According to data from Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev’s book, “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century,” the Soviet Union lost a staggering 134,100 tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored vehicles out of a total 204,400 units during the war. However, even with these great losses Soviet armor was key to driving back the German armies. Thus, proving Joseph Stalin’s maxim “Quantity has a quality all its own.”

Annual Soviet Armor Losses

These losses were spread out over the course of the war, with the majority occurring between 1941 and 1944. In 1941, the Soviet Union lost 23,500 units, which was a significant blow to their military capabilities. This was due in part to the surprise German attack on the Soviet Union, which caught the Soviet military off guard and unprepared.

In 1942, the Soviet Union lost another 24,100 units, including a significant number of tanks. This was a difficult year for the Soviet Union, as they were still reeling from the losses suffered in 1941 and were struggling to repel the German advance.

In 1943, the Soviet Union lost another 36,000 units. However, this was also the year in which the Soviet Union began to turn the tide of the war, with significant victories at Stalingrad and Kursk. Despite these victories, the Soviet Union still suffered significant losses in terms of tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored vehicles.

In 1944, the Soviet Union lost another 36,200 units. This was the year in which the Soviet Union began to push the Germans back towards their own borders and marked a turning point in the war.

Finally, in 1945, the Soviet Union lost another 14,300 units as they pushed into Germany and brought the war to a close.

Tank Losses

In terms of specific types of Soviet armored vehicles, tanks made up most of the losses suffered by the Soviet Union. Of the 134,100 units lost, 83,500 were tanks. This includes a significant number of T-34 tanks, which were a mainstay of the Soviet armored forces during the war. Other types of armored vehicles that were lost by the Soviet Union included self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers, armored tractors, and armored cars.

In conclusion, the Soviet Union suffered significant losses in terms of armored vehicles during World War II. These losses were spread out over the course of the war and had a significant impact on the Soviet Union’s military capabilities. Despite these losses, the Soviet Union was able to ultimately emerge victorious in the war thanks to the bravery and sacrifice of its soldiers and the resilience of its people.

Soviet Armor Losses Data

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*Includes cars, tractors, other armoured vehicles

Source: Krivosheev, Colonel General G.F. “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century.” Greenhill Books, 1997, London, Page 253

Other Soviet Loss Data Links

Irrecoverable Losses for Red Army Navy versus Germany and Japan

Red Army and Navy Losses, 1941-45 by Rank, Year, Quarter

Red Army and Navy Losses, 1941-45, by Year

Blavatnik Archive

Note: Data is from last four sub columns under column labeled “During war as a whole”

Vengeance Weapon 2

The average V-1 cost 5,090 Reichsmarks (RM) (approximately $2,000 in 1944) whereas a V-2 cost 100,000 RM at the beginning of 1944 and dropped to 50,000 RM by the end of the war. The V-1 required approximately 800 manhours of labor whereas the V-2 required 20,000 hours in early 1944 and decreased to 10,000 hours per unit by war’s end. Over 30,000 V-Is were produced whereas just over 3,000 V-2s were produced even though the first operational launches were only two months apart.

During its development phase numerous design issues were discovered through testing. This was a slow process as each issue had to be identify down to its root cause and appropriate corrective action taken. This included moving away from the pressure tanks utilized by the V-1 to deliver fuel to turbopumps, reengineering the combustion chamber to preclude burn through, and a host of other technical issues.

Production

Hitler authorized mass production of the V-2 in December 1942. However, a year and a half later mass production issues plagued the program. The Royal Air Force launched Operation Hydra at the Peenemunde production site neared readiness resulting in a four-to-six-week delay. Even though mass production had been authorized the design was still in flux and a finalized parts list still did not exist by the mid 1944.

Due to the Allied bombing efforts V-2 production was moved underground to the Mittelwerke production facility. As Peenemunde production wound down Mittelwerke production ramped up. Mittelwerke production facilities were underground well away from Allied bombers. A total of 515 V-2s were produced at Peenemunde and 6400 V-2s at Mittelwerke.

Specifications

The V-2 weighed 27,600 pounds, stood 45 ft 11 inches, and had a war with an explosive weight of 2000 pounds. The V-1 carried a slightly smaller warhead at 1,870 pounds versus the V-2’s warhead at 2,000 pounds.

Operations

V-2 rockets were most often transported by train at night and launched quickly from mobile launch sites. A dedicated tow vehicle, Meillerwagen, was used to move the V-2s from the train depot and erect the rocket at the mobile launch sites. The mobile launch sites were Germany’s response to the Allied targeting fixed launch sites or underground bunkers. 

First Launch and Targets

First launch occurred on September 7, 1944, when two units were launch at Paris, but both failed shortly after launch. The next day would see the first successful operational V-2 as one was launched and struck Paris. The most frequently targeted countries were Belgium 1,664 and England 1,402 times. The most targeted cities were Antwerp 1,610 and London 1,358 times.

V-2 Production Estimates Data

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“Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter IX, Table IX-2, Page 121, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Buil-1

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

*Source: “Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Page 54, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html

The USAAF 8th and 15th

The United States Army 8^th and 15^th Air Forces played a major role in the Allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany during World War II. Both the 8^th and 15th Air Forces were tasked with carrying out bombing missions against German aircraft manufacturing sites. These strategic bombing missions were designed to reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability to produce aircraft and engines, as well as to disrupt the production of aviation fuel and other supplies. 

The 8th Air Force’s bombing campaign was relentless and targeted the major German airframe and air engine manufacturers, such as Focke-Wulf FW 190, Messerschmitt Me 109 and Me 262, Heinkel He 177 and He 111, Junkers Ju 88 and 188, and BMW engine plants. Over the course of the war, thousands of aircraft took part in these missions. In total, the 8th Air Force flew over 200,000 sorties, dropping over 800,000 tons of bombs on Germany.

The 15^th Air Force originally stationed in Tunisia and later in Italy also targeted German airframe and air engine manufacturers. This included Messerschmitt Me 109, Me 410, and Me 262 aircraft plants. Among the missions the 15^th flew against engine manufacturers included five missions against the BMW Munich/Allach and five missions against the Daimler-Benz Wiener Neudorf factory.

The Big Week

Both the 8^th and 15^th Air Forces along with the RAF participated in Operation Argument or as it would become to be known as the Big Week. From February 20-25, 1944, the Allies bombing campaign focused on Germany’s aircraft industry in order to gain air superiority over the European skies. Air superiority was a requirement for a successful D-Day operation. Not only were aircraft manufacturers, especially fighter manufacturers, targeted but also airfields and aviation fuel supplies. 

But the biggest goal of the Big Week was elimination of as many of the existing Luftwaffe’s fighters as possible as well as introduction of new fighters. Prior to the Big Week Allied fighter escorts stayed close to their bombers and the Luftwaffe fighters stayed back at a distance. However, during the Big Week Allied escort fighters for the first time were ordered to leave the bombers and go directly after the German fighters. 

In some ways the results of the Big Week were mixed, but loss of fighters on the Allied side saw quick replacements with trained crew versus German replacement with ill trained crew. Although Germany was still producing large quantity of fighters the Luftwaffe was now in an operational downward spiral. German airmen, aircraft, and fuel qualities were degrading day by day. 

The results of these missions were devastating for the German aircraft industry. By D-Day the Allies had air superiority which would become air domination by the end of the war. This had a significant impact on the Luftwaffe, as it was no longer able to produce new aircraft and engines. This lack of new aircraft and engines severely weakened the German air force and was a major factor in the Allied victory in World War II.

USAAF 8th and 15th Missions Flown Against Aircraft Industry Data

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“Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Table V-4, Page 60, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

Bomb Tonnage Dropped on Aircraft Industry by UK and US Air Forces

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Tonnage Dropped

Prior to January 1944, the USAAF 8^th and 15^th Air Forces dropped a total of 28,030 tons on German aircraft manufacturers whereas in the first five months of 1944 they dropped a total 28,121 tons on that same strategic industry. The graphic shows two spikes in the USAAF bombing of the German aircraft industry, the months just prior to and the months just after D-Day. The months prior led to air superiority and the months after led to air domination.

The shape of the European battlefield was changing as the RAF and USAAF ramped up their bombing campaigns. Allied air forces strategically targeted Germany’s aircraft industry versus the Eastern Front where both Germany and the USSR primarily used their air forces to support army land actions. However, the German Luftwaffe gradually shifted their emphasis to the west.

Fighters and anti-aircraft guns, such as the famed 8.8 cm flax gun, more and more faced the UK and US Air Forces rather than the Soviet Air Force or Army. The 8.8 cm flax gun, better known in the west as the 88 mm, no longer was prioritized for the Eastern Front as an anti-tank weapon. Although a land front had not yet opened in France the Soviet Army saw some relief as weapon platforms and personnel were shifted west.

The 8^th Air Force dropped a total of 47,671 tons of their total 691,470 tons (6.87%) on Germany’s aircraft industry. The 15^th Air Force dropped a total of 14,352 tons (2.55%) of their total 545,000 tons on Germany’s aircraft industry. The RAF dropped a total of 29,000 tons (2.75%) of their total 1,060,000 tons on Germany’s aircraft industry. Overall, the Allies bomb tonnage dropped on Germany’s aircraft manufacturers total 91,047 tons or 3.95% of the 2,296,470 tons dropped.

Strategic Bombing Priority

Prior to May 1944 the German aircraft industry along with U-boat bases were the highest priority Allied strategic bombing targets. Post D-Day German aircraft industry sites were given a lower priority. Almost as many missions were flown against the German aircraft industry sites, but now they were secondary targets or even targets of last resort. Part of the reason for lowering the priority was that Germany had effectively dispersed their manufacturing sites making then less appealing a target.

In September 1944 Germany’s new wonder weapon, jet airplanes, were in the highest priority category after that of oil. Jets remained a high priority throughout the rest of the war. However, since jet production facilities were largely underground it was difficult to damage them.

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry Data

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Source: Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Table V-2, Page 58, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022, Source: 8th Air Force Statistical Summary; and for 15th Air Force, Tabulating Section, USSBS.

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

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Why the Aircraft Industry

The United Kingdom and the United States targeted the Luftwaffe, Germany’s air force, as one goal in their overall strategic bombing plan. The rationale behind this was that until Allies had at least air superiority their planes and airmen would be unable to fully attain the other strategic goals. Therefore, priority was given to destroy the Luftwaffe’s ability to be a force in the skies over Europe. This targeting took many forms. Luftwaffe bases were attacked destroying planes on the ground plus the supporting infrastructure. Luftwaffe training bases were also prime targets hoping to interrupt the pipeline of new airmen. The Luftwaffe aircraft and airmen were attacked in the air, on the ground, while being transported, and while be maintained.

Results

But it was the aircraft factories that were especially targeted hoping to destroy the pipeline of new aircraft, replacement parts, support equipment, and maintenance items in reaching the frontline Luftwaffe. Often German factories were able to come back online after the Allied raids within a few days. But even this proved to be beneficial to the Allies attaining their strategic goal. Some product had to be scrapped, others of lower quality as manufacturing equipment sustained damage, or due to personnel losses/absenteeism. 

The effect was not readily apparent early on. These raids caused personnel to be assigned to factory repair versus plane assembly, manpower expended to build dispersed factories, loss or degraded equipment, and skilled labor attrition. Through 1943-44 the German aircraft industry was not as functional as it could be even though their production numbers were increasing. It wasn’t enough, Germany’s production numbers were increasing, but the Allies were increasing at a greater rate with better quality product.

As the war evolved so did the Allies bombing tactics. The RAF took a nighttime bombing shortcoming called “creep back” and turned into part of the bombing technique. Human nature caused bombing crew to release their loads a slightly before it was time. Each subsequent plane in the bombing run would also release early compounding the effect. The solution was to have the initial target flares be released on the far end of the target so that the creep back would encompass the target.

Bomb Tonnage Dropped on Aircraft Industry by UK and US Air Forces Data

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Source: Aircraft Division Industry Report – U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.” Second Edition January 1947, Chapter V, Table V-1, Page 56, https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/airrep.html/index.html, data accessed on June 28, 2022, RAF data sourced from Air Ministry News converted to short tons, 8th Air Force sourced from Eighth AF Statistical Summary, 15th AF data sourced from “Air Power in Mediterranean”

Other Bombing Data Links

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

This website, ww2data.com, has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party internet websites referenced.  Nor does ww2data.com guarantee that any content on such websites are accurate or will remain accurate.

Note 1 – There are many differing numbers for missions flown and bomb tonnage dropped. The following was used: Humble, Richard (1975). War in the Air 1939–1945. London: Salamander

RAF and USAAF Bombing of Germany

Bashow noted that RAF, which included British, Australians, Canadians, Polish and French, airmen losses “Overall loss rates for the entire war averaged 2.58 percent per raid, which, ironically, would almost provide the ‘50-50 chance of survival’ upon which operational tour lengths would be first codified by the command in May 1943.”

Bashow, David, L. “None But The Brave The Essential Contributions Of RAF Bomber Command To Allied Victory During The Second World War”, Page 26, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009, Kingston, Ontario.

RAF bombing was concentrated on industrial and transportation targets in Germany’s heavily industrialized Ruhr region, with the aim of disrupting its war production. The RAF was heavily involved in the Allied bombing of Germany from 1939 to 1945, with notable successes including the devastating area bombing raids on Hamburg in July 1943, and the “Dambusters” raid on the Möhne and Eder dams in May 1943. The RAF also famously used radar-directed “Pathfinder” aircraft to mark targets for their bombers.

The USAAF joined the RAF in bombing Germany in 1943, initially focusing on strategic targets such as oil production, communications, and transportation centers. In 1944, the USAAF switched to a policy of “precision bombing”, targeting specific factories, marshalling yards and other key industrial sites. USAAF bombers also carried out the famous raids on the German cities of Dresden and Cologne in February 1945, which were among the most destructive raids of the war. 

The Royal Air Force dropped the lion’s share, 61 percent, compared to the US Army Air Force’s 39 percent of bomb tonnage onto Germany. Overall in Europe the USAAF dropped more tonnage than the RAF, but it was the RAF that carried it into the German homeland.

Throughout the war, both the RAF and the USAAF were forced to contend with Germany’s increasingly sophisticated air defense system. Germany deployed a range of anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and radar-guided fighter aircraft that frequently hampered Allied bombing efforts. The Luftwaffe also developed a series of guided missiles known as “V-weapons” that were used to target cities in Britain and France during 1944 and 1945.

Despite the German defensive counter measures the Allies succeeded in dropping almost 1.6 million tons of bombs on Germany. However, this campaign was costly for the Allies. The RAF had many more fighter flights whereas the USAAF had more bomber flights. The most striking statistics is the number of deaths for each air force. The RAF suffered sixteen more deaths than the USAAF out of a total 158,546. Nonetheless, strategic bombing was a major factor in Germany’s eventual defeat, as it disrupted the German industrial and transportation system, caused extensive damage to its infrastructure, and took a heavy toll on civilian morale.   

RAF and USAAF Bomb Tonnages on Germany 1939–1945 Data

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Source: Wikipedia. “Strategic bombing during World War II”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 30, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

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Other countries that were heavily bombed by the Allies included Romania for its oil and France to prepare for the second front. The most common targets were major industrial centers, transport hubs, munitions factories, and military installations. Additionally, area bombing these targets frequently struck urban areas killing civilians and creating millions of homeless.

Bombing Loads

The RAF and US Army Air Force (USAAF) carried equal loads into the skies over Europe. The RAF had many more fighter flights whereas the USAAF had more bomber flights. The most striking statistics is the number of deaths for each air force. The RAF suffered sixteen more deaths than the USAAF out of a total 158,546.

The night bombing raids were typically carried out by the British RAF with participation by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and French and Polish airmen. The RAF aircraft mainly relied on four-engined heavy bombers. The first being the Short Stirling later followed by the more successful Avro Lancaster and Handley Page Halifax. The daytime bombing raids were carried out by the USAAF Eight and Fifteenth Air Forces. The USAAF European operations mainly relied on B-24 Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses. The Allies also used smaller two-engined bombers, such as the British De Havilland Mosquito and the US B-25 Mitchell.

Strategic bombing although voiced at the end of World War I was still a new and untried approach to aerial warfare at the start of WWII. The French, Germans, and Soviets believed that the Air Forces would supplement the armies on the ground. Only the UK and US wholly bought into the strategic bombing approach. Several UK and US Air Force leaders believe that the air power alone could deliver the knockout blow. However, as with almost all new technologies and strategies a learning curve was required.

Bomber groups had to learn how to defend themselves from enemy fighters, such as the German Messerschmitt Bf 109, the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, and the Junkers Ju 88. The USAAF suffered a devastating defeat on October 14, 1943, going after the ball bearing factories during the second Schweinfurt raid, also called Black Thursday. Losses amounted to 26 percent of the attacking force and 22 percent of the bomber crews. 

On the plus side Allied raids in the Oil Campaign and targeting the German aircraft industry proved vital and successful. This first led to air superiority and then air domination. This was one of the requirements for a successful D-Day.

UK and US Bomb Tonnage Dropped in Europe Data

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Source: Wikipedia. “Strategic bombing during World War II”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 30, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

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B-29 Superfortress Range

Development of the B-29 Superfortress kicked the door open for the USAAF to systematically bomb Japan. With a range of 1,500 miles, it completed the first major raid since the Doolittle Raid on June 15, 1944. This raid flew out of China which proved to be a logistical challenge. However, it was the captured of Guam and Tinian that truly brought the Japanese mainland within range of the B-29, Superfortress. Logistically the islands were strategically better as the originating points. Bombing raids from these islands began in late 1944.

Damage Extent

Twenty-eight Japanese cities suffered more than 50 percent damage due to conventional bombing. Due to construction technique many Japanese cities were very susceptible to fire bombings which were used later in the war. The main reason for the bombing raids on Japanese cities was to weaken the country’s industrial capacity and morale. To achieve this, bombers would drop high explosives, incendiary bombs and napalm, targeting industrial and residential areas. The goal of the raids was to cause as much destruction as possible, in the hope of eventually forcing Japan to surrender. It is estimated that 500,000 Japanese citizens died in the bombing raids and another 5,000,000 were made homeless.

The most common type of raid was area bombing. This involved dropping large numbers of bombs over a wide area to create a blanket of destruction. The firebombing of Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945, is one of the most well-known examples of area bombing. In this raid, nearly 300 B-29 Superfortress bombers dropped some 1,700 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs, destroying an estimated 16 square miles of the city. High explosive bombs were used first to blow out windows and followed up with the incendiary bombs. Finally delayed fused high explosives were also included to deter firefighting efforts.

Other, less destructive, types of bombing were also used. Precision bombing, for example, involved targeting specific military and industrial sites, rather than entire cities. This was done using smaller, more agile aircraft such as the P-51 Mustang, the A-20 Havoc, and the B-25 Mitchell. 

The conventional bombing of Japanese cities was a major factor in the eventual surrender of Japan. These raids, along with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had a devastating effect on the morale of the Japanese people, and forced the government to accept the terms of the Allies.

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2 Data

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Source: Wikipedia. “Strategic bombing during World War II” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 30, 2022

Other Bombing Data Links

Conventional Bombing Damage to German Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

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Strategic Bombing

Allied strategic bombing aimed to eliminate military and infrastructure targets as well as deliver a blow to German morale. Germany pivoted its air and antiaircraft weapons to counter the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) air forces attacks. These German resource allocations against Allied strategic bombing limited what could be utilized on the Eastern Front. Although strategic bombing wasn’t the invasion desired by Stalin it began chipping away and then devasting Germany’s fighting capability.

Cities

The Allies first embarked on bombing campaigns against German cities in 1940, with the first UK large-scale night raid occurring over the city of Hamburg in July of that year. This was followed by a sustained campaign of night raids over major cities such as Berlin, Cologne, Dortmund and Dresden. The bombing raids inflicted massive damage to buildings, infrastructure and civilian lives. Entire city districts were obliterated, leaving behind a devastated landscape of rubble, dust and smoke.

These raids also caused huge disruption to transportation, as well as electricity and water supplies. In addition to the physical damage caused by the raids, the psychological effects on civilians were also profound. Many were traumatized by the experience, with the experience of the raids leaving deep emotional scars.

The situation worsened further in January 1943 when the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) conducted their first daylight bombing raid on the submarine bases at Wilhelmshaven, Germany. Prior to time the USAAF had only directed at German targets in France. With the Wilhelmshaven raid began a sharing of duties whereby the UK would bomb Germany at night and the US during the day. This duty sharing arrangement gave the German defenders little time for rest.

Hamburg

The single most intense targeting of a single city began on July 24, 1943, against Hamburg lasting eight days and seven nights. By July 27 a combination of factors resulted in the eruption of a firestorm. The weather was unusually dry and warm and firefighting was limited by previous bomb damage as well as withdrawal of other cities firefighters. Prior to these raids the British Royal Air Force determined how to most effectively use incendiary bombs. High explosive bombs were used first to blow out windows and followed up with the incendiary bombs. Finally delayed fused high explosives were also included to deter firefighting efforts. Approximately half of the 37,000 Hamburg’s deaths occurred that night.

In total, over 600,000 German civilians were killed during the war in conventional bombing raids. In addition to this, millions more were displaced and left homeless by the raids. 

Conventional Bombing Damage to German Cities in WW2 Data

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*Cities with population greater than 500,000

Source: Wikipedia. “Strategic bombing during World War II” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II, Data accessed on June 30, 2022

Other Data Links

Conventional Bombing Damage to Japanese Cities in WW2

V-1 Production Estimates

Allied Estimated Usage of the 30,000 plus V-1s Built

USAAF 8th and 15th Tonnage Dropped on German Aircraft Industry

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US Army Forces

On November 30, 1941, the United States Army had a significant presence in the Philippine Islands, which was then a territory of the United States. The US Army personnel in the Philippines consisted of approximately 10,000 regular Army soldiers, 8,000 Philippine Scouts (Filipino soldiers who served in the US Army), and 26,000 Philippine Commonwealth Army troops (Filipino soldiers under the control of the Philippine government).

The US Army was under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, who had been appointed as the Commander of US Army Forces in the Far East in July 1941. MacArthur was responsible for the defense of the Philippines, which was seen as a key strategic location in the event of a war with Japan.

US Preparedness

Despite the large number of troops in the Philippines, the US Army was not fully prepared for a war with Japan. There were shortages of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies, and the troops were not well-trained or well-equipped. There were several reasons why the US Army was not fully prepared for the Japanese attack on the Philippines:

Limited Resources

The US Army, the 19^th largest in the world, was spread thin across the globe, with troops stationed in other parts of the world. This meant that resources were limited, and the US Army had to prioritize where to allocate resources. 

Underestimation of Japanese Capabilities

The US Army underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese military. They believed that the Japanese would not be able to mount a successful attack on the Philippines and were caught off guard when the Japanese launched a surprise attack.

Limited Intelligence

The US Army had limited intelligence about the Japanese military, and what they did have was often outdated or inaccurate. This made it difficult for the US Army to predict where and when the Japanese would attack.

Poor Planning

The US Army’s planning for the defense of the Philippines was flawed. They focused on defending the major cities and ports, rather than on defending the entire archipelago. This left many areas vulnerable to attack.

Shortages of Supplies

The US Army in the Philippines was short on supplies and equipment, including weapons, ammunition, and food. This made it difficult for them to mount an effective defense against the Japanese.

Japanese Attack

On December 8, 1941, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on the Philippines, just hours after attacking Pearl Harbor. The US Army and Philippine troops fought bravely, but were eventually forced to surrender on April 9, 1942, after months of intense fighting and suffering from disease and starvation. The capture of the Philippines was a major victory for Japan and a significant setback for the Allies in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The consequences of the US Army’s surrender in the Philippines were significant and far-reaching:

Loss of Territory

The surrender of the Philippines meant that the United States lost control of a major strategic location in the Pacific. The Japanese were able to use the islands as a base for further expansion and as a launching point for attacks on other Allied territories.

Prisoners of War

The US Army soldiers and Philippine troops who surrendered became prisoners of war. Many were forced to endure harsh conditions and brutal treatment at the hands of their captors, including the infamous Bataan Death March.

Propaganda Victory for Japan

The capture of the Philippines was a major propaganda victory for Japan. It demonstrated to the world that the Japanese could defeat a major Western power and strengthened their position in the Pacific.

Loss of Morale

The surrender of the Philippines was a significant blow to the morale of the US Army and the American people. It was a reminder that the war would be long and difficult, and that victory was not assured.

Retaliation

The surrender of the Philippines also led to a desire for revenge among many Americans. This desire for retaliation would later fuel the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan.

Overall, the surrender of the Philippines was a significant setback for the Allies in the Pacific Theater of World War II and had far-reaching consequences for the war effort.

US Army Personnel in Philippine Islands: 30 November 1941 Data

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(a) Includes 31 Philippine Scout officers.

(b) According to W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (University of Chicago Press, 1948), I, 170, Air Corps strength on 7 December 1941 was 754 officers, 6,706 men.

(c) Includes officers for whom no unit is indicated.

Source: Watson, Mark Skinner. “Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations.” Page 449, Table 3, Center of Military History, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 50-62983, First Printed 1950-CMH Pub 1-1, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/csppp/ch13.htm#t1

Other Manpower Data Links

Comparative Military Manpower Sept 1939

Military Manpower by Nation 1940 to 1945

US Military Manpower 1939 – 1945

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