Soviet radio communications between military units, tanks, frontlines, headquarters, aircraft, etc. had been around for over a solid decade but its implementation was a mishmash. Aircraft radio set availability was commonplace whereas at the beginning of the war Soviet tanks may have had or may not have had radio communications capability.
Note 1: Availability does not equal number produced during the year. How to calculate: Number available on Jan1 of a given year = number available on Jan 1 of the preceding year + number received in the preceding year – number loss in the preceding year. See either ‘Data” or ‘Transposed Data” downloads below for actual data.
Note 2: 1941 availability numbers are as of the eve of the German invasion, June 22, 1941. All other availability numbers were as of January 1 of each of the following years.
Radio Usage
Tank Radios
Communications at the fighting level contrasted significantly between the Soviets and Germans. For example, the German Panzer IV was a medium tank first introduced in 1937. The Panzer IV had a crew of five which included the commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator. In contrast the Soviet T-34 had a crew of four and radios were a rarity in Soviet tanks early in the war. Initially only the unit commander’s tank had a radio. During the war radio became more widely but even in 1944 many tanks lacked a radio set.
Radios initially were reserved for the commander’s tank which communicated with their local headquarters receiving and transmitting. Flag communications or a follow the leader approach was often utilized. German tank communications could occur between individual tanks allowing a more coordinated effort at the platoon level. Radios were not installed in early T-34 due to short supply, expense, and lack of internal space.
Germany often would utilize captured equipment and the Soviet tanks were no exception, however Germany would retrofit radios into the captured tanks in order to meet their operational level requirements.
Radio Traffic Analysis
“The vastness of European Russia, its dearth of good roads, the great distances which had to be traversed, the lack of high-capacity long-distance commercial teletype circuits, as well as the shortage of military telephone apparatus and cables, compelled the Soviet Army to make a far greater use or radio communication than was necessary in the armies of the highly industrialized Western countries.” (1)
(1) Praun, Albert, General der Nachrichtentrupp (Lieutenant General), MS No P-038, “German Radio Intelligence”, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief Of Military History, March 1950, Pages 86-87, https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/friedman-documents/publications/FOLDER_240/41748999078819.pdf, Accessed March 18, 2023.
The vastness of European Russia combined with severe radio operator losses early in the war resulted in replacement operators using simple, conventional call signs enabling German counter radio intelligence to identify quickly the stations of a given net. In some respects, the Soviet radio capability grew and evolved during the war. First with improved cryptography for headquarter and higher echelon communications. However, improved field level radio communications lagged significantly due to poorly trained personnel.
Radio-Controlled Mines
The Soviet Union was the first country to develop, 1941, and deploy, 1942, radio-controlled mines. By the time of the Battle of Kursk both the Soviet Union and Germany were using radio-controlled mines as part of their anti-tank defenses. The battle, which took place from July to August 1943, was the largest tank battles in history and involved hundreds of thousands of troops and tanks. The Soviet Union used radio-controlled mines as part of its anti-tank defenses, particularly in the defensive belts that were set up to slow down and disrupt the German armored offensives.
Radio Usage Philosophical Differences
The Soviet Union and Germany used their military radios in different ways. The Soviet Union used its radios primarily for communication between units and for receiving and transmitting orders. Germany, on the other hand, used its radios for a wider range of purposes, including aerial reconnaissance, weather reports, and coordination between units in the field.
Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Chart Data
The above graph can be downloaded as an image.
To download the data shown below from which the graph was developed click on the icon below corresponding to you desired format. Note: to ensure all data is downloaded choose the ‘All’ selection in the Show Entries dropdown list. Otherwise only the data visible on the screen will download.
Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev
Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Data
Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258 (selected data), Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev
Soviet Radio Sets Availability 1941-45 Transposed Data Format
Source: “Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century”, Greenhill Books, London, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1997, Table 95 Section VII Radio Sets, Page 258, Edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev
Other Soviet Availability Data
Soviet Light Arms Availability 1941-45
Soviet Armored Vehicles Availability 1941-45
Soviet Artillery Availability 1941-45
Soviet Military Aircraft Availability 1941-45
Soviet Naval Vessel Availability 1941-45
Soviet Motor Vehicle Availability 1941-45
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