120,000 DP-27s produced in 1941 and 130,000 Maxim PM1910s produced in 1942.

Great Britain produced a smaller numbers of machine guns during the war. With the Bren which fired a .303 cartridge being the most common. It is estimated that Great Britain produced around 500,000 Bren guns. Production numbers varied by year, with approximately 28,000 Bren guns produced in 1940 and 133,000 produced in 1944.

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Land Forces Data

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Source: Wikipedia, “Military production during World War II.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Production Data Links

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

Allies Axis Vital Commerce and Raw Materials

German Soviet War Production, 1940-45

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Aircraft Production Example

Using aircraft types as an example Germany’s use of many models can be seen as both a strength and a weakness, depending on the context. Germany’s use of many aircraft models allowed them to have a diverse range of capabilities, with each aircraft optimized for a particular role. This gave them a tactical advantage in certain situations, such as having specialized planes for ground attack or long-range reconnaissance.

Additionally, Germany’s aviation industry was highly advanced, and they were able to develop cutting-edge technology that pushed the boundaries of what was possible in aircraft design. By producing many aircraft models, which helped them stay ahead of their enemies in terms of innovation.

However, having many aircraft types can make logistics and maintenance more complicated, especially when it comes to sourcing spare parts and training personnel. This can lead to inefficiencies and delays in operations, which can be a hindrance on the battlefield.

Additionally, producing many aircraft models requires significant resources in terms of time, money, and materials. This can strain a country’s resources, particularly in a total war scenario where resources are already scarce. Germany’s use of many aircraft models spread their resources too thin, preventing them from fully focusing on the development and production of their most effective designs.

Speer Reforms

Albert Speer was appointed as the Minister of Armaments and War Production in February 1942, and he initiated a series of reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of the German war economy. These reforms had a significant impact on the aircraft manufacturing industry in Germany.

One of Speer’s key initiatives was to rationalize production by consolidating smaller factories and focusing on larger, more efficient facilities. This allowed for greater standardization in production and more efficient use of resources. In the aircraft industry, this led to the closure of some smaller factories and the concentration of production in larger facilities. Unluckily for Germany the transition to larger more efficient aircraft factories occurred as the UK and US were ramping up their strategic targeting of Germany’s aircraft industry.

In response to the bombing raids, the German aircraft industry began to relocate factories to more remote areas or to underground bunkers. This allowed production to continue, but at a slower pace with reduced capacity and lesser quality. The bombing campaign also targeted transportation networks, including rail lines and river transportation, which disrupted the supply of raw materials and parts to aircraft factories. This further reduced the capacity of the German aircraft industry to produce new aircraft.

Germany’s use of many aircraft models in World War II was a mixed bag in terms of its effectiveness but overall, a net negative. While it allowed them to have a diverse range of capabilities and push the boundaries of technological innovation.  But it also limited total units produced while making manufacturing, logistics, and maintenance more complicated.

Numbers of Weapon Types Produced in Germany USSR, 1944 Data

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Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 22, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000, For Germany see Overy (1994), 363; (A) is for January, and (B) shows post-Speer reform figures. For USSR, ground forces armament figures are derived from first quarter serial production data in RTsKhIDNI, except aircraft based on annual series in Kostyrchenko (1994), 235-7.

Other Production and Availability Data Links

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Aircraft Available In Europe; Germany, UK, US, USSR

Warplanes Produced by Nation 1940 to 1945

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Land Forces

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Manufacturing Production Philosophy

“Quantity has a quality all its own.” It is debated if Stalin ever said this, but it was an operating principle for Soviet production. The Soviet Union maximized quantity produced over almost over all other production concerns. Whereas for most of the war the German approach optimized design excellence, development of the next generation of weapons, and specialized items fulfilling unique scenarios. 

The Soviet’s production philosophy was to keep the number of model types down, simplify manufacturing thereby requiring low skilled labor, and keep design change activity to a minimum while implemented those changes as a block. Germany’s production philosophy until 1943 was the opposite in that they had many model types, a complex manufacturing environment requiring skilled labor, and continuously incorporated design changes so that very few products in the field were identical thus complicating logistics. It wasn’t until the Speer reforms fully took effect in 1943 that Germany’s model types were reduced to a level commensurate with the Soviet Union allowing them to streamline their production processes.

The Soviet Union and Germany saw the upcoming war very differently and their industrial mobilization reflected their visions. Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war.

German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. Germany’s vision required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war. Accordingly, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. The Soviet Union foresaw a long war and mobilized its industries and military accordingly with factories running around the clock seven days a week.

Prior to the Speer reforms, Germany produced 26 different types of artillery while the Soviets produced five, Germany produced 12 types of antitank guns and the Soviets two, Germany produced ten types of antiaircraft guns and the Soviets three, Germany produced 18 types of tanks or armored vehicles and the Soviets six, and Germany produced 42 types of aircraft and the Soviets twelve.

Warships

Germany submarine production totaled 905,400 tons during the 1940-1945 war years. While the Soviet Union could focus totally on the land war against only one enemy and therefore only produced a handful of coastal surface ships.

German Soviet War Production, 1940-45 Data

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*Ground and air munitions, thousands

Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 14, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000

Other Production and Availability Data

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

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