Note: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year. See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.

Soviet Fleet

The Soviet fleet in 1939 was the seventh largest by tonnage in the world after Germany’s Kriegsmarine. Counterintuitively, the Soviet Union had the largest prewar submarine fleet in the world with 212 submarines available January 1, 1941. During the war the Soviet Union procured an additional fifty-one submarines but lost 102. With such a low procurement rate the Soviets were quickly surpassed by the German Kriegsmarine which in 1941 alone produced 199 U-boats. The Kriegsmarine would go on to exceed their 1941 production number in each year from 1942-44. In all the Soviet Union received an additional 2,588 vessels and lost 1,014 vessels during the war years.

Priorities

During the war Soviet naval budget allocations fell from 11.5% in 1941 to 6.6% in 1944 highlighting their priority versus the other military branches. Lend-Lease provided additional small surface ships. “The United Kingdom and the United States traded the Royal Navy battleship HMS Royal Sovereign (renamed Arkhangelsk) and the United States Navy cruiser USS Milwaukee (renamed Murmansk) in exchange for the Soviet part of the captured Italian navy.” (1) Additionally, the Soviet Union captured eleven Romanian, Latvian and Estonian and integrated them into their fleet. Also, four British submarines were received and renamed V1 to V4.oviet

(1) Wikipedia, “Soviet Navy”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy, accessed on March 7, 2023.

Operation Barbarossa saw Soviet Navy personnel participating in land battles as the regular Soviet Army forces were overrun. Sea port towns such as Leningrad and Sevastopol were two of several cities where Soviet sailors battled as land forces. Soviet submarines were the most capable naval force projection capability and even those were limited due to German mining operations and ineffectual leadership due to the purges of the 1930s.

Due to the geography the Soviet vessels served in many of their losses came from German land forces. Soviet naval forces were highly criticized by the UK and US for their ineffectiveness especially regarding the convoy protections needed for shipments into Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

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Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Chart Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, (Selected data) Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45 Data, Transposed Format

Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section V Ships, Page 256, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev

Other Soviet Availability Data

Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45

Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45

Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45

Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45

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“Everywhere one looks there are very impressive American production statistics throughout World War II. The war on the ground in Europe was often tank warfare. Between 1918 and 1933, the United States produced only 35 tanks, and no two of them the same model. In 1940, after witnessing Germany’s Blitzkrieg in Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, the United States produced 309 tanks, versus 1,400 in Britain and 1,450 in Germany. In 1943, however, the United States manufactured 29,500 tanks, more in 1 year than Germany produced in the entire war from 1939 to 1945. In all, the United States manufactured 88,430 tanks during World War II versus 24,800 in Britain and 24,050 in Germany.” (1)

(1) Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 93. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Industrial Production

An argument made by many is that with the combined Allied nations industrial might is that victory in World War 2 was all but a foregone conclusion. Except during the 1930s Germany led all nations in military production so the edge in Europe at least initially was with the Axis. German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. 

So, it was not a given that the Allies industrial might would trump Germany’s. US industries pivoting sharply from commercial products to military materiel was fraught with risk. US industries used to work at an arm’s length from the government now had to work hand in hand often conceding leadership to the government. Companies that previously competed vigorously now agreed to share patent and technical information. Shortages of manpower and materials were worked through coordinating committees based not just US need but upon greatest Allied need. The US and its Allied partners through its government, military, and industry leadership learned quickly how to work together. There were plenty of bumps in the road, but they worked as a team with a common goal. The Axis nations did not.

Germany squandered many of its early advantages. Germany’s vision required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war because they foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. Accordingly, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. Up to the Battle of Britain and Operation Barbarossa the German short war or political takeover scenario played out time and time again. The Allies on the other hand foresaw a long war and mobilized its industries accordingly with factories running around the clock seven days a week.

US Production Data

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US Production WWII: Ships 1941 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Production WWII: Aircraft 1940 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

US Production WWII: Tanks 1940 – 1945

Source: Gropman, Alan L. “Mobilizing U.S. Industry In World War II: Myth And Reality.” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, Washington, DC, Page 96. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/23588/mcnair50.pdf

Other Production and Availability Data Links

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Production Share

In 1940 and 1941 the UK was the leading warship producer by tonnage. In 1942 the US took over that role. 1941 was the year that the Axis nation had their largest share of the production pie at 36.2%. By 1943 the axis percentage stood at 11.9% and would fall to 7.5% by 1945.

Production Capacity

Historically not only were the UK and the US leading worldwide naval forces they were leading shipbuilders as well. The UK and the US could and would convert commercial shipbuilding facilities into military shipbuilding facilities. For example, prior to the war years Harland & Wolff in Belfast, Northern Ireland was famous for building ocean liners. However, during the war years Harland & Wolff transitioned to building built Abercrombie-class monitors and cruisers. Similar stories could be told of other British and American shipbuilders.

Liberty Ships

The production story of the Liberty ships is well known as the Kaiser shipbuilding facilities were able to reduce production time from more than a year to less than 90 days. Lesser known is Kaiser’s production of the Casablanca-class escort carrier. Kaiser’s bid to produce fifty escort carriers in two years was rejected as the Navy believed this was impossible. It took President Roosevelt’s advisers to intercede and award the contract. Kaiser delivered the fifty escort carriers on time.

The US was simplifying the design and using mass production techniques to produce quantity. The Axis nations were trying to streamline their production processes but overall, they were using traditional one at a time techniques. The US had forty-four shipbuilding facilities along their eastern, western and gulf coasts. The Great Lakes added eleven more bringing the grand total to fifty-five production facilities during the war years. 

For the most part the UK and US shipbuilding facilities were not attacked by their enemies whereas the Axis facilities found themselves under Allied bombardment. Freedom from enemy harassment allowed their facilities to be set up with emphasis on production first and foremost.

Warships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940 to 1945 Data

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*submarines only. Germany produced very few surface vessels between 1940 and 1945.

Trueman, C. N. “Weapons And Manpower.” https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/weapons-and-manpower/, Data accessed on July 22, 2022

Other Naval Vessel Data Links

Merchant Ships Produced by Nation by Total Tonnage 1940-45

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Naval Forces

US Army Dead Weight Tonnage Pacific and Atlantic, Nov 41 – Dec 42

Gains and Losses of British Flag Tonnage (>= 1,600 gross tons)

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The UK and US both had world sea faring navies. To a lesser extent so did Japan. Germany’s navy except submarines was for the most part limited to the North Atlantic. The Allies inherently had a larger naval vessel production base to start the war and naval vessels are a very long lead item. Therefore, having a larger base to begin with gave the Allies a big jump on their counterparts.

The Naval Conferences

A series of naval conferences beginning in 1921 held in Washington DC, Geneva in 1927, London in 1930, and London in 1935 aimed to set limits on naval tonnage overall and build the framework for disarmament. During the first conference there were three treaties signed and the one specific to naval vessel production was the Five-Power Treaty. The Five-Power Treaty signed in 1922 by the five major naval nations at the time were the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France and Italy (listed in size of navies).

“The Five-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy was the cornerstone of the naval disarmament program. It called for each of the countries involved to maintain a set ratio of warship tonnage which allowed the United States and the United Kingdom 500,000 tons, Japan 300,000 tons, and France and Italy each 175,000 tons. Japan preferred that tonnage be allotted at a 10:10:7 ratio, while the U.S. Navy preferred a 10:10:5 ratio.

The conference ultimately adopted the 5:5:3 ratio limits. Since the United States and the United Kingdom maintained navies in both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to support their colonial territories, the Five-Power Treaty allotted both countries the highest tonnage allowances. The treaty also called on all five signatories to stop building capital ships and reduce the size of their navies by scrapping older ships.” (1)

(1)  “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922”, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/naval-conference, Accessed on March 5, 2023.

Several follow-on conferences were held between 1927 and 1935, and the results modified the original the Five-Power Treaty to address tonnage ratios, cruisers, submarines, and auxiliary ships.  Cruisers became a sticking point as the original treaty limited the size but not how many could be built, and all raced to build as many as possible. The provisions in both the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 treaties were set to expire in 1936. Japan ended further participation upon the 1936 expiration date.

Prewar Shipbuilding Facilities

Both the United States and the United Kingdom had large commercial and military shipbuilding facilities with long established capabilities. Germany and Japan both had smaller shipbuilding capabilities. Almost all of Japan’s shipbuilding during the 1930s were naval ships whereas Germany’s were split between military and commercial vessels. But it was the UK and the US that were producing the greatest tonnage.

Minorities and Women Shipbuilders

The US tapped into nontraditional shipbuilding labor including minorities and women. These laborers became welders and electricians, machine operators and pipefitters, mechanics and painters. Women at the Charlestown Navy Yard totaled over 8,000 of the 50,000 shipbuilders in 1943.

Annual Allied Axis Naval Construction 1939-45 Data

The above graph can be downloaded as an image.  

To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

How to sort by multiple columns – First sort by one of the columns. Then press the “Shift” key on the keyboard and while holding the Shift key click on a second header.  This column now becomes the second sorting column.  This feature is useful when the first sorting column has values that repeat for multiple rows.

Source: Ellis, John, “The World War II Databook”, BCA by arrangements with Aurum Press Ltd., London, 1993, Page 280, Table 95

Other Production and Availability Data Links

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Naval Forces

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

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Sea Faring Culture

Of the five major World War II belligerents Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States were established sea faring nations. Although the Soviet Union had a large coastline most of it was iced in for much of the year or bottled up in the Black Sea. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, the UK’s Royal Navy was the largest in the world followed by the US and then Japan. Both the UK and the US navies prior to the war operated fully in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Whereas the Japanese navy mostly operated in the Pacific. Additionally, these three nations also had a significant trading capability.

Germany and the Soviet Union militarily were land based heavyweights. Although Germany went on a surface navy production spree in the mid to late 1930s it was their submarine production that would stand out.  Germany’s large submarine force interdicted the UK and US sea movements but were not able to project power via the sea. The Soviet Union’s naval capabilities were mainly coastal versus ocean faring.

Production

The UK and the US both outproduced all Axis nations combined during WWII war years. The US produced 2,020 large surface naval vessels (large naval vessels defined as aircraft carriers, escort carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates & destroyer escorts, and other large vessels), the UK produced 558 large naval vessels and the Axis nations combined produced 398 large naval vessels. 

Both Germany and Japan outproduced all Allied nations in submarines during WWII. Germany produced 1,119 submarines, Japan 867, and the Allies 577.

In smaller specialty naval vessels such as patrol boats, demining or landing craft production was almost all on the Allied side of the ledger. 

Oil

WWII naval vessels required vast quantities of oil. The Allied nations had it and the Axis nations did not. The Japanese even took to using unrefined oils from occupied Borneo causing lower performance and higher maintenance. Lack of oil limited German and Japanese naval capabilities compounding their numerical disadvantage. In the Pacific the US submarines high priority targets included all merchant ships especially oil tankers. Whereas the Japanese submarines prioritized the US naval vessels. Lack of oil forced both German and Japanese vessels to use the shortest routes versus the longer safer routes.

Allies Axis Weapon Production – Naval Forces Data

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To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download

*Total large ships includes the columns labeled; Carriers, Escort Carriers, Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates & Destroyer Escorts, and Other large vessels.

**Includes midget submarines

Source: Wikipedia, “Military production during World War II.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Production and Availability Data Links

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Prewar Expectations

Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. And the early days proved out Germany’s expectations, beginning in 1935 with Germany violating the Treaty of Versailles by introducing military conscription on through to France signing an armistice with Nazi Germany in 1940. Germany saw no need to mobilize for an industrial total war. For example, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. 

Outside of the ongoing war in China the Japanese saw a rapid expansion into the southwest Pacific followed by a negotiated peace. Japan believe they could expand their empire and control the much-needed resources that they lacked. “They planned to fight a war of limited objectives and having once secured these objectives to set up a defense in such depth that the United States would find a settlement favorable to Japan an attractive alternative to a long and costly war. To the Japanese leaders this seemed an entirely reasonable view.” (1)

(1) Morton, Louis, “Command Decisions Japan’s Decision for War”, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC 1990, Page 122

Whereas the Allied Nations consisting of the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) all believe that it would be a long war, and each quickly mobilized their industries for total war in ways suited for their situations. 

Industrial Philosophy

All three Allied nations relied on mass production. The UK and US utilized a capitalistic mass production approach, and the USSR utilized a central planning approach to mass production. The US adapted lessons from the automobile industry to the building of tanks, locomotives, and aircraft. The Soviet Union dialed up production rates. USSR military analysis determined the projected life of a weapons group or platform, such as a tank, and their requirements for subcomponents reflected that life expectancy.

Germany and Japan relied on a more artisanal production approach often with very short production runs. Axis militaries were intimately involved with production demanding design changes often in the middle of production runs thus slowing current production and making logistics later on much more difficult.

Additionally, the Allied nations tried to limit the number of weapon types. For example, Germany produced 42 types of aircraft versus the Soviet Union producing twelve types.

Coordination Between Partners

Italy’s and Japan’s leaders were stunned when Germany invaded the USSR. No pre-coordination occurred the three nations. Japan’s partners were also surprised when the bombed Pearl Harbor. The Allies had some level of cooperation between the three major partners and a high-level degree of cooperation between the UK and the US. Allied cooperation made all three of their industries more efficient via programs such as Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease.

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries Data

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* Tanks, self-propelled artillery, vehicles

** For the Allies Missiles were only for test

Source: Wikipedia, “Military production during World War II.” https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Production and Availability Data Links

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Manufacturing Production Philosophy

“Quantity has a quality all its own.” It is debated if Stalin ever said this, but it was an operating principle for Soviet production. The Soviet Union maximized quantity produced over almost over all other production concerns. Whereas for most of the war the German approach optimized design excellence, development of the next generation of weapons, and specialized items fulfilling unique scenarios. 

The Soviet’s production philosophy was to keep the number of model types down, simplify manufacturing thereby requiring low skilled labor, and keep design change activity to a minimum while implemented those changes as a block. Germany’s production philosophy until 1943 was the opposite in that they had many model types, a complex manufacturing environment requiring skilled labor, and continuously incorporated design changes so that very few products in the field were identical thus complicating logistics. It wasn’t until the Speer reforms fully took effect in 1943 that Germany’s model types were reduced to a level commensurate with the Soviet Union allowing them to streamline their production processes.

The Soviet Union and Germany saw the upcoming war very differently and their industrial mobilization reflected their visions. Germany foresaw a series of short wars or political takeovers of states in one-on-one actions. During the 1930s Germany more so than any other European nation mobilized their military and industry for war.

German self-sufficiency was a key principle in their war preparations which included construction of synthetic fuel and rubber plants, prioritizing military over civilian economic policy, and stockpiling raw materials. Germany’s vision required industrial and military mobilizations but not that of total war. Accordingly, Germany’s early war aircraft production was running two shifts for five days a week. The Soviet Union foresaw a long war and mobilized its industries and military accordingly with factories running around the clock seven days a week.

Prior to the Speer reforms, Germany produced 26 different types of artillery while the Soviets produced five, Germany produced 12 types of antitank guns and the Soviets two, Germany produced ten types of antiaircraft guns and the Soviets three, Germany produced 18 types of tanks or armored vehicles and the Soviets six, and Germany produced 42 types of aircraft and the Soviets twelve.

Warships

Germany submarine production totaled 905,400 tons during the 1940-1945 war years. While the Soviet Union could focus totally on the land war against only one enemy and therefore only produced a handful of coastal surface ships.

German Soviet War Production, 1940-45 Data

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To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.

*Ground and air munitions, thousands

Source: Harrison, Mark “Industrial mobilisation for World War II: a German comparison*.” Page 14, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/opk2000mobilisation.pdf, Data accessed May 20, 2022, *This paper appeared as a chapter in The Soviet Defence Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 99-117. Edited by John Barber and Mark Harrison. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press, 2000

Other Production and Availability Data

Allies Axis Major Weapons Groups – Production Summaries

US WW2 Production – Aircraft

Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45

German Flak Production History by Model

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.